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This dissertation is consist of three empirical studies in economics. The first part empirically examines the effect of universal pre-k on labor force participation of fertility age
women in Oklahoma. I investigate the policy effect from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives. I apply the synthetic control method (SCM) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) data to identify the causal relationship between universal pre-k and female labor
outcomes. I find that universal pre-k increases labor supply of women aged 25 to 45 in
Oklahoma. The second empirical study focuses on how the birth outcomes of US children
respond to exposure to Chinese import competition. Exploring the variation in US trade
exposure driven by China’s supply-side productivity changes and falling in trade costs, I
find evidence that the rise of Chinese exports to US is not harmful to newborn health and
infant mortality; instead, empirical evidence shows that the percentage of low birth weight
infants in US counties is largely reduced by the increase in US-China trade volume. In the
last chapter, I develop a nonparametric partial identification approach to bound transition
probabilities under various assumptions on the measurement error and mobility processes.
This approach is applied to panel data from the United States to explore short-run mobility
before and after the Great Recession.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN POLICY ON FEMALE
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION — A SYNTHETIC CONTROL APPROACH

1.1. Introduction
In an effort to increase the human capital development of children, universal pre-kindergarten
(pre-k) has become an increasingly popular policy response. While a substantial literature
shows that universal pre-k improves child outcomes (Gormley and Gayer, 2005; Berlinski et
al., 2009; Drange and Telle, 2015; Chor, Andresen and Kalil, 2016; Herbst, 2017), there is
little analysis of the policy’s causal impacts on other household members. A well-known fact
is that time-consuming home child care and costly day care are barriers to maternal labor
force participation. Cohany and Sok (2007) show that the labor force participation rate of
married women with young children declined during a time of increase in the overall female
labor force participation rate. High-quality child care can provide young children a good
start in education while allowing their parents to work through an increase of pre-k enrollment rate. It thus potentially breaks the cycle of intergenerational poverty and improves
welfare for two generations simultaneously. Understanding the effects of universal pre-k on
maternal labor market participation is also essential to uncover the potential mechanisms
through which universal pre-k affects child outcomes. There might be a secondary effect of
universal pre-k on child outcomes through the increase of maternal labor supply, resulting in
an increase in total household income and parental investment in their children. Therefore,
the study of causal relationship between universal pre-k and maternal labor supply is vital
for complete welfare analysis of pre-k programs.
In this paper, I examine the impact of universal pre-k on maternal labor market behavior.
This paper focuses on the high quality universal pre-k in Oklahoma as a case study. The
expansion of universal pre-k should not only focus on the free assess to child care, but also
on the quality of child care offered. However, the quality of universal pre-k programs is
1

implicit and thus difficult to quantify. However, the pre-k program of Oklahoma is generally
considered to be a high quality program because of its government mandated small classroom
size and highly educated teachers.1 To further investigate the quality effect of universal prek, I compare the empirical results to Georgia where the program is typically considered to
be of relatively lower quality.
To show the importance of pre-k program quality, I first propose a theoretical model to
investigate how quality and price changes affect maternal labor outcomes. The static labor
supply model suggests that price reduction and quality improvement both increase maternal
labor force participation at the extensive margin. While quality improvement unambiguously
increases mothers’ hours of work, the policy effect along the intensive margin is ambiguous
due to opposing income and substitution effects. The empirical study investigates the effects
of universal pre-k on both extensive and intensive margin, including labor force participation
rate, employment rate, the percentage change in full-time job participation and working
hours.
The contribution of this paper is to use the synthetic control method (SCM) to examine
the causal impact of universal pre-k on multiple labor outcomes of potential mothers. The
major challenge in analyzing causal-relationship between universal pre-k and maternal labor
force participation is to construct a credible counterfactual. This paper employs the SCM to
construct a well-fitted control group. Before this paper, three identification strategies have
been applied to link the expansion of child care programs to labor supply of mothers: an
instrumental variable approach (Gelbach, 2002), a regression discontinuity approach (Fitzpatrick, 2010) and a difference-in-differences approach (Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2013).
The most commonly used empirical method in the universal pre-k literature is the
difference-in-differences (DID) method. Comparing to DID, which constructs a control group
with equally weighted untreated, the SCM is advantageous because it allows for the construction of a linear combination of unaffected states that minimizes the distance between
Oklahoma and its synthetic control group in terms of observed pre-intervention characteristics. I find that the synthetic control group has a seemingly better fit than the equally
weighted control group. Moreover, since Oklahoma is a small US state with more noisy
1

Section 1.2 briefly introduces the history and major characteristics of Oklahoma universal pre-k.

2

data than larger US states, using the traditional SCM developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) does not provide a good counterfactual for Oklahoma.
Doudchenko and Imbens (2017) suggest that allowing for negative weights may well improve
the out-of-sample prediction. Therefore, I improve the SCM by allowing for negative weights
on the unaffected units in the donor pool. I also include all lags of the dependent variables
as control variables in the regression procedure to emphasize the importance of lags. In
this setting, the improved SCM produces a much better counterfactual than the traditional
SCM. Another advantage of the SCM is that the estimation results show the deviation between Oklahoma and “Synthetic Oklahoma” in each post-intervention year, thus providing
a dynamic view of the treatment effect.
The empirical analysis uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1980 to 2007.
Oklahoma’s universal pre-k program begun in 1998. The results of this paper are as follows.
Oklahoma universal pre-k increases the labor force participation rate, employment rate, and
working hours of women of childbearing age. However, universal pre-k has little effect on
full-time labor force participation of women of childbearing age. I also stratify the sample
of potential mothers by four socioeconomic characteristics—education level, marital status,
poverty status and numbers of children in the household. I find that married mothers, mothers with lower than high school and higher than college education, and mothers with no more
than two children are more likely to increase their labor supply after the implementation of
the universal pre-k policy. These findings suggest that a high-quality universal pre-k impacts
on the labor market decisions of mothers from disadvantaged as well as non-disadvantaged
backgrounds. The synthetic control analysis yields no effect of the 1998 Oklahoma universal pre-k policy on labor outcomes of mothers with younger than 5 years old children and
mothers with 4-year-olds only. My finding shows that pre-k has positive effects on labor
supply for all women of fertility age, but insignificant effects when focusing only on mothers with younger children. It suggests that women may be more inclined to work before
having children since they expect to continue to work after having kids, but end up with
staying at home once they actually have kids. The empirical analysis on Georgia universal
pre-k presents no evidence of significant effects of Georgia universal pre-k on maternal labor
outcomes. It is possible that the difference between the effects of Oklahoma and Georgia
3

universal pre-k is caused by quality variation of universal pre-k programs.
Broadly previous studies on the relationship between child care and maternal labor supply
can be classified into two categories. The first strand of literature examines the labor supply
elasticity of market prices of child care. Anderson and Levine (1999) find that the response of
the female labor force participation rate to the price of child care is decreasing in education
levels for women with children under age 13. Connelly and Kimmel (2003) find a significant
negative effect of child care price on the employment of single mothers. Lundin et al. (2008)
show that the maternal labor supply did not respond to a child care reform in Sweden which
set a cap on the price of child care. Another strand of literature studies the labor market
effects of child care policies, including child care subsidies and pre-kindergarten programs.
Michalopoulos et al. (1992) show that a refundable child care tax credit would increase the
labor supply of mothers. Tekin (2005) shows that single mothers are highly responsive to
child care subsidies by increasing their employment while moving away from parental and
relative care toward center care in the process. Blau and Tekin (2007) find that the subsidy
recipients were about 13 percentage points more likely to be employed than nonrecipients.
Since the emergence of nationwide and statewide universal pre-k programs, there has
been an increasing interest in the estimation of the effects of universal pre-k on maternal
labor market decisions. The empirical evidence from non-US countries generally indicates a
remarkable increase of maternal labor supply with a nationwide expansion to universal prek. Schlosser (2005) finds that introducing free public preschool to 3- or 4-year-old children
in Israel increased the labor supply of mothers by about seven percentage points. Goux
and Maurin (2010) also find that early school availability to 2- and 3-year-old children in
France had a significant employment effect on single mothers. Baker et al. (2008) show
that the labor supply of married women rose about 14.5 percent with the highly subsidized
and universally accessible child care program, “$5 per day child care” in Quebec, Canada.
Simonsen (2010) shows that a price increase of 1 euro per month decreases employment by
0.08%, which corresponds to a price elasticity of -0.17 using Danish data. Koebel and Schirle
(2016) show that the Canadian Universal Child Care Benefit has significant negative effects
on the labor supply of legally married mothers but positively affects the labor supply of
single mothers.
4

The US evidence, however, shows mixed results. Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013) find
that universal pre-k programs had a positive impact on the employment rate of less educated
mothers with 4-year-olds only. Fitzpatrick (2010) shows that the universal pre-k increased
pre-k enrollment by 12 to 15 percent, but had no robust impact on maternal labor supply,
she also finds increased labor supply in rural families. Fitzpatrick (2010) uses the regression
discontinuity (RD) method to address the causal relationship. This method, however requires
information on birth months of Oklahoma children and the sample size is much smaller than
Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013). Herbst (2017) finds that maternal employment increased
substantially after the US Lanham Act of 1940, a heavily subsidized and universal childcare
program during World War II.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the background of
US pre-k programs and the Oklahoma universal pre-k policy. Section 1.3 provides a static
labor supply model to examine how price and quality changes affect the consumption of
market child care and the maternal labor supply. Section 1.4 describes the data used for this
analysis. In section 1.5, I describe the synthetic control method. Section 1.6 presents and
discusses the results from the synthetic control analysis. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2. Background on US Pre-kindergarten Education Programs and Oklahoma
Universal Pre-k
Since the President’s 2013 State of the Union address, 34 states have increased funding
for their preschool programs, amounting to over $1 billion in new state resources dedicated to
early education.2 Nowadays, expanding access and improving the quality of pre-k programs
become major concerns of policymakers in early education. Before the universal pre-k, several
federal and statewide pre-k programs have been established to help children from low-income
families. Since 1935, the federal government has supported early care and education for poor
children to promote their healthy development and give them a better chance to succeed.
But the improvement in early education of the past 80 years is slow due to “a haphazard array
of uncoordinated programs, shaped by outdated science and entrenched political interests,
2

White House Website, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/13/fact-sheet-presidentobama-s-plan-early-education-all-americans
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and long driven by addressing unintended consequences of previous policies rather than core
goals”.3
The federal government now funds dozens of small programs providing services to children from birth through age five, but the preponderance of federal funds—$17.2 billion—is
spent on three major programs: Head Start at $9.2 billion, the Child Care Development
Fund (CCDF) at $5.4 billion, and child care expenditures from Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) at $2.6 billion annually.4 All three programs fund poor children’s
participation in early care and education. Since those early child care programs are almost
all highly targeted on poor families, nowadays, policymakers and economists are interested
in expanding traditional public pre-k to a universal level, so that every pre-k age child (3or 4-years-old) would have access to free public pre-k.
In the state level, several states have been on the path to funding universal pre-k during
the past two decades. Georgia first established a universal pre-k program in 1995, followed
by Oklahoma in 1998, Florida in 2005 and then Illinois in 2006. California and New York
also started to establish universal pre-k in the 1990s, but it has not yet been implemented
statewide due to budget and political issues. In 2014, of the 41 states with state-funded
pre-k programs (including the District of Columbia), only nine served more than half of all
4-year-olds statewide, and eleven states served less than ten percent of all 4-year-old children.
Only three states—Georgia, Oklahoma and Florida—are believed to “truly” have universal
pre-k programs in terms of their pre-k enrollment rates.5
The Oklahoma universal pre-k program is in high quality and is believed to be a successful
example. In the spring of 1998, House member Joe Eddins and state senator Penny Williams
secured approval to amend the school formula so that four-year-olds would be included in the
school funding formula. Since 1998, Oklahoma has provided universal access to public prekindergarten. Children in Oklahoma who turn 4 years old on or before September 1st are
eligible for the public pre-kindergarten program. The Oklahoma universal pre-k program
3
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Sara Mead, The Building Blocks of Success, June 26, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledgebank/2015/06/26/setting-the-record-straight-on-state-pre-k-programs
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offers two options: full day or half day, both of which provide high standard curriculum
for young children. With 74 percent of all 4-year-olds enrolled in pre-k programs in 2014,
Oklahoma maintains a high enrollment rate.
Besides the free access for every pre-k age child and the high enrollment rate, the quality
of Oklahoma universal pre-k is also a remarkable feature. This is primarily based on the
high quality of teachers and the small group size. All teachers must have college degrees and
certificates in early childhood education and receive the same compensation as teachers in
public elementary schools. In regard to the classes, the group size is set to not exceed 20 and
the maximum child to staff ratio is set at 10 to 1.6 Additionally, National Institute for Early
Education (NIEER) reports that the Oklahoma universal pre-k has a generous expenditure
of almost $7,427 per child, while the spending per child in Georgia is $3,490 and the average
annual pre-k expenditure per child in the US is no more than $5,000.
1.3. The Model
In this section, I present a static labor supply model to investigate how the price and
quality changes of a pre-k program affect maternal labor market decisions. Assume a mother
can always find a job and her working hours are perfectly flexible, the utility maximization
problem is given by
max U (X, Q, L)
X,H

(1.1)

s.t. X + Pm H = W H + Y

(1.2)

H +L=T

(1.3)

Q=

H
T −H
Qm +
Qh
T
T

(1.4)

In this setup, a mother’s utility U (X, Q, L) is derived from three sources: consumption
of numeraire good X, average quality of child care Q, which is defined as the time weighted
average of the market child care (day care) and the home child care following Michalopoulos
et al. (1992), and leisure time L = T − H, where T is the time endowment and H is number
6

Oklahoma State Department of Education, http://sde.ok.gov/sde/early-childhood-and-family-education
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of hours worked per day.
Equation (1.2) is the budget constraint. W is the hourly wage rate of working mothers
and Pm is the price of the market pre-k per hour. Assume that the utility of other family
members is exogenous to the utility function of mothers. I also take the income of other
family members as part of mother’s exogenous non-labor income Y . Further, I assume that
working mothers have to purchase market pre-k or participate in a public pre-k program
during their work time, i.e., no one else in the family will take care of their children when
the mothers are at work. Rewrite equation (1.2), we have

X = (W − Pm )H + Y = W̃ H + Y

(1.5)

where W̃ is the hourly wage rate net of market pre-k cost.
Equation (1.3) is the time constraint. Assume that mothers spend all their leisure time
on child care at home, so that the time spent on home child care is T − H. Then the average
quality is given by Equation (1.4), where Qm is the quality of market child care and Qh is the
home child care quality provided by mothers. Finally, assume no market child care is better
in quality than home child care provided by mothers, such that Qm = αQh and 0 < α < 1.
Therefore, we can rewrite equation (1.4) as
H
T −H
αQh +
Qh
T
T
H
= [1 − (1 − α) ]Qh
T

Q=

(1.6)

We can observe that mothers are affected by the universal pre-k policy through price and
quality changes on both the extensive and the intensive margins.
The working decision of a mother at the extensive margin depends on whether the utility
from working exceeds the utility from staying at home and taking care of her child (children).
Let D denote the working decision of the mother. For the working decisions of mothers on
the extensive margin, D = 1 denotes a mother chooses to work and D = 0 demotes the
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mother chooses to stay at home. Therefore we have,

D=



1 if U |H=H ∗ >0,X=X ∗ ,Q=Q∗ −U |H=0,X=Y,Q=Q > 0
h

0 otherwise

where U |H=0,X=Y,Q=Qh is the non-working utility and H ∗ , X ∗ and Q∗ are the utility-maximizing
values of each variable conditional on working.
Similarly, for the working decisions of mothers on the intensive margin, D = 1 denotes a
mother chooses to work more hours and D = 0 demotes the mother chooses to work as long
as before the policy implementation. Therefore we have,

D=



1 if U |H=H ∗ =H 0 +,X=X ∗ ,Q=Q∗ −U |H=H 0 ,X=Y,Q=Q > 0
h

0 otherwise

where U |H=H 0 ,X=Y,Q=Qh , U |H=H ∗ =H 0 +,X=X ∗ ,Q=Q∗ are the working utilities before and after
the universal pre-k policy and  is a positive number of working hours.
The threshold of entering the labor market is quantified by a reservation wage. Equation
(1.2) and (1.5) indicate that the price of market pre-k Pm affects a mother’s working decision
through the net wage W̃ . When the implementation of universal pre-k leads to a price
reduction, the net wage W̃ increases and it is more likely to exceed the mother’s reservation
wage. Either W̃ is higher than the reservation wage and mothers shift from staying at home
to working, or W̃ is still below the reservation wage and mothers remain at home.
Besides the large price reduction, quality improvement of a pre-k program would also
have an impact on mother’s working decisions. Equation (1.4) suggests that the quality of
market pre-k Qm affects a mother’s utility function through the allocation of working hours
and leisure. For a given market pre-k price, when the quality of market pre-k or public pre-k
improves, the parameter α in equation (1.6) increases, so that the utility loss from lowerquality child care is smaller and the gap between mothers’ net wage and reservation wage
decreases. Hence, for the extensive margin, quality improvement increases the likelihood of
working.
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However, for working mothers, a rise in the net wage W̃ is well known to have a theoretically ambiguous effect on working hours due to the trade-off between the negative income
effect and positive substitution effect. For the effect of quality improvement, as α increases,
the average quality of childcare Q is higher, the marginal utility from home child care decreases, and mothers will allocate less time to home child care and correspondingly allocate
more time to work. Thus, quality improvement increases mothers’ working hours.
In summary, universal pre-k should unambiguously increase the maternal labor force
participation rate, especially when the program is in high quality. However, the model does
not make a decisive prediction on mothers’ working hours, although the effect is more likely
to be positive when the program quality is higher.
1.4. Empirical Strategy
The empirical method employed in this paper is the synthetic control approach, first
introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and developed by Abadie et al. (2010).
The SCM allows for estimation in settings where a single unit is exposed to an event. It
provides a data-driven procedure to construct a synthetic control unit that approximates the
characteristics of the treated unit. In this section, I will briefly introduce the SCM used to
analyze the effect of the 1998 Oklahoma universal pre-k on female labor market decisions.
Suppose we observe S + 1 states, one of which is our treated state, Oklahoma, which we
call state 1. Let YitN denote the outcomes of interest that would be observed for state i at
time t in the absence of the intervention, where i = 1, . . . , S + 1, t = 1, . . . , T . Let T0 be
the number of pre-intervention periods and 1 ≤ T0 < T . Let YitI be the outcome that would
be observed for state i at year t if state i is exposed to the universal pre-k policy in period
T0 + 1 to T . Two assumptions are needed for the synthetic control method.
Assumption 1: No anticipation effects
The intervention has no effect on the outcomes before the implementation period t ∈
{1, . . . T0 }. Under Assumption 1, for t ∈ {1, . . . T0 } and all i ∈ {1, . . . S + 1}, we have
YitN = YitI .
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Assumption 2: No interference on untreated units
There is no interference between treated and untreated states, the outcomes of the untreated states are not affected by the intervention implemented in the treatment state.
This estimated treatment effect is α1t = Y1tI − Y1tN . Since Y1tN is unobserved, we need to
estimate the counterfactual Y1tN with the following factor model
Y1tN = δt + θt Z1 + λt µ1 + ε1t

(1.7)

where δ1 is an unknown state fixed effect, Z1 is a (r × 1) vector of observed covariates
(not affected by the intervention), θt is a (1 × r) vector of unknown parameters, λt =
(λt1 , λt2 , . . . , λtF ) is a (1 × F ) vector of unobserved time fixed effect for t = 1, . . . F , µ1 =
(µ11 , µ12 , . . . µ1F ) is an (F × 1) vector of unobserved factor loading for the treated state
Oklahoma, and the error terms εit are unobserved transitory shocks at the state level with
zero mean. Note that we will obtain the difference-in-differences (fixed effect) model from
equation (1.7) if λt is constant over time.
The synthetic control group is obtained by assigning weights ω = (ω2 , ..., ωS+1 ) to each
untreated unit in the donor pool. The value of the outcome variable for each synthetic control
PS+1
PS+1
PS+1
P
ω
µ
+
ω
Z
+
λ
ω
Y
=
δ
+
θ
indexed by ω is S+1
s
s
s
s
t
s
st
t
t
s=2 ωs εst . The optimal
s=2
s=2
s=2
weight vector ω ∗ is the one that minimizes the distance between the pre-intervention observed
characteristic vector Xi of the treated state and the selected control group, ||X1 − X0 W ||,
where Xi includes both covariates Zi and outcome variables Yi , X1 is the pre-intervention
observed characteristics of the treated unit and the X0 is the same observed variable set of
the untreated states.7
Abadie et al. (2010) impose three restrictions in analyzing the effect of California’s
tobacco control program—no intercept, the sum of weights add up to 1, and all weights are
non-negative. In this paper, to obtain a better counterfactual for the treated state, I relax
the non-negativity assumption (ωs ≥ 0, s = 2, 3, ..., n + 1). Doudchenko and Imbens (2017)
claim that allowing for negative weights may well improve the out-of-sample prediction.
First, allowing for weights on the observed characteristics of the untreated unites may be
7

See details on optimal weight vector selection on Abadie et al. (2010)
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able to better fit those of the treated unit. Doudchenko and Imbens (2017) show an example
when there is one treated state and two control states and the key characteristic is the share
of young people. If the share of young people in the treated state is 2/3, and the shares of
the control states are 1/2 and 1/3, assigning weights 2 and -1 respectively to the two control
states can produce the identical share of young people to the treated states. The second
reason is negative weights can help with bias-reduction as the bias goes to zero in a faster
rate in settings with many covariates to be matched on.8 I still keep the no intercept and sum
up to 1 restrictions in the minimization procedure because imposing these two restrictions
helps produce a unique weight matrix, though Doudchenko and Imbens (2017) claims no
restrictions are necessary for the SCM. The intuition behind the negative weights is that the
control group is constructed by some virtual states, which have characteristics opposite to
some real US states.
For inference, Abadie et al. (2010) suggest using placebo tests to measure the significance
of estimates. The basic idea behind the placebo tests is to apply the synthetic control method
to all the control units in the donor pool as if they were also exposed to the universal prek policy and test whether the treated unit behaves in a significantly different way from
unexposed units. Under the null hypothesis that policy intervention has no impact on the
treated unit, the estimate for the treated unit is expected to lie within the distribution of the
placebo estimates. I also apply the pre/post rooted mean squared prediction error (RMSPE)
ratio test to measure the significance of treatment effects. The pre/post RMSPE ratio test
is an extension of the placebo tests, it measures the closeness between the observed variables
of the treated unit and the synthetic control group before and after the policy intervention.
Therefore, we can compare the pre/post RMSPE ratio of the treated unit to that of the
untreated unit to examine whether there is a relative larger increase in post RMSPE.
1.5. Data
The primary data set is the March Current Population Survey (CPS), which provides
detailed labor statistics and demographic characteristics for individuals and households in
the US annually. The entire study period is from 1980 to 2007 to cover a long enough pre8

See Abadie and Imbens (2011).
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intervention period before the intervention year 1998 and the sample ends in 2007 to avoid
the effect of the financial crisis and more recent expansion of pre-k in other states. Since the
enrollment of Oklahoma universal pre-k starts at the end of February each year, in case the
labor outcomes of women in Oklahoma is immediately affected by the new policy in 1998,
the post-intervention period is set to start from 1998.
Female (25-45)
Before 1998

After 1998

Labor force participation rate

0.71

0.74

Working hours

28.67

28.94

Family total income

32716.80

55539.84

Mother’s age: 25-30

0.25

0.21

Mother’s age: 30-35

0.24

0.23

Mother’s age: 35-40

0.25

0.25

Mother’s age: 40-45

0.26

0.31

Mother’s education level: below high school

0.11

0.10

High school graduates

0.40

0.34

College graduates

0.44

0.50

Above college degree

0.05

0.06

White

0.86

0.76

Black

0.07

0.09

Other race

0.07

0.15

Family size

3.45

3.45

Food Stamp Recipients

0.10

0.10

Children enrolled in free lunch program

0.35

0.43

Below poverty line

0.14

0.14

Number of observations

6060

3331

Table 1.1. Demographic and Economic Characteristics Before and After 1998 in Oklahoma
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The major outcomes of interest are labor outcomes of potential mothers (women aged 25
to 45),9 mothers with younger than 5 year olds and mothers with 4 year old children only
after the universal pre-k policy. There are three reasons to focus on the sample of potential
mothers, defined as women between 25 to 45 years old, as the primary sample of interest.
First, the provision of free and high-quality pre-k shortens the duration of utilization of day
care and/or home care, resulting in a higher possibility of females to stay in their current
jobs before their children turn 3 or 4 years old. Therefore, there might be a spillover effect
on mothers whose children is younger than 4 years old. In addition, universal pre-k may also
have an effect on fertility decisions and it will thus affect the labor market outcomes of all
women of childbearing age. Prior studies have shown that the increase of child care subsidies
or the expansion of child care programs would increase fertility rates (Blau and Robins, 1989;
Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2003; Haan and Worhlich, 2011; Bauernschuster et al., 2015).
Third, the sample size of mothers with only 4-year-olds is small in the Current Population
Survey (CPS), especially for a small US state like Oklahoma, and the sample size issue would
be more severe in the study of heterogeneous effects by subgroups.
The labor outcomes includes labor force participation rate, percentage change of fulltime labor force participation, hours-of-work for working mothers and employment rate.
The major labor outcomes following the model in Section 1.3 are labor force participation
rate as the outcome on the extensive margin and working hours as the outcomes on the
intensive margin. Universal pre-k is expected to increase the likelihood that a mother is
employed since mothers who have free full-time child care options are better able to work.
Employment is also restricted by job availability though. It is possible that mothers who
are willing to work cannot find jobs, especially after years of unemployment. Therefore, the
empirical analysis is needed to investigate the effect on employment rate. The percentage
change in full-time working mothers, defined as the ratio of full-time working mothers to the
whole working sample of mothers, is a proxy of change in job type. When a high-quality
universal pre-k policy is implemented, the marginal rate of substitution between the utility
9

In Appendix A, I present the synthetic control method analysis on potential mothers in different age
ranges, including women aged 25-35, 25-40, 20-45, 25-50, the results are robust for slightly narrowing or
expanding age groups, I choose women aged 25 to 45 mainly because this group is the commonly used
sample of fertility age women.
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of working and home child care is smaller and thus working mothers are more likely to switch
from part-time jobs to full-time jobs. Unlike the change of working hours, percentage change
in full-time working females could also indicate a change in type of jobs.
The CPS defines an individual to be ‘in the labor force’ if she is employed or unemployed,
so that those who are at school, retired and staying at home are not in the labor force. The
employment rate is the ratio of those who are employed to the population of females in
the labor force. The ‘working hours’ variable in this paper is defined as how many hours
an individual work (not including zero) the week before the survey and percentage of fulltime labor force participation is directly from the indicator variable of full-time or part-time
employment. The studied outcomes of interest are state level labor statistics obtained from
aggregating the individual level data in CPS.
Since the dependent variables are state level labor outcomes and the universal pre-k
policy takes place at the state level, it is convenient to estimate the effect in aggregate
level. Meanwhile, the synthetic control method is good for the comparative case study in
aggregate entities or administrative areas. Thus I use the individual CPS data to form state
level controls such as the fraction of population by race and education level. CPS personal
sample weights are used in the data aggregation. The sample size of the women aged 25 to
45 in the CPS is 1,478,181 for all states from 1980 to 2007. The state level data used for
the synthetic analysis has a sample size of 1,428, which comes from the multiplication of the
number of states and districts in the CPS (51) and the number of study years (28). The
corresponding set of explanatory variables {Zi } consists of demographic characteristics such
as age, race and economic characteristics including total family income, personal income,
family size and spouse’s working hours.10 To capture state level shocks to female labor
outcomes and to better construct the synthetic control group, I also take the labor outcomes
of women aged 45 to 60 as an additional control variable. In addition, I add state gross
domestic product (GDP) into the set of explanatory variables {Zi }, obtained from another
data source—Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA). The CPS data also shows high serial
correlations in female labor outcomes. For example, the correlation between the female
labor force participation rate and its one-year lagged variable is as high as .8877. To deal
10

The full set of the explanatory variables is listed in Appendix B.
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with this issue, I take the lags of outcome variables in each pre-intervention period into the
control variable set. Therefore, lags of dependent variables are given more importance in the
synthetic control analysis relative to other controls in {Zi } .
Table 1.1 summarizes the individual level data to show the before and after differences
in the demographic and economic characteristics in Oklahoma. There are a number of
things that are worth pointing out from the table. First, the statistics show that the labor
force participation rate increased after 1998, but working hours seemed to remain the same.
Second, family total income rose dramatically from about 32k to 55k on average.11 Table
1.1 also indicates that a larger percentage of females are pursuing higher level of education.
Next, as expected, the demographic characteristics in the summary statistics were stable
over time; whereas only the racial composition had a notable change. Finally, although the
number of free lunch recipients increased after 1998, the fractions of food stamp recipients
and households below the poverty line did not change much in Oklahoma.
Table 1.2 summarizes the state level statistics for Oklahoma and the rest of US before
and after 1998. It suggests that, compared to the rest of US states, women aged 25 to 45
in Oklahoma were less likely to participate in the labor market and worked fewer hours per
week. The GDP difference shows that the economy of Oklahoma was below the average level
of other US states. Hence, it should not be surprising that the labor force participation rate
of Oklahoma was lower than average. Table 1.2 also shows that Oklahoma had a higher
fraction of lower-educated women, food stamp and free lunch recipients, and high-poverty
households. As for the racial composition, Oklahoma had more non-whites than other states.
Ultimately, when controlling for time difference, the summary statistics in Table 1.2 appear
to show a non-substantial change in the labor force participation rate of fertility age women
in Oklahoma relative to the simple average of the rest of US.

11
In the CPS data, the family income is not adjusted by CPI, for reference, $32k in 1990 is about $42k in
2000.
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1.6. Empirical Estimates

1.6.1. Main Results
Now I estimate the impact of the 1998 universal pre-k policy on Oklahoma female labor
force participation. The main results presented below investigate the labor outcomes of
childbearing age women (women aged 25-45) and mothers with young children. In this
section, I first present the effects of universal pre-k on the labor force participation rate of
fertility age women to further illustrate the empirical strategy. Then I show the estimation
effects on three other labor outcomes of potential mothers in Oklahoma—percentage of fulltime labor force participation, average weekly working hours and employment rate. Lastly,
I repeat the empirical analysis on mothers with younger than 5-years-olds and mothers with
4-year-olds only to compare with previous evidence.

Notes: The graph presents the labor force participation rate each year. The solid black line stands
for the trend of labor force participation rate of Oklahoma and the dash line represents the trend
of labor force participation rate of the rest of US states in average from 1980 to 2007 excluding
Georgia, who had established universal pre-k policy in 1995.

Figure 1.1. Maternal Labor Force Participation Rate—Oklahoma vs. the Rest of US States
(excluding Georgia)
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Before applying the synthetic control method, Figure 1.1 plots the labor force participation rates of potential mothers in Oklahoma compared to a naive control constructed by
assigning equal weights to all unaffected US states. Note that before 1990, the naive control
group appears to be a good control, however, after 1990 and up to 1998, there is a significant
gap. Therefore, using equally weighted untreated US states would not be a good strategy to
investigate the policy of interest.

Note: The vertical dash line indicates the policy intervention year 1998, the starting date of the
universal pre-k policy was September 1st, 1998. I treat 1998 as the first year of post-intervention
period, the results are robust if 1998 is taken as a pre-intervention year.

Figure 1.2. Maternal Labor Force Participation Rate (25-45 sample)—Oklahoma vs. Synthetic Oklahoma (Traditional SCM)

Figure 1.2 presents the synthetic control without allowing for negative weights on the
untreated units. Comparing to the simple average control in Figure 1.1, which is normally
used in the difference-in-differences approach, the traditional SCM provides a better counterfactual in the pre-intervention (pre-1998) period. The better fit from employing the SCM
is due to the fact that the SCM does not assume equal weight to each untreated unit in the
control group and it takes the lags of outcome variables in minimizing the distance between
the observed characteristics of treatment and control. Except for the period 1992 to 1994,
labor force participation rates of the synthetic control group in most years before 1998 were
generally close to labor force participation rates of Oklahoma. The huge drop in labor force
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participation rate may result from measurement error and small sample bias. In that case,
the low labor force participation rate in 1993 in Oklahoma bring noise to the data analysis.
Another possible explanation for this big drop is that the oil price crisis in the early 1990s
had a stronger effect on Oklahoma’s economy. Historical statistics show that in each oil
price decline (defined as inflation-adjusted oil prices falling nearly continually by more than
30 percent and more than $20 a barrel), the employment rate in the oil and gas sector in
Oklahoma alone decreased by at least seven percent.12

Note: Same as Figure 1.2

Figure 1.3. Maternal Labor Force Participation Rate (25-45 sample)—Oklahoma vs. Synthetic Oklahoma (SCM allowing for negative weights)

In order to obtain a better counterfactual, I allow for negative weights in constructing
the control group and add labor force participation rates from 1980 to 1997 into the control
variable set to emphasize on the strong correlation between the outcome variable and its
lags. Though allowing for negative weights in the synthetic control method may require
more extrapolation from the data, it works better in pre-trend fitting for Oklahoma. Figure
1.3 shows the results. It obviously shows that the synthetic control with negative weights
and more importance on the outcome variables provides a better counterfactual than the
12

Chad Wilkerson, “How will Oklahoma be affected be decline of oil price?”, March 11, 2015. Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Denver, Oklahoma City, Omaha.
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traditional synthetic control. Figure 1.3 suggests that the labor force participation rates of
potential mothers in Oklahoma are higher than the labor force participation rates of potential
mothers in the synthetic control group in the post-intervention period.
Table 1.3 provides the weights of each state used to construct the “Synthetic Oklahoma”.
A state will be assigned zero weight if it is not chosen to construct the synthetic control
group. Note that Georgia is eliminated from the donor pool of the unaffected states, hence
the synthetic control group is ensured to be untreated before the policy intervention year
1998.

Note: All lines represent the distribution of estimated gaps between the treated unit and nonintervened control states. The black line stands for the estimated gaps of Oklahoma and the
estimated gaps of the placebos are indicated by grey lines.

Figure 1.4. Placebo Tests on Synthetic Control Results of Oklahoma

Figure 1.3 shows that the trend in female labor force participation rate of “Synthetic
Oklahoma” well-matches that of Oklahoma in the pre-intervention period. Table 1.4 further
displays the closeness of the observable characteristics between Oklahoma and “Synthetic
Oklahoma”, these variables are used to construct the synthetic control. I also list the differences in observable characteristics between Oklahoma and the simple average of unaffected
US states in Table 1.4 for comparison. It shows that the observed charateristics of the
synthetic control group closely match the observed charateristics of Oklahoma.
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Now regarding the post-intervention period, the female labor force participation rate in
Oklahoma shows no break from the pre-intervention period. However, Figure 1.3 suggests
a large distance between the labor force participation rates of Oklahoma and “Synthetic
Oklahoma” after the policy implementation. Moreover, the labor force participation rate of
Oklahoma is larger than that of the synthetic control group in almost every post-intervention
year. Abadie et al. (2010) suggest to use placebo tests to investigate the significance of
empirical results obtained from the SCM. The nature of these tests is to conduct a series of
placebo studies by iteratively applying the SCM to states other than Oklahoma. Figure 1.4
shows the placebo tests of the synthetic control estimation. The lines in Figure 1.4 represent
the distribution of estimated gaps between the treated unit and their synthetic control group
in labor force participation rate. The gap line for Oklahoma is in black and the gap lines for
other states are in grey. As expected, it is found that the estimated gap between Oklahoma
and “Synthetic Oklahoma” generally lies above most of the placebos. Therefore, the placebo
test shows a statistically significant and positive impact of the Oklahoma universal pre-k
policy on the labor force participation rate of women of childbearing age.

Figure 1.5. Pre/post RMSPE Ratio of Female Labor Force Participation Rate by States

Besides the placebo tests, I also apply the pre/post RMSPE ratio test for inference.
The pre/post RMSPE ratio test is an extension of the placebo tests, but using numbers
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rather than a graph to compare the pre-post difference. In the synthetic control method,
the rooted mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) is used to measure the closeness between the observed variables of the treated unit and the synthetic control group, it is deq P
t=T 2
1
fined as
t=0 et , where e = |Xtreated − Xsynth | is the distance between the treated
T
unit and the synthetic control group in the value of variable X. The pre/post RMSPE raq
q P
Pt=T
t=T0 2
1
1
2
e
/
tio
t
t=0
t=T0 +1 et is the relative measure of the pre-intervention and
T0
T −T0 +1
the post-intervention difference in observed characteristics. The pre/post RMSPE ratio of
the treated unit is compared with the ratios of the placebos. A relatively smaller pre/post
RMSPE means the post-intervention difference between the treated unit and the synthetic
control group is larger than pre-intervention difference, thus it is likely to show a significant
treatment effect. Figure 1.5 shows the pre/post RMSPE ratio of labor force participation
rates of all US states. Oklahoma has a small pre/post RMSPE ratio, and the pre/post
RMSPE ratio of Oklahoma is one of the smallest among all 50 US states and the District of
Columbia. It suggests that the difference in the female labor force participation rate between
Oklahoma and the synthetic control group before the implementation of the universal pre-k
policy is smaller than the post-intervention difference. In other words, the treatment effect
relative to pre-intervention difference is large.
Next, I examine the response of other three labor outcomes of women aged 25 to 45
to the universal pre-k policy: percentage change of full-time labor market participation,
employment rate and mean weekly working hours. I first examine the policy effect on the
percentage change of full-time job participation, which indicates not only a change in labor
force participation but also a change in job type. Figure 1.6 shows that the effect of universal
pre-k on the percentage of full-time female workers aged 25 to 45 in Oklahoma is statistically
insignificant. There is no great difference between the full-time job participation rates of
potential mothers in Oklahoma and the synthetic control group after 1998, and the placebo
tests also show the gap in full-time job participation rate of fertility age women in Oklahoma
is generally inside the range of placebos.
Then I examine the effect on hours of work of working mothers. Since the theoretical
model has an ambiguous solution on evaluating the effect of universal pre-k on the intensive
margin, it is especially useful to utilize empirics. The synthetic control estimation in Figure
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Figure 1.6. Synthetic control analysis on Percentage of Full-time Working Women Aged
25-45

1.7 shows that the post-trend of average working hours in Oklahoma is opposite to the posttrend of average working hours in the synthetic control group. The working hours of women
aged 25-45 appear to decrease right after the universal pre-k policy and then increase to be
much higher than the average working hours of the synthetic control group. This suggests
that the universal pre-k increases working hours of women aged 25-45 in the long run.

Figure 1.7. Synthetic control Analysis on Working Hours of Women Aged 25-45

The last labor outcome to analyze is state level employment rate of women aged 25 to
45. Figure 1.8 shows a higher employment rate of potential mothers in Oklahoma than that
in the synthetic control group for most of the post-intervention years. The placebo tests
also suggest the gap between the employment rate in Oklahoma and the synthetic control is
generally large and above zero, but the differences in employment rates of potential mothers
between Oklahoma and the synthetic control group in 2001 and 2006 are not significantly
different from zero.
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Figure 1.8. Synthetic Control Analysis on Employment Rate of Women Aged 25-45

At last, to compare with previous studies, I apply the synthetic control method on mothers with younger than 5 years old children and the direct policy-affected sample—mothers
with 4-year-olds only. In this section, I will only show the effects of universal pre-k on the
labor force participation rate and mean weekly working hours of the two samples, the estimation results of the other two labor outcomes are presented in Appendix D. Figure 1.9
and Figure 1.10 show the effects of universal pre-k on the labor force participation rate and
weekly working hours of mothers with 5 years old children, respectively. Surprisingly, the
results suggest no statistically significant effects of the universal pre-k policy on the extensive
and intensive margin labor outcomes of mothers with younger than 5-year-olds. Figure 1.9
shows that the post-intervention labor force participation rates of mothers in Oklahoma are
higher than the synthetic control group, but the distance is not significantly different from
zero. The labor force participation rate of mothers with younger than 5 years old children
increased in the first two years after the policy implementation and then dropped back to
level almost identical to the synthetic control group. Figure 1.10 shows an increasing posttrend of mean weekly working hours of mothers with younger than 5 years old children in
Oklahoma, however, the synthetic control group also follows an increasing trend close to
Oklahoma. The placebo tests also show that the gap between mean weekly working hours of
mothers with younger than 5 years old children in Oklahoma and its synthetic control group
is not significantly different from zero.
For the sample of mothers with 4 years old children only, first note that sample size
of mothers with 4 years old children is small, especially for small states. Also note that
the study time period of this sample is different from the sample of women of childbearing
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Figure 1.9. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate of Mothers with
Children Younger than 5 Years Old

Figure 1.10. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours of Mothers with Children
Younger than 5 Years Old

age. I match mothers with 4-year-olds using their household ID, which is not available in
IPUMS-CPS prior to 1988. Figure 1.11 presents the synthetic control analysis on the labor
force participation rate of mothers with 4-year-olds only. Except for a large decrease in
2005, the labor force participation rate in Oklahoma is not significantly different from that
of the synthetic control group in the post-trend. This is also confirmed by the placebo tests
in the right panel. In regard to the intensive margin effect, Figure 1.12 shows the weekly
working hours of mothers with only 4 years old children in Oklahoma does not follow a clear
increasing and decreasing pattern. In fact, the mean weekly working hours of mothers with
only 4 years old children in Oklahoma moves up and down cyclically. Therefore, there is
no clear break from the pre-trend, and there is no evidence of significant effect of universal
pre-k on mean weekly working hours of mothers with 4-year-olds only. Thus, different
from previous literature, this paper suggests that the effect of universal pre-k on the labor
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outcomes of the policy-targeted sample is statistically insignificant.

Figure 1.11. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate of Mothers with
4-year-olds Only

Figure 1.12. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours of Mothers with 4-yearolds Only

To summarize, the main results show that the universal pre-k policy has positive effects
on labor force participation rate, employment rate and weekly working hours of women of
childbearing age, but the effect is statistically insignificant on full-time labor force participation of women in the fertility age. The empirical result agrees with the predictions of
the theoretical model in Section 1.3. It suggests that the universal pre-k policy increases
extensive margin labor outcomes of potential mothers. Though the policy effect on the intensive margins is ambiguous in theory, the empirical result shows universal pre-k positively
affect mothers’ working hours. However, the positive effects of universal pre-k are neither
consistent for mothers with younger than 5 years old children nor mothers with only 4 years
old children. Although the labor force participation rate of mothers with younger than 5
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years old children in Oklahoma is also positively affected by the universal pre-k policy, it
is not statistically significant, and there is no evidence of significant and positive effect on
mean working hours of mothers with younger than 5 years old children. If the study sample
is further specified to mothers with 4 years old children only, the positive effect of universal
pre-k vanishes. The null effect of universal pre-k on the labor outcomes of mothers with
young children may be due to several possibilities.
First, the universal pre-k policy affects maternal labor supply through actual enrollment
in child care programs. Albeit the total enrollment rate of Oklahoma is increasing in the
post intervention period13 , mothers are not required to work to qualify for the universal pre-k
program. It is possible that marginal utility from leisure and/or home child care for young
children exceeds marginal utility of working, thus mothers remain to stay at home.
Second, since the universal pre-k policy may have a positive effect on the fertility decisions
of women, it is also possible that the decision to have additional children would reduce a
mother’s incentive to work. Thus the positive effect of the universal pre-k policy might be
canceled out by the indirect effect of childbearing decisions.14
Third, the universal pre-k policy may simply crowd out existing private day care and
mothers transfer their children from private pre-k to public pre-k without changing their
labor market decisions. The fourth explanation is that female labor force participation rates
of highly developed countries, such as the US and Sweden (Lundin et al., 2008), are already
high before a further expansion on child care policy. Moreover, studies on the wage elasticity
of female labor supply show that women are no longer as responsive to wage changes as
before (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Heim, 2007). Hence universal pre-k may have limited effect
on the maternal labor supply.
At last, the theoretical labor supply model suggests mothers with lower family income are
more likely to enter the labor market with low-cost or free child care programs, however, the
existing child care programs for poor families, such as the Head Start, may already enable
mothers from disadvantaged background to participate in the labor market.
13

See Appendix C.

14

In Appendix C, I show annual fertility rate in Oklahoma and estimate the effect of universal pre-k on
fertility rate using the SCM.
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1.6.2. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
So far the analysis has primarily focused on all potential mothers. However, the impact
of universal pre-k may vary in education level, marital status, family income and number
of children mothers. Anderson and Levine (1999) find that the response of female labor
force participation to the price of child care decreases in education levels for women with
children under age 13. Koebel and Schirle (2016) show that the Canadian Universal Child
Care Benefit has significantly negative effects on the labor supply of legally married mothers
but has significantly positive effects on the labor supply of single mothers. In this section, I
focus on the labor outcomes of women of childbearing age to avoid small sample size problem
that maybe produced from further sample restrictions. And I will only show the effects of
universal pre-k on labor force participation rate and working hours of potential mothers.
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I first investigate the effects of universal pre-k on the labor force participation rate of
women with family income below and above the poverty line. The theoretical model shows
that mothers with lower non-labor incomes have stronger incentives to work for a given
consumption level since their expected wage rates are more likely to be higher than their
reservation wages. Moreover, as universal pre-k provides free child care to all pre-k age
children, I also expect mothers with higher family income to respond to the policy. The
results suggest that the labor outcomes of income disadvantage mothers are not so responsive to universal pre-k. The mean weekly working hours of potential mothers with family
income below the poverty line in Oklahoma is higher than in the synthetic control group for
a few years after the policy intervention and then drop to be close to the synthetic control
group. Though the theoretical model suggests that the labor market decisions of mothers
from poorer families (with a lower value of Y ) are more likely to be affected by a child care
policy, several free public pre-k and child care credit programs for poor families existed before
universal pre-k. It’s possible that mothers from high-poverty families have already enrolled
their children in other public pre-k programs and participated in the labor force before the
availability of universal pre-k. The CPS data shows that labor force participation rate of
women whose family income is below the poverty line is about 87% before 1998. Conse15

The synthetic control estimation and placebo tests on the labor outcomes of subsamples are presented
in Appendix E.
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quently, the maternal labor supply of poorer mothers would not be significantly affected by
this new child care policy. The empirical results show that the labor force participation rate
of women from higher income family is also not responsive to universal pre-k. However, the
mean weekly working hours of potential mothers with family income above the poverty line
in Oklahoma increase after 1998 and are higher than the synthetic control group. Therefore,
the results suggest that universal pre-k programs, though in high quality, may not affect the
labor force participation rate of women with higher family income. This is probably because
they care more about taking care of their children than working to support their families.
However, for mothers who work before the implementation of universal pre-k, they are able
to increase their working hours by sending their children to a free and all-day pre-k program.
The second subsample analysis is on mothers with differential marital status. The estimation results show that the treatment effect on the labor outcomes of married women is
similar to the effect on all women of childbearing age. The effect of universal pre-k on the
labor force participation rate of married women is positive and statistically significant. The
mean working hours of the married sample present an increasing trend after 1998, and the
post-trend of mean working hours of Oklahoma gradually exceed that of the synthetic control
group. In the analysis of unmarried mothers, the working hours of unmarried mothers in
Oklahoma are larger than the working hours of unmarried mothers in the synthetic control
group during the post-intervention period, which indicates a positive effect of universal pre-k
on weekly working hours of unmarried mothers. However, the labor force participation rate
of unmarried mothers in Oklahoma decreases after 1998 and it is largely below the the labor
force participation rate in the synthetic control group after 2001. One possible explanation
is that unmarried mothers only receive financial support from the government if their income
is below a threshold level. For example, chilren are not eligible for the free lunch if their
family income is higher than the federal poverty line. The universal pre-k increases total
income of poor family by reducing their child care payment, therefore, losses in labor income
being compensated by welfare transfers from the government disincentivizes work. Further
justification could be that the pre-intervention labor force participation rate of unmarried
mothers in Oklahoma is already high. Since a great majority of unmarried mothers (82%)
were already working, the total effect of the policy on maternal labor supply is limited.
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Third, I analyze the the labor outcomes of women of childbearing age with differential education levels. I categorize education levels of potential mothers into lower than high school,
high school, and college and higher than college. The empirical results show that universal pre-k has a positive impact on women that are either low or high educated, especially
those with a college or higher degree. This may be explained by the quality of Oklahoma
universal pre-k because mothers with higher education level are more willing to send their
children to high-quality pre-k programs. There is no evidence of statistically significant effect
of universal pre-k on the working hours of women with either high or low education levels.
This results may not be surprising because the effect of universal pre-k on working hours
are intensive margin effect, which focuses on the sample of potential mothers who already
work before the universal pre-k policy. Since education level is a proxy of working skills, it is
highly possible that mothers’ working hours after the policy implementation are determined
by their unchanged working abilities.
I also investigate the effect of universal pre-k on mothers with different numbers of children in the households because taking care of more children are more time-consuming. As
expected, no significant effects exist on the labor force participation rate of mothers with
more than two children. However, the empirical result shows that mothers with fewer than
two children increase their labor force participation after universal pre-k becomes available.
This suggests that the universal pre-k policy is more likely to increase the labor force participation rate of mothers with fewer children. The effect of universal pre-k on the working
hours of mothers with either fewer or more than 2 children are statistically insignificant.
In summary, universal pre-k has differential effects on mothers from different socioeconomic groups, and universal pre-k, which provides free pre-kindergarten to all pre-k age
children, also has an impact on mothers from non-disadvantaged backgrounds.
1.6.3. Expansion of Case Study to Georgia Universal Pre-k
In this section, I apply the synthetic control method to the case of 1995 Georgia universal
pre-k. Georgia is the very first state that established universal pre-k statewide. Unlike
Oklahoma, Georgia universal pre-k program is available for both 3- and 4-year-old children.
As a result, the per-child expenditure on Georgia universal pre-k is much less, and Georgia
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universal pre-k does not require a high standard of teacher quality in state legislation. The
purpose of studying Georgia universal pre-k is to see the effect of universal pre-k on the labor
outcomes of a relatively low-quality pre-k state.

Figure 1.13. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate

Figure 1.14. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours

Figure 1.13 and Figure 1.14 show the effects of Georgia universal pre-k on female labor
force participation rate and working hours respectively, as well as their corresponding placebo
tests. The pre-intervention period shows a good match between Georgia and its synthetic
group. In the post-intervention period, both labor force participation rate and working hours
of women aged between 25 to 45 are not significantly affected by Georgia universal pre-k
policy. This might be explained by the possibility that maternal labor supply are more
responsive to high quality universal pre-k in making labor market decisions.
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1.7. Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of a high-quality universal pre-k program on the labor
outcomes of mothers. I first present a theoretical labor supply model to predict the effect
of universal pre-k on maternal labor supply. It suggests that price reduction and quality
improvement in a child care program may increase the probability of a mother working but
yields an ambiguous prediction regarding the working hours. In the empirical analysis, this
paper chooses the high-quality Oklahoma universal pre-k program as the special case of
interest. I apply a newly developed method—the synthetic control approach—to state level
Current Population Survey data. To construct a better counterfactual for the treated state,
Oklahoma, which is a small state with noisy data, I allow negative weights on the untreated
state and add lags of the outcome variables in all pre-intervention years into the control
variable set in the synthetic control analysis. I also use the placebo tests and pre/post
RMSPE ratio test to investigate the significance of the treatment effect.
This paper examines the effects of universal pre-k on four labor market outcomes: labor
force participation rates, employment rates, percentage of full-time labor force participation
and working hours. The primary sample of interest is potential mothers, defined as women
aged 25 to 45. The empirical findings suggest that the 1998 Oklahoma universal pre-k policy
has a positive effect on the labor force participation rate, employment rate and weekly
working hours of potential mothers in Oklahoma. The empirical results agree with the
theoretical model predictions. And the empirics further show that the working hours of
women of childbearing age are also increased by the universal pre-k policy. The empirical
evidence also shows that there is little effect of universal pre-k on the labor outcomes of
mothers with 4-year-olds only, though Oklahoma pre-k enrollment rate has been increased
since the implementation of universal pre-k.
The analysis on heterogeneous treatment effects shows that universal pre-k has differential
effects on mothers with different socioeconomic backgrounds. The universal pre-k policy
increases the labor force participation rate for both low-educated (lower than high school
education level) and high-educated (college or above college education level) mothers, but
has no effect on high school graduates. Married women are more responsive to the universal
pre-k policy than unmarried women in labor force participation, though the working hours of
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both married and unmarried mothers are increased by universal pre-k policy. The working
hours of potential mothers whose family income is above the poverty line is increased by
universal pre-k, and mothers with fewer children (no more than 2) increase their labor force
participation after the policy implementation.
At the end of the empirical study, I expand the synthetic control analysis to another
pre-k state—Georgia, which is believed to have a relatively lower-quality universal pre-k
program compared to Oklahoma. Georgia universal pre-k is found to insignificantly affect
female labor outcomes. This may suggest that mothers are not responsive to lower-quality
universal pre-k if other characteristics related to maternal labor market behavior are not
significantly different between Oklahoma and Georgia.
In conclusion, the universal pre-k policy not only increases the pre-k enrollment rate and
school performance of pre-k age children, but also positively affect the labor outcomes of
fertility age women who live in a high-quality universal pre-k state. Hence, the universal
pre-k policy may help reduce the inter-generational education and income gap by providing
children good starts as well as providing mothers chances to work. The empirical results
of this paper shows no discernible effect of universal pre-k on the labor market decisions
of mothers with young children. Future research examining the effects of pre-k, and child
policies in general, should not necessarily restrict the sample to households currently with
young children. Moreover, future studies on efficiency or benefits to costs of universal pre-k
programs should consider the welfare of all family members, and policy makers should pay
more attention on the quality of pre-k programs.
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Before 1998

After 1998

Oklahoma rest of US Oklahoma rest of US
Labor force participation rate

0.72

0.74

0.75

0.78

Working hours

28.84

28.59

29.22

30.25

Family income

33164.04

35674.11

54624.93

61654.86

Mother’s age: 25-30

0.07

0.08

0.07

0.07

Mother’s age: 30-35

0.21

0.21

0.20

0.20

Mother’s age: 35-40

0.59

0.60

0.60

0.61

Mother’s age : 40-45

0.13

0.12

0.14

0.12

Mother’s education level: below high school

0.04

0.04

0.09

0.09

High school graduates

0.15

0.13

0.34

0.30

Some college, no degree

0.08

0.07

0.22

0.20

Associate Degree,

0.03

0.04

0.09

0.11

Bachelors degree

0.05

0.07

0.19

0.22

Above college degree

0.02

0.02

0.06

0.08

White

0.85

0.85

0.79

0.82

Black

0.07

0.11

0.08

0.11

Other race

0.07

0.04

0.13

0.07

Family size

3.43

3.40

3.32

3.26

Food Stamp Recipients

0.10

0.10

0.09

0.07

Children enrolled in free lunch program

0.30

0.26

0.33

0.26

Missing in free lunch data

0.24

0.30

0.26

0.29

Below poverty line

0.16

0.14

0.14

0.12

58584.26

107485.4

111232.7

233695

19

950

9

450

GDP
Number of observations

Sources: State GDP data is from the Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA), all other statistics are
from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics of Oklahoma and the rest of all other U.S. states.
In the state level, there is one observation each year for each state. There are 50 states and 1
district (District of Columbia) in the date set. Excluding Oklahoma, the number of the rest of the
US states is 50.

Table 1.2. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables at State Level—OK vs. rest of US
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State

Weight

State

Weight

Alabama

0.313

Montana

-0.111

Alaska

-0.108

Nebraska

-0.403

Arizona

-0.104

Nevada

0.431

Arkansas

-0.126

New Hampshire

0.228

California

0.005

New Jersey

0.028

Colorado

0.195

New Mexico

0.116

Connecticut

0.219

New York

-0.155

Delaware

-0.166

North Carolina

-0.036

District of Columbia

0.048

North Dakota

-0.045

Florida

-0.167

Ohio

0.178

Hawaii

0.134

Oregon

-0.088

Idaho

-0.081

Pennsylvania

0.011

Illinois

-0.034

Rhode Island

-0.209

Indiana

-0.045

South Carolina

0.352

Iowa

0.158

South Dakota

-0.049

Kansas

0.239

Tennessee

-0.09

Kentucky

0.177

Texas

0.15

Louisiana

0.152

Utah

0.203

Maine

-0.151

Vermont

0.199

Maryland

-0.036

Virginia

-0.146

Massachusetts

0.091

Washington

0.216

Michigan

-0.129

West Virginia

0.059

Minnesota

-0.025

Wisconsin

-0.23

Mississippi

-0.192

Wyoming

-0.026

Missouri

0.051

Note: Georgia is not included in this table of weights. Since Georgia universal pre-k starts in 1995,
including Georgia in this analysis violates Assumption 2 of the synthetic control framework.

Table 1.3. Weights in the Synthetic Control Group
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OK vs. Synthetic OK OK vs. Rest of US
female education: less than high school

-0.001

0.063

female education: high school

0.036

0.265

female education: some college

-0.001

0.145

female education: associate degree

0.036

0.048

female education: college

-0.003

0.090

female education: master or doctoral

0.005

0.020

-5814.66

5829.97

married

0.038

0.090

separated, divorced, or widow

-0.009

0.024

never married

-0.050

-0.114

food stamp

0.015

0.003

free lunch

0.020

0.052

below poverty line

0.033

0.024

white

0.072

0.005

black

-0.049

-0.037

other race

0.018

0.031

family total income

Table 1.4. Mean Differences between Oklahoma and “Synthetic Oklahoma” and Oklahoma
and the Rest of US States in Demographic Economic Characteristics (Partially)

36

CHAPTER 2
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND NEWBORN HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM US
EXPOSURE TO CHINESE IMPORT COMPETITION

2.1. Introduction
Trade liberalization, especially import competition from low-waged countries, is known
to impact good prices, household income and labor market outcomes of high-wage countries.
Import competition in turn may affect the welfare of children. Although previous studies
have investigated the effects of trade liberalization on child outcomes such as child labor
in developing countries (Edwords and Pavcnik, 2005) and mortality of teenagers (Levine
and Rothman, 2006; Owen and Wu, 2007), little attention is paid on the impact of import
competition on the birth outcomes of children in developed countries. This lack of research
exists despite the well-known fact that early childhood human capital development plays
a crucial role in later-life outcomes (Almond et al., 2005; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004;
Currie et al., 2010). Prenatal disadvantaged children are at risk of worse outcomes on
physical wellness in their later-lives as well as adverse socioeconomic outcomes such as poor
school performance in childhood, lower future wages and higher crime rates in adulthood. As
a result, understanding the effects of trade liberalization on newborn health in the US may
help policymakers effectively implement public health programs for disadvantaged children,
who are differentially affected by import competition. To fill this gap in the literature, I
examine the effect of exposure to Chinese import competition on the birth outcomes of US
children in this paper.
Recently, existing literature is increasingly interested in the impact of import competition
on health outcomes. Pierce and Scott (2016) find that counties more exposed to the change in
trade policy exhibit higher rates of suicide and related causes of death that have been linked
to relative loss of employment and income. McManus and Schaur (2016) find that import
competition from China increases the injury rates and the injury risk in the competing US
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industries. The impact of Chinese import competition is not only on workers themselves in
the trade-exposed industries, Marcus (2013) and Bubonya et al. (2014) find that job losses
of workers have spillover effect on the mental well-being of their spouses. Marcus (2013)
finds that unemployment due to firm closure decreased mental health by 27% of a standard
deviation for unemployed individuals themselves and by 18% of a standard deviation for
their spouses. Bubonya et al. (2014) present evidence that the mental well-being of wives
declines following their husbands’ job loss if that job loss results in a sustained period of
unemployment or pre-unemployment financial hardship.
Exposure to import competition from China may impact birth outcomes of US children,
either positively or negatively, by altering labor market opportunities, affecting the provision
of public goods, reducing the prices of goods, mitigating pollution caused by manufacturing
plants and affecting the fertility decisions of young couples. The first two channels are
expected to negatively affect family welfare and newborn health, while the last three effects
of trade are likely to be potential mechanisms that improve the health outcome of newborns.
First, exposure to Chinese import competition may increase unemployment in the US,
in turn affects child outcomes through parental job losses. The reduction of production
costs and trade barriers in less developed countries allow foreign firms with comparative
advantage in labor out-compete US domestic manufacturing firms, resulting in an increase
in local unemployment. A substantial literature provides theoretical models and empirical
evidence for the negative relationship between Chinese import competition and employment
of US workers (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Autor et al., 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2012;
Lake and Millimet, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2016). The trade-induced job losses in turn may
have an impact on the birth outcomes of children through maternal nutrition deprivation
because parental job losses reduce family income in the short run, thus parents who lose
jobs may not have enough money to buy food and nutritious supplements. Another impact
of parental job losses on the health outcomes of newborns is through the mental stress
of mother, even if it is their spouses rather than themselves who lose jobs (Macus, 2013;
Bubonya et al., 2014). The mothers’ mental stress may trickle down to their children in
utero. Therefore, trade-induced job losses may have a negative impact on newborn health.
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Second, import competition from China has an impact on the provision of public goods
through its effect on government revenue. Feler and Senses (2016) find that the increasing
import competition from China leads to declines in housing prices and business activities,
resulting in less government revenue. As shown by Feler and Senses (2016), funding for
public services such as education and health care for low-income families is highly localized
in the US, with heavy reliance on property and sales tax revenues. The reduction in the
provision of public goods associated with prenatal health care thus may negatively affect the
birth outcome of US children.
Third, trade liberalization is known to provide households access to cheaper goods and
a wide variety of consumption (Levine and Rothman, 2006; Freenstra and Weinstein, 2010;
Tovar, 2012; Courtemanche et al., 2015). The idea that trade liberalization improves living standard of people is supported by the theory of comparative advantage (Frankel and
Romer, 1999), rent seeking theory in the political economics (Dollar and Kraay, 2004), and
substantial empirical evidence. For example, Amiti et al. (2017) find that the China trade
shock reduced US manufacturing price index by 7.6 percent between 2000 to 2006, which is
in principle driven by policy changes after China’s accession to WTO. Though trade liberalization may not directly affect the health care industry in the US, the availability of cheap
imported materials may reduce production cost related to medical equipment and drugs.
Moreover, the reduction in good prices has a direct income effect on US households, thus
the accessibility to cheaper goods enables households to spend more on food and health
products. As a consequence, trade liberalization may increase the health outcomes of US
newborns through the reduction in good prices.
Fourth, the rise of Chinese imports may reduce pollution in trade-exposed US counties as
Chinese import competition prompts closure of inefficient manufacturing plants. Domestic
companies are also able to import intermediate or final products of heavily polluted industries
from China instead of producing, or outsource production to low-wage countries. A number
of literature is interested in the impact of air pollution on child health. Currie and Neidell
(2005) and Chay and Greenstone (2005) both find improvement in air quality reduces infant
mortality. The World Health Organization (WHO) conducts an assessment of research on
pollution and child health in 2005. The report, entitled “Effects of air pollution on children’s
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health and development”, shows that the risks posed by ambient air pollutants are related to
various aspects of children’s health.
Finally, the import penetration from China may also affect the prevalence of marriage
among young adults and their fertility decisions. Autor et al. (2017) explores the impact
of trade shock from China on the marriage and fertility decisions. They find that import
competition from China reduces marriage rate and fertility rate of young US people, and the
reduction in fertility is not uniform across demographic groups. Since they find the fertility
among young mothers decreases proportionally less than the fertility among old mothers,
the reduction of fertility rate may positively affect birth outcomes of US children because
younger women are more likely to deliver healthier babies.
To find the causal effect of the surge of Chinese imports on the health outcomes of US
newborns, I use the instrumental variable method following Autor et al. (2013). The empirical results suggest that US exposure to Chinese import competition reduces the percentage
of newborns with low birth weight and premature births, while other birth outcomes are not
significantly affected by trade exposure. Further, in order to provide a more comprehensive
understanding of health consequences of import competition, I examine two potential mechanisms that would improve newborn health—improvement in air quality and reduction in
good prices. I find reduction in air pollution and availability of cheaper goods are possible
channels that would improve the birth outcomes of US children. Another potential mechanism might be the increase in the share of young mothers in fertility (Autor et al., 2017).
This paper contributes to the strand of literature on the effect of Chinese trade penetration on the welfare of US people. Though a substantial literature has shown evidence that
Chinese import competition causes job losses of US workers, this paper finds evidence that
trade between US and China is beneficial to US children.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy
used to examine the effect of Chinese import competition on newborn health. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 presents and discusses the main results. Section 5 discusses the
potential mechanisms through which exposure to Chinese import competition may positively
affect the birth outcomes of US children. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2. Empirical Strategy
Since exposure to Chinese import competition may be endogenous to newborn health, I
explore the exogenous variation of local trade exposure via county-level industry structure
to examine the causal effect of Chinese trade penetration. The empirical strategy is based
on Autor et al. (2013), who study the effect of Chinese import competition on US labor
market using an instrumental variable approach.
The empirical model is a standard two-way fixed effects model at the US county level
estimated by two-stage least squares. The regression model is
2

0

Yct = α + β1 IP Wctu + β2 IP Wctu + Xct β + λc + γt + εct

(2.1)

where Yct is the birth outcomes in county c and year t, and Xit is a vector of control variables
including the demographic characteristics of the newborns and their mothers. λc and γt are
county and year fixed effects, respectively. εct is the error term. Since birth outcomes of
children are more likely to be a result of the exposure to Chinese imports when children
2

are in utero, the trade exposure variable IP Wctu takes the value of last time period. IP Wctu

is included to account for the fact that the fraction of adverse birth outcomes decline in a
non-linear manner. Figure 1 shows that the predicted value of outcome variables are more
likely to follow a non-linear pattern when they are regressed by the county level import per
worker.
The exposure to Chinese import competition is measured by the concept of the percapita change of Chinese import to the US (IP Wct ).1 The trade exposure variable IP Wctu is
defined as the imports apportioned to US counties weighted by its share of national industry
employment in the baseline year. Formally,
IP Wctu =

X L1990
cj

1
L1990
c

1

j

L1990
j

Mjt

(2.2)

In the existing literature, there are several measures of exposure to trade competition. Jensen and Kletzer
(2006) and Eliasson et al. (2012) use locational Gini coefficient to measure the industrial concentration of
domestic regions. Bernard et al. (2003) measure an industrial exposure to imports from low-wage countries
via the value share (VSH) of imports originating in these low-wage countries.
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where IP Wctu is the per-capita Chinese import to the US in county c and year t. L1990
is
c
the working population by county in the baseline year 1990,

L1990
cj
L1990
j

is the ratio of county level

industry employment to national industry employment in 1990 and Mjt is the import of US
from China in industry j and in year t. The key explanatory variable IP Wctu is instrumented
by the exposure to Chinese import competition on eight other high-income countries IP Wcto .
Import per worker (IP Wct ) is widely used to study the effect of the exposure to import
competition from low-wage countries on labor market outcomes. It is chosen as the measure
of exposure to Chinese import competition in this study for two reasons. First, import
per worker (IP Wct ) is related to both trade shock and local labor market. The impact
of import competition on domestic employment is a potential mechanism that affects birth
outcomes of children. The second reason is that import per worker (IP Wct ) measures county
level exposure to Chinese import competition by weighting industry level imports with the
county-industry labor share, though the imports of each US county is not directly observed
in trade data.
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that the surge of Chinese import to
US is driven mainly by the productivity growth of China after its transition to a marketoriented economy and the trade costs reduction after its openness to international trade,
especially after China’s accession to the WTO. Under this assumption, the rising of Chinese
imports has common within-industry effects on trade sectors of the United States and other
high-income countries. The exposure to Chinese import competition of eight other highincome countries IP Wcto is thus used to instrument the US trade exposure variable IP Wctu .2
It captures the growth in imports from China that reflect technology shocks and demand
shocks common to high-income countries.
2.2.1. US Exposure to Chinese Import Competition
The key explanatory variable is county level exposure to Chinese import competition. I
follow Autor et al. (2013) to use regional variation in industrial composition to construct
local exposure to Chinese import competition.
2

Following Autor et al. (2013), the eight other high-income countries are those that have comparable
trade data covering the full sample period: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand,
Spain, and Switzerland.
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In the first step, I use the 1990 Census 5% sample to construct the baseline year county
level labor share by industry. The Census data has rich information on labor statistics,
including occupation and associated industry. The number of industries used to construct
county-industry employment share is 93. The county-industry employment share is the
number of workers in one industry in each county over the total number of worker working
in this industry nationwide. It is fixed in the baseline year 1990 because the contemporaneous
employment share might be endogenously affected by Chinese import competition through
job reallocation.
In the next step, I construct the trade exposure variable IP Wct , I link the county-industry
employment share obtained from 1990 Census to US-China trade data. The import data is
collected from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). WITS provides information on
trade volume and the impact of protection and tariff changes. Since the industry identifier in
WITS is the Standard Industry Code (SIC) while the industry identifier in the 1990 Census
data is coded as “ind1990”, I map the SIC to ind1990 to obtain a common industry identifier
to combine trade data with employment shares. Import per worker is obtained by summing
up the the products of county-industry employment and imports from China of all industries
following equation (2) in Section 2. The final panel has a total number of observations of
6,034 from 1991 to 2004.3
To implement the identification strategies, I utilize a panel of trade and health data from
1992 to 2004. I first combine the US-China trade data with the county-industry employment
share that is calculated from the 1990 Census to obtain county level exposure to Chinese
import competition. The data is then merged with the birth outcome data. The final panel
has approximately 340 counties each year because the county identifiers of the National
Vital Statistics are only available for around 460 large populated counties in the US, and
the number of counties that can be identified in the 1990 Census data is about 430. The
county identifiers of small counties are not publicly available in these data sets due to security
reason.

3

US-China trade data in WITS is available from 1991.
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2.3. Data

2.3.1. US Exposure to Chinese Import Competition
The key explanatory variable is the county level exposure to Chinese import competition.
I follow Autor et al. (2013) to use a regional variation in industrial composition to construct
local exposure to Chinese import competition.
In the first step, I use the 1990 Census 5% sample to construct the baseline year countyindustry labor share. The Census data has rich information on labor statistics, including
occupation and associated industry. The number of industries in the trade sectors that are
used to construct county-industry employment share is 93. The county-industry employment
share is the number of workers in one industry in each county over the total number of worker
working in this industry nationwide. It is fixed in a baseline year because the contemporaneous employment share might be endogenously affected by Chinese import competition
through job reallocation. I chose 1990 as the baseline year because it is before the study
time period 1992-2004 and the Census is available in 1990 to construct the county-industry
employment share.
In the next step, I construct the trade exposure variable IP Wct by linking the countyindustry employment share obtained from 1990 Census to the industry level imports from
China. The import data is collected from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The
WITS provides information on trade volume and the impact of protection and tariff changes.
Since the industry identifier in WITS is the Standard Industry Code (SIC) while the industry
identifier in the 1990 Census data is coded as “ind1990”, I map the SIC to ind1990 to obtain
a common industry identifier for the data combination. Import per worker is obtained by
summing up the the products of county-industry employment and imports from China of
all industries following equation (2) in Section 2. The final panel has a total number of
observations of 6,034 from 1991 to 2004.4

4

US-China trade data in WITS is available from 1991.
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2.3.2. Birth Outcomes and Family Characteristics
The birth outcomes are from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS). It is an individual level data that provides rich information on vital events such as births, deaths,
marriages, divorces, and fetal deaths. The Vital Statistics also provides data on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the newborns and their mothers. In this study,
I collapse the birth outcomes into county level by year.
The birth outcomes include the percentage of children with low birth weight, low Apgar
scores, overweight and premature birth. Low birth weight (LBW) is defined as a birth weight
of a live-born infant of 2,499 grams or less, regardless of gestational age. Low birth weight
infants have a greater risk of poor later-life health, which may require a longer period of
hospitalization after birth, and they are also more likely to develop significant disabilities.
Overweight birth is another unusual birth weight state, it is defined as a birth weight of
more than 4,000 grams5 .
The Apgar score provides an accepted and convenient method for reporting the status of
the newborn infant immediately after birth. A 5-minute Apgar score that is no more than 7 is
considered to be a low score, and the Apgar evaluation is given every 5 minutes for the infants
whose total score are less than 7. Another useful criterion of newborn health is the gestation
period. Preterm birth, also known as premature birth, is defined by the National Institutes
of Health as the birth of a baby at fewer than 37-week gestational age. Premature infants
are at greater risk for cerebral palsy, delays in development, hearing problems, and sight
problems. Preterm birth is also the most common cause of death among infants worldwide
and the earlier a baby is born, the higher risk for adverse health outcomes.
The control variable set contains the demographic and family characteristics of the newborns, including a infant’s gender and birth order as well as her mother’ race, residential
information, education level, age at birth and marital status. Controls are aggregated at the
county level as means or percentages.
I further examine the effect of exposure to Chinese import competition on the death
rate of newborns since the estimation will be biased if healthier babies are selected into
live births. The infant mortality rate is the number of deaths under one year old occurring
5

Overweigth birth is defined by using the definition of “fetal macrosomia".
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among the live births in a given geographical area during a given year over per 1,000 live
births occurring among the population of the given geographical area during the same year.
The infant mortality data is collected from the Compressed Mortality File (CMF), which
is comprised of a county-level national mortality file and a corresponding national population
file. The CMF is collected from the mortality files of the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS), which record every death of a U.S. resident annually from 1968 to 2016. The
detailed mortality files contain an extensive set of variables collected from hospital death
certificates. In this paper, I use the county level infant mortality data. However, like
the National Vital Statistics, the CMF and NCHS only collect mortality data from high
population-density counties, so the county level data does not include all counties in the US.
The mortality data is merged with the the birth outcome data described above by county.
Table 1 shows summary statistics.
The final step of data management is to combine the health data (birth outcomes and
mortality rate) and the trade data with the exposure variable. The longitudinal data thus
includes the trade exposure variable, health outcomes and family characteristics of newborns
in each US county over time. Figure 1 shows the fractions of mean low birth weight across
all US counties in every study year. It suggests there is an increasing fraction of low birth
weight newborns in the US after 1991, though the medical and health care industry was
rapidly growing. The right panel of Figure 1 presents the relationship between the import
per worker variable and the fraction of low birth weight by county, the OLS predicted line
suggests a negative relationship between import per worker and low birth weight. Figure 2
shows the time trend of average mortality rate of newborns, which was decreasing in 1990s.
The scatter plot in the right panel shows a negative relationship between import per worker
and mortality rate.
2.4. Empirical Results

2.4.1. Main Results
In this section, I empirically examine the effect of exposure to Chinese import competition
on health outcomes of US newborns, including the percentage of low birth weight, overweight,
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Figure 2.1. Low Birth Weight

Figure 2.2. Mortality Rate

low Apgar scores, early delivery and the mortality rate of US newborns. Table 2 presents the
results applying the empirical model in Section 2. It shows that the trade exposure variable
IP Wct and its quadratic form IP Wct2 are jointly significant in impacting low birth weight
and premature birth, while only the effect on low birth weight is statistically significant at
a significance level of 1%. Also note that though IP Wct and IP Wct2 do not significantly
affect the outcome of low Apgar score individually, they have jointly significant impact on
the fraction of low Apgar score.
Since the regression model includes the quadratic form of county level import per worker,
the impact of exposure to Chinese import competition should be explained by the marginal
effect of import per worker. Moreover, the sign of the marginal effect of import per worker
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depends on the level of exposure to Chinese import competition. More specifically, exposure
to Chinese import competition measured by import per worker (IP Wct ) reduces(increases)
the incidence of low birth weight and premature births if import per worker is below(above)
a certain threshold. For example, the marginal effect of IP Wct on the percentage of low
birth weight is negative when IP Wct < 3.5086, which is true for nearly 99.7% of US counties
in the data. The marginal effect of IP Wct on the percentage of premature births is negative
if IP Wct < 4.0969, and nearly 99.8% of US counties are below the threshold.
However, the marginal effect of IP Wct on the incidence of low Apgar scores seems to
be positive for all US counties from estimation results in Table 2. This result is surprising
because I find positive correlation between the percentage of low birth weigh and low Apgar
score, thus IP Wct and IP Wct2 should have consistent impact on the fraction of newborns
with low birth weight and low Apgar score. I plot the marginal effects of import per worker
on the percentage of newborns with low birth weight, short gestational period, low Apgar
score in Figure 2. It shows that the marginal effects of average import per worker on low
birth weight and premature birth is always below zero at 5% confidence interval. However,
the confidence interval of the marginal effect on the fraction of low Apgar score includes
negative values at the 5% significance level. Since the confidence interval is too wide to
exclude null effect, passing the joint significance test does not necessarily ensure a significant
positive effect of import per worker on the percentage of newborns with low Apgar scores at
the 5% confidence interval.
Table 2 also shows the test results of the first-stage F-test and the endogeneity test for
the instrumental variable approach. The first-stage F-test is for testing the validation of
the instrumental variables, since all IV regressions pass the F-test, import per worker of
other eight high-income countries is a valid instrument for the import per worker of US.
In addition, four out of five birth outcomes pass the endogeneity tests. It suggests that
an instrument is needed for import per worker of US since it is endogenous to the birth
outcomes in the model.
Import competition from China may have differential impacts on birth outcomes of children with different initial parental human capital endowment through its direct effect on
local labor market. I analyze the effect of Chinese import competition on newborns whose
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Figure 2.3. Marginal Effects of IPW with Confidence Interval

mothers are differently educated. The mothers’ education levels are classified into three categories: less than high school, high school diploma or college unfinished, and bachelor’s degree
and above. The incidence of low birth weight is reduced for all sub-samples of newborns, and
the percentage of children whose mothers are in lower education level decreases in a larger
magnitude than those whose mothers are higher educated.6 It suggests that Chinese import
competition might have a greater benefit on disadvantaged children.
In conclusion, the estimation results suggest exposure to Chinese import competition
improve newborn health for almost all counties in the data. It is also found that the trade
exposure has little effect on infant mortality. The empirical results thus suggest no evidence
that higher exposure to Chinese import competition harms the health outcomes of newborns
in the US; instead, the rise of Chinese imports improves the health condition of newborns
on their birth weight and gestation. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows a larger impact
6

The estimation results are shown in Appendix A.
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of Chinese import competition on the birth outcomes of disadvantaged children.
The positive effect of import competition on newborn birth weight and gestation may
be explained by lower prices of goods important to prenatal health due to free trade, the
reduction in air pollution due to the closure of manufacturing plants and the decline in the
share of health disadvantaged mothers in fertility. It is also possible that the positive labor
market effect in non-import competing and trade-beneficiary sectors exceeds the negative
effect on import-competing trade sectors. Therefore, the effect of Chinese import competition
is positive on average.
2.4.2. Potential Mechanisms
In this section, I discuss three potential mechanisms through which exposure to Chinese
import competition may have a positive impact on newborn health: reduction in air pollution, income effect from the availability of cheaper goods and an increase in the share of
young women in fertility.
2.4.2.1. Trade Exposure and Air Pollution
This section examines whether the positive effect of exposure to Chinese import competition on newborn health is through the reduction in air pollution since China’s comparative
advantage in labor-abundant sectors may result in closure of heavily polluted manufacturing
plants in the US. Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) and McAusland and Millimet (2016) find
evidence of a beneficial impact of expanded trade on the environmental quality. Currie and
Neidell (2005) and Chay and Greenstone (2005) find that the improvement in air quality
reduces infant mortality.
I use the same empirical model in Section 2 to regress air pollution outcomes on the
trade exposure variable IP Wct . Thus the regression results explain the effect of import
competition from China on the air quality of differentially exposed US counties. The air
quality data is collected from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
it provides air quality data collected at outdoor monitors across the United States. The Air
Quality Index Report (AQI) of EPA displays annual summaries of AQI values in a county
or a city. I transfer count of days in each AQI category into percentage forms because the
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total number of days under monitoring per year is not uniform across counties. I also study
the effect of import per worker on the percentage of days when the AQI could be attributed
to each criteria pollutant.
Table 3 shows the estimation results. The marginal effect of IP Wct on good days is
positive when IP Wct < 2.7668, which is true for nearly 98.8% of US counties in the data.
The marginal effect of IP Wct on unhealthy days is negative when IP Wct < 3.4681, and
nearly 99.4% of US counties have an exposure level below 3.4681. The results suggest that
IP Wct improves air quality by increasing the percentage of good days in air quality and
decreasing the fraction of unhealthy days in AQI categories.
Table 3 also shows the trade effect on air pollution attributed to each criteria pollutant.
Three out of five toxic gaseous pollutants (CO, N O2 , and Ozone) are not significantly affected
by exposure to Chinese import competition. The import competition from China reduces the
particle pollution measured by PM2.5 in the US. The marginal effect of IP Wct on PM2.5
is negative when IP Wct < 2.9928, which contains nearly 99% of US counties. However,
emission of SO2 is increased by exposure to Chinese import competition and the marginal
effect of IP Wct on SO2 is positive for all US counties in the data. The negative effect of
trade exposure on the criteria pollutant SO2 may be canceled out by the reduction in other
criteria pollutants. Thus we observe an overall positive effect of Chinese import competition
on the percentage of days in good air quality.
Since the import data is available in the industry level, the import competitive industries
can be further categorized into ‘dirty’ (heavily polluted) or ‘clean’ industries.7 I calculate
the import per worker of the two types of industries, and then examine the effects of import
per worker by different industrial air pollution levels on newborn health. I find the marginal
effect of import per worker from heavily polluted industries on the fraction of low birth
weight is negative for most of the US counties, however, Chinese import competition from
clean industries, including the food sectors increases the fraction of low birth weight.8 The
results suggest import competition from heavily polluted industries are more likely to improve
7

The industries are defined to be dirty if they belong to mining and quarrying, Manufacturing , Electricity,
gas, steam and air conditioning supply, or Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation
activities.
8

The estimation results are shown in Appendix B.
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the health outcomes of US newborns.
In summary, the empirical results suggest that air quality improvement is likely to be a
mechanism that leads to a positive health impact of exposure to Chinese import competition
on US children. And the import competition from heavily polluted industries are more likely
to improve the health outcomes of US newborns through the improve in air quality, though
it is believed to increase unemployment in US labor market.
2.4.2.2. Trade Exposure and Access to Cheaper Goods
International trade is well-known to reduce prices for consumers and provide consumers
a wide variety of goods and services. Thus, the rise of Chinese imports may affect the
average birth outcomes of differentially trade-exposed counties through the reduction in
good prices and the improvement in the living conditions of local families. Since data on
household consumption or food expenditure is hard to obtain in the study time period, I use
the number of Walmart stores and supercenters in each county to proxy for accessibility to
cheap goods. Courtemanche et al. (2015) suggest that being close to Walmart stores can
help reduce food insecurity. The number of Walmart stores in each county, however, does
not consider households who live near county borders and are closer to a Walmart store in a
nearby county. Therefore, the estimation using the growth of Walmart stores as a measure
of accessibility to cheap goods may be downward biased.
The locations of Walmart stores and supercenters across the US is obtained from the
Remote Sensing Data, which is collected from the aerial photography and NASA satellite
imagery.9 The location data is further collapsed into county level and merges with the trade
data in Section 3.1. The empirical strategy follows Section 2. The key explanatory variable
is the import per worker and the dependent variable is the growth in number of Walmart
stores and supercenters in each county in the study time period.
Table 4 shows that exposure to Chinese import competition increases the number of
Walmart stores in more trade-exposed counties. The marginal effect of IP Wct on the number
of Walmart stores in each county is positive when IP Wct < 3.8388, almost all counties
9

The data of location of Walmart and Target stores is ready in the project of Using GIS and Remote
Sensing to Teach Geoscience in the 21st Century.
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(99.5%) is below this trade exposure threshold. The result suggests that exposure to Chinese
import competition might improve newborn health through its effect on the prices of goods.
The increasing availability of cheap goods to local US families is more likely to have a
higher impact on poorer families or poorer counties. Previous literature has shown that the
increasing number of Walmart scores may reduce the poverty rate of US counties (Courtemanche et al., 2015). I then study the effects of import per worker interacted with county
level poverty rates on the health outcomes of newborns. Like the county-industry employment share defined in Section 3.1, the contemporaneous poverty rate might be endogenously
affected by Chinese import competition, thus I use county level poverty rates in 1990 as the
baseline poverty rates. The regression model is then given by
2

2

Yct =α + β1 IP Wctu + β2 IP Wctu + β3 IP Wctu × povertyc + β4 IP Wctu × povertyc
0

+ Xct β + λc + γt + εct

(2.3)

where povertyc is poverty rate of each county in 1990, and Xct contains all the control
variables in Equation (2) and Table 2.
Table 5 shows the estimation results. The marginal effect of import per worker on health
outcomes of newborns in Equation (3) now depends not only on county level exposure to
Chinese import competition, it depends on county level poverty rate as well. For example,
the marginal effect of import per worker on the percentage of newborns with low birth weight
is now given by
M EIP W = 0.0028 − 2 × 0.0001IP W − 0.0651poverty + 2 × 0.0055IP W × poverty

(2.4)

Equation (4) shows that both the sign and the magnitude of the marginal effect of IPW
depend on IPW and the poverty rate of counties, and the marginal effect is likely to be
positive if there is one county that is more exposure to Chinese import competition and its
poverty rate is high. It is easier to show the marginal effect of import per worker interacted
with poverty rate of each county in a graph. Figure 3 shows the marginal effects of average
import per worker over years on the fraction of low birth weight at different percentiles of
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poverty rate. It suggests that the marginal effect of aggregated IPW on the percentage of low
birth weight is generally negative, and as the poverty rate increases from a lower percentile
to a higher percentile, the negative effect becomes larger.

Figure 2.4. Marginal Effects of IPW with Confidence Interval at Different Percentile of
Poverty

I can also examine the effect of exposure to Chinese import competition interacted with
time-variant county wealth measured by per capita income (in 10,000 dollars) of each county
over time. Similarly, the regression model is given by
2

2

Yct =α + β1 IP Wctu + β2 IP Wctu + β3 IP Wctu × pcincct + β4 IP Wctu × pcincct
0

+ Xct β + λc + γt + εct

(2.5)

where pcincct is per capita income of counties each year, and Xct contains all the control
variables in Equation (2) and Table 2.
Table 6 shows the estimation results. The marginal effect of import per worker on the
percentage of low birth weights M EIP W is now given by
M EIP W = 0.0190 − 2 × 0.0079IP W − 0.0047pcinc + 2 × 0.0018IP W × pcinc
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(2.6)

Moreover, the marginal effect of per capita income also depends on the level of trade exposure,
so that
M Epcinc = 0.0014 − 0.0047IP Wct + 2 × 0.0018IP Wct × pcincct

(2.7)

The marginal effect of import per worker and per capita income is similar to the marginal
effect of import per worker and poverty rate. Equation (6) shows that the sign of the
marginal effect of import per worker depends on both the trade exposure and the per capita
income of a county. Suppose the 1.2 ≤ IP W ≤ 1.36, the first part of the marginal effect
0.019 − 2 × 0.0079IP W ≤ 0, and as 4.71 − 2 × 1.76IP W > 0, the second part of Equation
(6) is also negative. In this case, the marginal effect of IPW on the percentage of low birth
weight is negative and decreases as the per capita income increases. However, only 3% of
counties has an import per worker between 1.2 and 1.36. For the rest of 97% counties whose
import per worker is below 1.2 or above 1.36 import per worker, the sign of the marginal
effect of import per worker is determined simultaneously by the interaction between county
level trade exposure and per capita income.
2.4.2.3. Trade Exposure and Fertility
Autor et al. (2017) study the effect of trade shock from China on the marriage rate and
fertility rate of young US people. Following Autor et al. (2013), the marriage and fertility
decisions of young US people are affected through the adverse labor market effect of import
competition. They show evidence that one-unit import shock lowers births per thousand
women of ages 20-39 by 4%. But this decline is not uniform across demographic groups.
Fertility among younger (including teens) and unmarried women falls proportionately less
than fertility among older and married women.
Though the increase in out-of-wedlock birth share may have a long-run adverse effect
on birth outcomes, the decline in the share of fertility among older women may result in
an increase in average birth weight. This is because pregnancy is often physically easier for
women in their 20s and there’s a lower risk of health complications since young women are
also less likely to have gynecological problems. As a result, younger women are less likely to
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have premature or low-birth-weight babies than older women, and thus China penetration
in trade may potentially reduce the incidents of poor outcomes at birth by increasing the
share of young women in fertility.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper uses an instrumental variable fixed effect model to examine the causal effect of
an increasing exposure to Chinese import competition on newborn health in the US. Despite
the strong evidence that US exposure to Chinese imports has had negative impacts on labor
market outcomes and adult health, I find no evidence of an adverse effect on newborn health.
In fact, there is evidence of a reduction in the incidence of low birth weight and premature
birth. This paper thus makes a contribution to trade literature by suggesting the benefits of
free trade on the newborns.
I further investigate three potential mechanisms through which trade shock from China
may positively affect birth outcomes of US children. I find that exposure to Chinese import
competition improves the average air quality of more trade-exposed US counties and the
benefit of trade on air quality may lead to an improvement in newborn health. The empirical
evidence also shows that reduction in good prices induced by the rise of Chinese imports
is another mechanism that may drive down the incidence of low birth weight. Moreover,
Chinese import competition has a larger impact on the average birth outcomes of US counties
that have a higher poverty rate or a lower per-capita income level. At last, previous studies
show that exposure to Chinese import competition reduces the fertility rate of US young
couples while increases the share of young women in fertility. In turn, early age childbearing
improves the average birth outcomes of US children.
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Variable

Mean

Min

Max

Observation

0.075

0

0.202

4426

0.024

0

0.222

4426

0.033

0

0.6

4304

0.192

0

0.397

4426

0.008

0.002

0.022

4426

0.549

0.018

5.866

4426

27

24

34

4426

0.677

0.261

1

4426

≤ High School

0.191

0

0.583

4426

High School

0.540

0

1

4426

College Degree

0.268

0

1

4426

White

0.779

0

1

4426

Black

0.152

0

0.802

4426

Other Race

0.069

0

1

4426

Boy Ratio

0.512

0.222

0.600

5208

Birth Order

2.026

1.709

3.667

5208

Birth Outcomes
Low Birth Weight
(Birth Weight<2500 grams)
Overweight Birth
(Birth Weight>4000 grams)
Low Apgar Score
(5 minutes Apgar Score≤7)
Premature Birth
(Gestation<37)
Mortality Rate
Trade Variables
Import per worker (IPW)
Mother Characteristics
Mother’s Age
Married
Mother’s Education Level

Mother’s Race

Child Characteristics

Note: The summary statistics are from the county level data. The table describes
the birth outcomes and family characteristics for each surveyed county from 1990
to 2004. Except for birth order and mother’s age, which are in level, variables
are in percentage form.

Table 2.1. Summary Statistics
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Birth Outcome

Low Birth Weight

Overweight

Low Apgar Score

Premature

Mortality

-.0044***

0.0001

0.0110

-0.0034*

-0.0001

(0.0001)

(0.0004)

(0.0090)

(0.0018)

(0.0002)

0.0006***

0.00004

-0.0006

0.0004

0.0000

(0.0002)

(0.0001)

(0.0028)

(0.0003)

(0.0000)

Joint Significance

0.0000

0.1828

0.0172

0.0630

0.3416

First-stage F-test

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Over Identification Test

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Test of Endogeneity

0.0000

0.0000

0.0180

0.1319

0.0000

IP Wct
IP Wct2

Note: The control set includes county level average mother’s age at birth; percentage of mothers with less than high school,
high school and college education; percentage of married mothers; percentage of mothers who are white, back and other
race; ratio of male newborns by county.
The US trade exposure variable IP Wct is instrumented by the exposure to Chinese import competition of eight other
high-income countries.
The table presents test results in p-value.
The regression is also weighted by the inverse of county population squared.
*** Indicates significant at the 1% level.
** Indicates significant at the 5% level.
* Indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 2.2. Effect of IPW on Aggregate birth outcomes (2SLS)
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Pollution Outcomes

Good (Days)

Moderate

Unhealthy

Very Unhealthy

Hazardous

0.0296**

-0.0165

-0.0051**

-0.0004

0.00002

(0.0127)

(0.0106)

(0.0022)

(0.0012)

(0.00004)

-0.0054**

0.0032

0.0007*

0.0001

-0.0000

(0.0022)

(0.0018)

(0.0004)

(0.0002)

(0.0000)

Joint Significance

0.0442

0.2008

0.0685

0.6368

0.5713

First-stage F-test

0.0000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Over Identification Test

0.0000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Test of Endogeneity

0.0000

0.0000

0.2300

0.8926

0.5214

CO

N O2

Ozone

SO2

PM2.5

0.0053

0.0095

-0.0180

0.0185

-0.0439**

(0.0115)

(0.0102)

(0.0178)

(0.0121)

(0.0186)

-0.0017

0.0005

0.0028

-0.0008

0.0073**

(0.0020)

(0.0017)

(0.0030)

(0.0021)

(0.0032)

Joint Significance

0.4881

0.6092

0.5994

0.0216

0.0569

First-stage F-test

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Over Identification Test

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Test of Endogeneity

0.4129

0.0418

0.0076

0.5352

0.0000

Number of Obs.

4,820

4,820

4,820

4,820

4,820

IP Wct
IP Wct2

IP Wct
IP Wct2

Data Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency.
The results are from using fixed effect model and instrumental fixed effect model.
The US trade exposure variable IP Wct is instrumented by the exposure to Chinese import competition of eight
other high-income countries.
No other control variables are used in the estimation.
The table presents test results in p-value.
The regression is also weighted by the inverse of county population squared.
*** Indicates significant at the 1% level.
** Indicates significant at the 5% level.
* Indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 2.3. Trade Exposure and Air Pollution Condition
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Number of Walmart Stores
IP Wct

0.4579***
(0.0764)

IP Wct2

-0.0596***
(0.0002)

Joint Significance

0.0000

First-stage F-test

0.0000

Over Identification Test

0.0000

Test of Endogeneity

0.0003

Number of Obs.

4,411

Data Source: Remote Sensing Data.
Note: The results are from using fixed effect model and instrumental fixed effect model.
The US trade exposure variable IP Wct is instrumented by the exposure to Chinese import competition of eight other high-income
countries.
No other control variables are used in the estimation.
The table presents test results in p-value.
The regression is also weighted by the inverse of county population
squared.
*** Indicates significant at the 1% level.
** Indicates significant at the 5% level.
* Indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 2.4. Trade Exposure and Number of Walmart Stores by County
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Birth Outcome

Low Birth Weight

Overweight

Low Apgar Score

Premature

Mortality

0.0028**

-0.0027***

-0.0253**

-0.0048*

0.0007***

(0.0012)

(0.0006)

(0.0122)

(0.0027)

(0.0003)

-0.0001

0.0008***

0.0248***

0.0031**

-0.0064

(0.0006)

(0.0003)

(0.0064)

(0.0013)

(0.0002)

-0.0651***

0.0299***

0.3478***

0.0334

-0.0064**

(0.0123)

(0.0055)

(0.0936)

(0.0264)

(0.0001)

0.0055

-0.0081

-0.2268***

-0.0304**

-0.0014

(0.0064)

(0.0029)

(0.0561)

(0.0138)

(0.0013)

Joint Significance

0.0000

0.0000

0.0156

0.0085

0.0000

First-stage F-test

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Over Identification Test

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Test of Endogeneity

0.0000

0.0000

0.0118

0.0000

0.0000

IP Wct
IP Wct2
IP Wct × povertyc
IP Wct2 × povertyc

Note: The control set includes county level average mother’s age at birth; percentage of mothers with less than high school,
high school and college education; percentage of married mothers; percentage of mothers who are white, back and other
race; ratio of male newborns by county.
The US trade exposure variable IP Wct is instrumented by the exposure to Chinese import competition of eight other
high-income countries.
The regression is also weighted by the inverse of county population squared.
The presented coefficients are rounded to 4 decimal digits, 0.000 does not mean null effect, the significance level is shown
by the symbol of *.
The table presents test results in p-value.
*** Indicates significant at the 1% level.
** Indicates significant at the 5% level.
* Indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 2.5. Effect of IPW on Aggregate Birth Outcomes (2SLS) with Interaction with County
Level Per Capita Income
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Birth Outcome

Low Birth Weight

Overweight

Low Apgar Score

Premature

Mortality

0.0190***

-0.0002

0.0421*

0.0474***

0.0047***

(0.0030)

(0.0008)

(0.0222)

(0.0065)

(0.0006)

-0.0079***

0.0007

-0.0232***

-0.0118***

-0.0016***

(0.0011)

(0.0002)

(0.0005)

(0.0023)

(0.0002)

-0.0047***

-0.0001

-0.0101*

-0.0118***

-0.0010***

(0.0006)

(0.0003)

(0.0056)

(0.0013)

(0.0001)

0.0018***

-0.0001

0.0065***

0.0028***

0.0003***

(0.0002)

(0.0001)

(0.0022)

(0.0005)

(0.0000)

0.0014*

-0.0001

0.0187***

0.0068***

0.0007***

(0.0007)

(0.0003)

(0.0056)

(0.0015)

(0.0002)

Joint Significance

0.0000

0.0207

0.0156

0.0000

0.0000

First-stage F-test

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Over Identification Test

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Test of Endogeneity

0.0000

0.0000

0.0786

0.0000

0.0000

IP Wct
IP Wct2
IP Wct × pcincct
IP Wct2

× pcincct

pcincct

Note: The control set includes county level average mother’s age at birth; percentage of mothers with less than high school,
high school and college education; percentage of married mothers; percentage of mothers who are white, back and other race;
ratio of male newborns by county.
The US trade exposure variable IP Wct is instrumented by the exposure to Chinese import competition of eight other highincome countries.
The regression is also weighted by the inverse of county population squared.
The presented coefficients are rounded to 4 decimal digits, 0.000 does not mean null effect, the significance level is shown by
the symbol of *.
The table presents test results in p-value.
*** Indicates significant at the 1% level.
** Indicates significant at the 5% level.
* Indicates significant at the 10% level.

Table 2.6. Effect of IPW on Aggregate Birth Outcomes (2SLS) with Interaction with County
Level Poverty Rate
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CHAPTER 3
PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION OF ECONOMIC MOBILITY: WITH AN APPLICATION
TO THE UNITED STATES

3.1. Introduction
There has been substantial interest of late in intra- and inter-generational mobility. Dang
et al. (2014, p. 112) state that mobility “is currently at the forefront of policy debates around
the world.” Within the popular press, it has been noted that “social mobility ... has become a
major focus of political discussion, academic research and popular outrage in the years since
the global financial crisis.” 1 In this paper, we study the analysis of economic mobility while
accounting for measurement error in income data. Specifically, we offer a new approach to
addressing measurement error in the estimation of transition matrices.
Measurement error in income data is known to be pervasive, even in administrative data.
In survey data, measurement error arises for two main reasons: misreporting (particularly
with retrospective data) and imputation of missing data (Jäntti and Jenkins 2015). It is now
taken as given that self-reported income in survey data contain significant measurement error, and that the measurement error is nonclassical in the sense that it is mean-reverting and
serially correlated (Duncan and Hill 1985; Bound and Krueger 1991; Bound et al. 1994; Pischke 1995; Pedace and Bates 2000; Bound et al. 2001; Kapteyn and Ypma 2007; Gottschalk
and Huynh 2010). Compounding matters, Meyer et al. (2015) find that both problems –
nonresponse and accuracy conditional on answering – are worsening over time. In administrative data, measurement error arises for three main reasons: misreporting (tax evasion
or filing errors), conceptual differences between the desired and available income measures,
and processing errors (Bound et al. 1994; Bound et al. 2001; Kapteyn and Ypma 2007;
Pavlopoulos et al. 2012; Abowd and Stinson 2013; Meyer et al. 2015; Obserski et al. 2016).
1

See Washington Post (October 6, 2016) at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/
06/striking-new-research-on-inequality-whatever-you-thought-its-worse/?utm_term=.83d37c53195b.
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Even if administrative data are entirely accurate, they are only available in a handful of
developed countries.
However, existing studies of mobility either ignore the issue or utilize complex solutions
that invoke strong (and often non-transparent) identification assumptions and have data
requirements that are quite limiting. The most frequent response to measurement error in
the empirical literature on mobility is to mention it as a caveat (Dragoset and Fields 2006).
While the usual assumption is that measurement error will lead to upward bias in measures
of mobility, the complexity of various mobility measures along with the nonclassical nature
of the measurement error makes the direction of any bias uncertain. Glewwe (2012, p. 239)
states that “all indices of relative mobility tend to exaggerate mobility if income is measured
with error,” yet others offer a different opinion. Dragoset and Fields (2006, p. 1) contend
that “very little is known about the degree to which earnings mobility estimates are affected
by measurement error.” Gottschalk and Huynh (2010, p. 302) note that “the impact of
nonclassical measurement error on mobility is less clear since mobility measures are based
on the joint distribution of reported earnings in two periods.”
Our approach to the analysis of mobility given measurement error in income data concentrates on the partial identification of transition matrices. We provide informative bounds on
the transition probabilities under minimal assumptions concerning the measurement error
process and a variety of nonparametric assumptions on income dynamics. To our knowledge,
this is the first study to extend the literature on partial identification to the study of transition matrices (see, e.g., Horowitz and Manski 1995; Manski and Pepper 2000; Kreider and
Pepper 2007, 2008; Gundersen and Kreider 2008, 2009; Kreider et al. 2012). Within this
environment, we first derive sharp bounds on transition probabilities under minimal assumptions on the measurement error process. We then show how the bounds may be narrowed
by imposing more structure via shape restrictions, level set restrictions that relate transition
probabilities across observations with different attributes (Manski 1990; Lechner 1999), and
monotonicity restrictions that assume monotonic relationships between the true income and
certain observed covariates (Manski and Pepper 2000).
In contrast to existing approaches to handle measurement error in studies of mobility
(discussed in Section 3.2), our approach has several distinct advantages. First, the assump64

tions invoked to obtain a given set of the bounds are transparent, easily understood by a
wide audience, and easy to impose or not impose depending on the particular context. Moreover, bounds on the elements of transition matrices extend naturally to bounds on mobility
measures derived from transition matrices. Second, our approach only requires data at two
points in time. Third, our approach is easy to implement (through our creation of a generic
Stata command).2 Fourth, our approach extends easily to applications other than income,
such as dynamics related to consumption, wealth, occupational status, labor force status,
health, student achievement, etc.
The primary drawback to our approach is the lack of point identification. Two responses
are in order. First, our approach should be viewed as a complement to, not a replacement
for, existing approaches. Indeed, one usefulness of our approach is to provide bounds with
which point estimates derived via alternative estimation techniques may be compared. Second, many existing approaches to deal with measurement error in mobility studies end up
producing bounds even though the solutions are not couched as a partial identification approach (e.g., Dang et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2017). This arises due to an inability to identify
all parameters in some structural model of observed and actual incomes.
Perhaps a secondary drawback of our approach is the focus on transition matrices to
capture mobility. Such matrices have the disadvantage of not providing a scalar measure of
mobility, simplifying spatial and temporal comparisons of mobility. While there is merit to
this critique, there are several responses. First, transition matrices are an obvious starting
point in the measurement of mobility. Jäntti and Jenkins (2015, p. 822) argue that, when
measuring mobility across two points in time, “the bivariate joint distribution of income contains all the information there is about mobility, so a natural way to begin is by summarizing
the joint distribution in tabular or graphical form.” Second, transition matrices are easily
understood by policymakers and the general public and thus are frequently referenced within
these domains. The importance of this cannot be oversold. For example, a recent article in
The New Yorker (March 26, 2014) argued that an “essential part” of the work by Piketty
and others as it relates to inequality is the presentation of the data in a manner that is
“easier to understand” through the avoidance of “clever but complicated statistics ... which
2

Available at http://faculty.smu.edu/millimet/code.html.
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attempted to reduce the entire income distribution to a single number.” 3 Third, transition
matrices allow one to examine mobility at different parts of the income distribution (Lee et
al. 2017). Finally, bounds on (scalar) measures of mobility derived from the elements of the
transition matrix are easily obtained from our approach.
We illustrate our approach examining intra-generational mobility in the United States using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the United States.
Specifically, we examine mobility over two four-year periods, 2004 to 2008 and then 2008 to
2012. Understanding mobility patterns in the US is important as there is convincing evidence
that income inequality has been increasing in the US. However, the welfare impact of this
rise depends crucially on the level of economic mobility.4 Shorrocks (1978, p. 1013) argues
that “evidence on inequality of incomes or wealth cannot be satisfactorily evaluated without
knowing, for example, how many of the less affluent will move up the distribution later in
life.” More recently, Kopczuk et al. (2010, p. 91-2) conclude that “a comprehensive analysis
of disparity requires studying both inequality and mobility” as “annual earnings inequality
might substantially exaggerate the extent of true economic disparity among individuals.”
Our analysis of US mobility yields some striking results. First, we show that relatively
small amounts of measurement error leads to bounds that can be quite wide in the absence
of other information or restrictions. Second, the restrictions considered contain significant
identifying power as the bounds can be severely narrowed. Finally, allowing for misclassification errors in up to 10% of the sample, we find that the probability of being in poverty (out
of poverty) four years later conditional on being in poverty (out of poverty) in the initial
period is at least 33% (87%) under our most restrictive set of assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of
existing approaches to address measurement error in studies of mobility. Section 3.3 presents
our partial identification approach. Section 3.4 contains the empirical application. Section
3.5 concludes.

3

See http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/pikettys-inequality-story-in-six-charts.

4
The level of income inequality in the US has followed a U-shaped pattern over the past century (Picketty
and Saez 2003; Kopczuk et al. 2010; Atkinson and Bourguignon 2015).
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3.2. Literature Review
Burkhauser and Couch (2009) and Jäntti and Jenkins (2015) provide excellent reviews of
the numerous mobility measures. Bound et al. (2001) and Meyer et al. (2015) offer excellent
surveys regarding measurement error in microeconomic data. Here, we focus on approaches
that have been taken to address (or not address) measurement error in analyses of economic
mobility. We identify three general approaches in the existing literature: (i) ignore it, (ii) ad
hoc data approaches, and (iii) structural approaches. In the interest of brevity, we relegate
much of the discussion of the prior literature to the appendix. Here, we discuss only those
methods most comparable to our approach. These methods fall within the third category
and utilize structural models to simulate error-free income. Armed with the simulated data,
any mobility measure may be computed, including transition matrices. Clearly, the validity
of this approach rests on the quality of the simulated error-free data. Obtaining simulated
values of error-free data is not trivial and typically relies on complex models invoking a
number of fairly opaque assumptions.
Studies pursuing this strategy include McGarry (1995), Glewwe and Dang (2011), Pavlopoulos et al. (2012), Dang et al. (2014), and Lee et al. (2017). McGarry (1995) posits a variance
components model to isolate the portion of observed income that represents measurement
error. Upon simulating error-free income, conditional staying probabilities for the poor are
examined. The results indicate substantially less mobility in the simulated data. However,
the model defines measurement error as the individual-level, time-varying, serially uncorrelated component of income. Thus, all time-varying idiosyncratic sources of income variation
are removed. Moreover, the individual-level, time-varying, serially correlated component of
income is not considered measurement error. Finally, parametric distributional assumptions
are required for identification in practice.
Glewwe and Dang (2011) begin with the assumption that log income follows an AR(1)
process. The authors then combine OLS and IV estimates of the forward and reverse regressions, along with assumptions about the variance components of the model, to simulate
error-free income. The simulated data are then used to assess income growth across the
distribution. As in McGarry (1995), the results suggest substantial bias from measurement
error. However, as in McGarry (1995), identification of error-free income relies on strong
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assumptions for identification, such as serially uncorrelated measurement error, particular
functional forms, and valid instrumental variables.
Pavlopoulos et al. (2012) build on Rendtel et al. (1998) and specify a mixed latent Markov model to examine error-free transitions between low pay, high pay, and nonemployment. The model requires data from at least three periods, as well as requires perhaps
strong assumptions concerning unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. In addition,
serial correlation in measurement error is difficult to address and extending the model to
more than three states is problematic. Nonetheless, the results align with the preceding
studies in that mobility is dampened once measurement error is addressed.
Dang et al. (2014) consider the measurement of mobility using pseudo-panel data. Since
the same individuals are not observed in multiple periods, the authors posit a static model
of income using only time invariant covariates available in all periods. The model estimates,
along with various assumptions concerning how unobserved determinants of income are correlated over time, are used to bound measures of a two-by-two poverty transition matrix.
This approach implicitly addresses measurement error through the imputation process as
missing data can be considered an extreme form of measurement error. However, measurement error in observed incomes used to estimate the static model and compute the poverty
transition matrix is not addressed. Moreover, it is not clear how one could extend the method
to estimate more disaggregate transition matrices.
Finally, Lee et al. (2017) estimates a complex model based on an AR(1) model of
consumption dynamics with time invariant and time-varying sources of measurement error
to simulate error-free consumption and estimate transition matrices. Consistent with the
preceding studies, significantly less mobility is found in the simulated data. While the
authors’ model has some advantages compared to earlier attempts to simulate error-free
outcomes, these advantages come at a cost of increased complexity, decreased transparency
of the identifying assumptions, and a need for four periods of data. In addition, bounds are
obtained as not all parameters required for the simulations are identified.
In summary, the literature on addressing measurement error in studies of mobility has
witnessed significant recent growth. However, there remains much scope for additional work.
While simulation-based methods allow for estimation of transition matrices, these methods
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are complex, lack transparency, rely on strong functional form and distributional assumptions, and often require more than two years of data. Moreover, the common reliance in
the majority of the simulation approaches on an AR(1) model of income or consumption
dynamics is worrisome. Lee et al. (2017, p. 38) acknowledge that “this model is not so much
derived from a well-developed theory, but it is a convenient reduced-form model.” Finally,
the reliance on precise assumptions concerning the nature of the variance components is
unappealing in light of Kapteyn and Ympa’s (2007, p. 535) finding that “substantive conclusions may be affected quite a bit by changes in assumptions on the nature of error in survey
and administrative data.”
Our proposed approach complements these existing approaches. However, in contrast to
simulation approaches, which often end up with bounds on transition probabilities, we set
out to estimate bounds from the beginning, making it transparent exactly how the bounds
are affected by each assumption one may wish to impose. Furthermore, the assumptions
imposed to narrow the bounds are much easier for non-experts to comprehend.
3.3. Model

3.3.1. Setup
Let yit∗ , denote the true income for observation i, i = 1, ..., N , in period t, t = 0, 1. An
observation may refer to an individual or household observed at two points in time in the
case of intragenerational mobility or a parent-child pair observed at two points in time in
the case of intergenerational mobility. Further, let F0,1 (y0∗ , y1∗ ) denote the joint (bivariate)
∗
∗
cumulative distribution function (CDF), where yt∗ ≡ [y1t
· · · yN
t ].

While movement through the distribution from an initial period, 0, to a subsequent
period, 1, is completely captured by F0,1 (y0∗ , y1∗ ), this is not practical. Moreover, policymakers
and the media often focus on more easily understood transition matrices. A K ×K transition
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∗
matrix, P0,1
, summarizes this joint distribution and is given by





∗
P0,1

 p∗11 · · · · · · p∗1K 


 .
.. 
..
 ..
.
. 


.
=
 .
.. 
...
 ..
. 






p∗K1 · · · · · · p∗KK

(3.1)

Elements of this matrix have the following form

1
0
≤ y1∗ < ζl1 )
Pr(ζk−1
≤ y0∗ < ζk0 , ζl−1
0
Pr(ζk−1
≤ y0∗ < ζk0 )
Pr(y0∗ ∈ k, y1∗ ∈ l)
=
k, l = 1, ..., K,
Pr(y0∗ ∈ k)

p∗kl =

(3.2)

where the ζs are cutoff points between the K partitions such that 0 = ζ0t < ζ1t < ζ2t <
t
t
· · · < ζK−1
< ζK
< ∞, t = 0, 1.5 Thus, p∗kl is a conditional probability. A complete lack

of mobility implies p∗kl equals unity if k = l and zero otherwise.6 Finally, we can define
conditional transition matrices, conditioned upon X = x, where X denotes a vector of
∗
observation attributes. Denote the conditional transition matrix as P0,1
(x), with elements

given by

0
1
Pr(ζk−1
≤ y0∗ < ζk0 , ζl−1
≤ y1∗ < ζl1 |X = x)
0
Pr(ζk−1
≤ y0∗ < ζk0 |X = x)
Pr(y0∗ ∈ k, y1∗ ∈ l|X = x)
=
k, l = 1, ..., K.
Pr(y0∗ ∈ k|X = x)

p∗kl (x) =

(3.3)

5

For example, if K = 5, then the cutoff points might correspond to quintiles within the two marginal
distributions of y0∗ and y1∗ .
6
In contrast, ‘perfect’ mobility may be characterized by origin-destination independence, implying p∗kl =
1/K for all k, l, or by complete rank reversal, implying p∗kl = 1 if k + l = K + 1 and zero otherwise. See
Jäntti and Jenkins (2015) for discussion.

70

Implicit in this definition is the assumption that X includes only time invariant attributes.7
For clarity, throughout the paper we consider two types of transition matrices: (i) those
with equal-sized partitions and (ii) those with unequal-sized partitions. With equal-sized
partitions, the ζs are chosen such that each partition contains 1/K of the population. For
example, equal-sized partitions with K = 5 correspond to a quintile transition matrix. In
∗
sum to one and mobility is necessarily zero-sum
this case, the rows and columns of P0,1

(i.e., if an observation is misclassified in the upward direction, there must be at least one
observation misclassified in the downward direction). With unequal-sized partitions, only
∗
the rows of P0,1
sum to one and mobility is not zero-sum. For example, we shall consider

the case of a 2 × 2 poverty transition matrix, where ζ1t is the poverty line in period t.
∗
∗
Given the definition of P0,1
or P0,1
(x), our objective is to learn something about its

elements. With a random sample {yit∗ , xi } and a choice of K and the ζs, the transition probabilities are point identified as they are functions of nonparametrically estimable quantities.
The corresponding plug-in estimator is consistent. However, as stated previously, ample
evidence indicates that income is measured with error. Let yit denote the observed income
for observation i in period t. With data {yit , xi } and a choice of K and the ζs, the empirical
transition probabilities are inconsistent for p∗kl and p∗kl (x).
With access only to data containing measurement error, our goal is to bound the probabilities given in (3.2) and (3.3). The relationships between the true partitions of {yit∗ }1t=0
and the observed partitions of {yit }1t=0 are characterized by the following joint probabilities:
(k0 −k,l0 −l)

θ(k,l)

= Pr(y0 ∈ k 0 , y1 ∈ l0 , y0∗ ∈ k, y1∗ ∈ l)

(3.4)

where the subscript (k, l) indexes the true partitions in period 0 and 1 and the superscript
(k 0 − k, l0 − l) indicates the degree of misclassification given by the differences between the
observed partitions k 0 and l0 and true partitions k and l. If k 0 − k, l0 − l > 0, then there
is upward misclassification in both periods. If k 0 − k, l0 − l < 0, then there is downward
misclassification in both periods. If k 0 − k and l0 − l are of different signs, then the di7

Note, while the probabilities are conditional on X, the cutoff points ζ are not. Thus, we are capturing
movements within the overall distribution among those with X = x.
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(0,0)

rection of misclassification changes across periods. θ(k,l) represents the probability of no
misclassification in either period for an observation with true income in partitions k and l.8
∗
With this notation, we can now rewrite the elements of P0,1
as

p∗kl =

Pr(y0∗ ∈ k, y1∗ ∈ l)
Pr(y0∗ ∈ k)
(k0 −k,l0 −l)

P

Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l) +

k0 ,l0 =1,2,...,K
(k0 ,l0 )6=(k,l)

=
Pr(y0 ∈ k) +

θ(k,l)

(k0 −k,l0 −le
l)

P
k0 ,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
k0 6=k

θ(k,lel)

(k−k0 ,l−l0 )

P

−

k0 ,l0 =1,2,...,K
(k0 ,l0 )6=(k,l)

−

P
k0 ,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
k0 6=k

θ(k0 ,l0 )

(k−k0 ,l0 −le
l)

θ(k0 ,lel)

rkl + Q1,kl − Q2,kl
pk + Q3,k − Q4,k
= K(rkl + Q1,kl − Q2,kl ),

≡

(3.5)
(3.6)

where the final line holds only in the case of equal-sized partitions.9 Q1,kl measures the
proportion of false negatives associated with partition kl (i.e., the probability of being misclassified conditional on kl being the true partition). Q2,kl measures the proportion of false
positives associated with partition kl (i.e., the probability of being misclassified conditional
on kl being the observed partition). Similarly, Q3,k and Q4,k measure the proportion of false
negatives and positives associated with partition k, respectively.
The transition probabilities in (3.5) and (3.6) are not identified from the data alone.
The data identify rkl and pk , but not the misclassification parameters, θ. One can compute
sharp bounds by searching across the unknown misclassification parameters. There are
∗
K 2 (K 2 − 1) misclassification parameters in P0,1
. However, several constraints must hold (see

Appendix G). Even with these constraints, obtaining informative bounds on the transition
probabilities is not possible without further restrictions. Section 3.2 considers assumptions
8 (0,0)
θ(k,l)

∗
may be strictly positive even though income is misreported in either or both periods (i.e., yit 6= yit
for at least some i and t) as long as the misreporting is not so severe as to invalidate the observed partitions
(i.e., k 0 = k and l0 = l regardless). Throughout the paper, we use the term measurement error to refer to
∗
errors in observed income (yit 6= yit
) and misclassification to refer to errors in the observed partition (k 0 6= k
0
or l 6= l).
9

The expression in (3.5) is identical to that in Gundersen and Kreider (2008, p. 368) when K = 2.
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on the θs. Section 3.3 considers restrictions on the underlying mobility process.
3.3.2. Misclassification

3.3.2.1. Assumptions
∗
Given the presence of measurement error, we obtain bounds on the elements of P0,1
, given

in (3.5).10 We consider the following misclassification assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Rank Preserving Measurement Error). Misreporting does not alter an observation’s rank in the income distribution in either period. Formally, defining Ft (yit ) and
Ft∗ (yit∗ ), t = 0, 1, as the marginal CDFs of observed and true income in each period, then

Ft (yit ) = Ft∗ (yit∗ ) ∀i, t
=⇒ Qj,kl = 0, j = 1, ..., 4, ∀k, l.

Assumption 2 (Maximum Misclassification Rate).
(i) (Arbitrary Misclassification) The total misclassification rate in the data is bounded from
above by Q ∈ (0, 1). Formally,
K X
K X
4
X

Qj,kl ≤ Q.

(3.7)

k=1 l=1 j=1

(ii) (Uniform Misclassification) The total misclassification rate in the data is bounded from
above by Q ∈ (0, 1) and is uniformly distributed across partitions. Formally,
10

In the interest of brevity, we focus attention from here primarily on the unconditional transition matrix.
We return to the conditional transition matrix in Section 3.3.
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K
X

Q1,kl ,

l=1

K
X
l=1

Q2,kl ,

K
X

Q3,k ,

K
X

l=1
K
X

l=1
K
X

k=1

k=1

Q1,kl ,

Q4,k ≤

Q
∀k
K

(3.8)

Q2,kl ≤

Q
∀l.
K

(3.9)

Assumption 1 is similar to Heckman et al.’s (1997) rank invariance assumption in the
context of the distribution of potential outcomes in a treatment effects framework. Although
this assumption is quite strong, it is a useful benchmark. Assumption 2 places restrictions on
the total amount of misclassification allowed in the data. As we discuss below, the amount
of misclassification is dependent on the choice of K. As such, one could express Q as Q(K);
we dispense with this notation for expositional purposes.
For the case of equal-sized partitions, misclassification is necessarily zero-sum; upward
misclassification of some observations necessarily implies downward misclassification of others. Thus, even if measurement error in income is uni-directional, misclassification errors
must be bi-directional. However, for the case of unequal-sized partitions, this need not be
the case. In such cases, we also consider adding the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Uni-Directional Misclassification). Misclassification occurs strictly in the
upward direction. Formally,
Q2,11 = Q4,1 = Q1,KK = Q3,K = 0.
Assumption 3 rules out the possibility of any false positives (negatives) occurring in the
worst (best) partition. Note, this assumption is consistent with mean-reverting measurement
error as long as the negative measurement errors for observations with high income are not
∗
sufficient to lead to misclassification. For example, if P0,1
is a 2×2 poverty transition matrix,

Assumption 3 permits observations with true incomes exceeding the poverty threshold to
underreport income, but not to a degree whereby they are misclassified as in poverty. Such an
assumption may not hold, for instance, if some households above the poverty threshold report
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incomes below the poverty threshold in an attempt to qualify for means-tested transfers.
3.3.2.2. Bounds

3.3.2.2.1

Rank Preserving Measurement Error (Assumption 1)

Under As-

sumption 1 the sampling process identifies the transition probabilities despite the presence
of measurement error, yielding the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1. the transition probabilities are identified by
Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l)
Pr(y0 ∈ k)


I(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l)
=E
.
I(y0 ∈ k)

p∗kl =

(3.10)

The transition probabilities are nonparametrically identified. Estimation proceeds by replacing
the terms with their sample analogs, given by
P

I(y0i ∈ k, y1i ∈ l)
P
i I(y0i ∈ k)
X
K
=
I(y0i ∈ k, y1i ∈ l)
i
N

pb
pkl =

i

(3.11)
(3.12)

where the last line follows in the case of equal-sized partitions. Proof: See Appendix G.
3.3.2.2.2

Maximum Misclassification Rate (Assumption 2)

Under Assumption

2 if Q > 0, the transition probabilities are no longer nonparametrically identified. We have
the following propositions.
∗
Proposition 2. Consider a transition matrix, P0,1
, with equal-sized partitions. Under Assumption 2(i), the transition probabilities are bounded sharply by

max{K(rkl − Q), 0} ≤ p∗kl ≤ min{K(rkl + Q), 1}.

(3.13)

Under Assumption 2(ii), the transition probabilities are bounded sharply by
max{K(rkl − Q/K), 0} ≤ p∗kl ≤ min{K(rkl + Q/K), 1}.

(3.14)

Proof: See Kreider and Pepper (2008, p. 335) and Horowitz and Manski (1995, Corollary
1.2).
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∗
Proposition 3. Consider a transition matrix, P0,1
, with unequal-sized partitions. Under
Assumption 2, the transition probabilities are bounded sharply by




rkl + Q1,kl
rkl − Q2,kl
∗
, 0 ≤ pkl ≤ min
,1
(3.15)
max
pk + Q3,k
pk − Q4,k

where the following constraints must hold

0≤
0≤
0≤
0≤

Q1,kl
Q2,kl
Q3,k
Q4,k

≤ 1 − rkl
≤ rkl
≤ 1 − pk
≤ pk

in addition to

Q1,kl + Q4,k ≤ Q
Q2,kl + Q3,k ≤ Q
under Assumption 2(i) or

Q1,kl + Q4,k ≤ Q/K
Q2,kl + Q3,k ≤ Q/K
under Assumption 2(ii). Proof: See Appendix G.
Estimation of the bounds in Propositions 2 and 3 proceeds by replacing rkl and pk with
their sample analogs. Estimation of the lower bound in Propositon 3 requires the additional
step of minimizing the lower bound with respect to Q2 and Q3 subject to the appropriate
constraints. Similarly, estimation of the upper bound Propositon 3 requires maximizing the
upper bound with respect to Q1 and Q4 subject to the appropriate constraints.
3.3.2.2.3

Uni-Directional Misclassification (Assumption 3)

For simplicity, we

only consider Assumption 3 in the case of a 2 × 2 transition matrix. We have the following
proposition.
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Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 2(i) and 3, the four elements of a 2 × 2 transition
matrix with unequal-sized partitions are bounded sharply by
r11
≤
min{p1 + Q, 1}


r12 − Q
,0 ≤
max
p1


r21 − Q
max
,0 ≤
p2 − Q


r22 − Q
max
,0 ≤
p2

p∗11
p∗12
p∗21
p∗22




r11 + Q
≤ min
,1
p1


r12 + Q
≤ min
,1
p1 + Q


r21 + Q1
≤ min
,1
max{p2 − Q4 , 0}


r22
≤ min
,1
min{p2 − Q, 0}

(3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)
(3.19)

where the following constraints must hold

Q1 , Q4 ≥ 0
Q1 + Q4 ≤ Q.

(3.20)

Under Assumptions 2(ii) and 3, sharp bounds are identified by replacing Q with Q/2 in
(3.16)-(3.20). Proof: See Appendix G.
Estimation of the bounds are straightforward using the appropriate sample analogs with
the exception of the upper bound for p∗21 . In this case, the upper bound is obtained by
maximizing the expression with respect to Q1 and Q4 subject to the constraints in (3.20).
3.3.3. Restrictions
Propositions 2-4 provide bounds on transition probabilities considering only restrictions
on the misclassification process. Here, we explore the identifying power of incorporating restrictions on the mobility process. The restrictions may be imposed alone or in combination.
3.3.3.1. Shape Restrictions
Shape restrictions place inequality constraints on the population transition probabilities.
Here, we consider imposing shape restrictions assuming that large transitions are less likely
than smaller ones.
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Assumption 4 (Shape Restrictions). The transition probabilities are weakly decreasing in
the size of the transition. Formally, p∗kl is weakly decreasing in |k − l|, the absolute difference
between k and l.
This assumption implies that within each row or each column of the transition matrix, the
diagonal element (i.e., the conditional staying probability) is the largest. The remaining
elements decline weakly monotonically moving away from the diagonal element. This leads
to the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Denote the bounds on p∗kl under some combination of Assumptions 2-3 as
LBkl ≤ p∗kl ≤ U Bkl .
Adding Assumption 4 implies the following sharp bounds:

max



sup LBkl0 , sup LBk0 l ≤ p∗kl ≤ U Bkl if k = l
(3.21)
k0 =1,...,K




∗
max sup LBkl0 , sup LBk0 l ≤ pkl ≤ min inf0 U Bkl0 , inf0 U Bk0 l if k < l(3.22)
k≤l ≤l
k≤k ≤l
l0 ≥l
k0 ≤k




∗
max sup LBkl0 , sup LBk0 l ≤ pkl ≤ min inf
U Bkl0 , inf
U Bk0 l if k > l(3.23)
0
0

l0 =1,...,K

l0 ≤l

l≤l ≤k

k0 ≥k

l≤k ≤k

Proof: See Appendix G.
Estimation is straightforward given estimates of the preliminary bounds, LBkl and U Bkl .
3.3.3.2. Level Set Restrictions
Level set restrictions place equality constraints on population transition probabilities
across observations with different observed attributes (Manski 1990; Lechner 1999).
Assumption 5 (Level Set Restrictions). The conditional transition probabilities, given in
(3.3), are constant across a range of conditioning values. Formally, p∗kl (x) is constant for all
x ∈ Ax ⊂ Rm , where x is an m-dimensional vector.
For instance, if x denotes the age of an individual in years, one might wish to assume that
p∗kl (x) is constant for all x within a five-year window around x.
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From (3.3) and (3.5), we have

k0 ,l0 =1,2,...,K
(k0 −k,l0 −l)6=(0,0)

p∗kl (x) =

θ(k,l)

(k0 −k,l0 −le
l)

P

Pr(y0 ∈ k|X = x) +

k0 ,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
k0 6=k

≡

(k0 −k,l0 −l)

P

Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l|X = x) +

θ(k,lel)

(k−ke
k,l−le
l)

P

(x) −

ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
(ke
k,le
l)6=(k,l)

(x) −

P
ke
k,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
ke
k6=k

rkl (x) + Q1,kl (x) − Q2,kl (x)
pk (x) + Q3,k (x) − Q4,k (x)

θ(kek,lel)

(k−ke
k,l0 −le
l)

θ(kek,lel)

(x)

(x)

(3.24)

where now Qj,· (x), j = 1, ..., 4, represent the proportions of false positives and negatives conditional on x. As such, we also consider the following assumption regarding the conditional
misclassification probabilities.
Assumption 6 (Independence). Misclassification rates are independent of the observed attributes of observations. Formally,
Qj,· (x) = Qj,· , j = 1, ..., 4.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Denote the bounds for p∗kl (x) under some combination of Assumptions 2-4
and 6 as
LB(x) ≤ p∗kl (x) ≤ U B(x).
(3.25)
Adding Assumption 5 implies the following sharp bounds on the conditional transition probabilities:
sup LB(z) ≤ p∗kl (x) ≤ inf U B(z).
(3.26)
z∈Ax

z∈Ax

Assuming X is discrete, sharp bounds on the unconditional transition probabilities are given
as




X
X
∗
Pr(X = x) sup LB(z) ≤ pkl ≤
Pr(X = x) inf U B(z) .
(3.27)
x

x

z∈Ax

z∈Ax

Proof: See Manski and Pepper (2000).
To operationalize Proposition 6, bounds on the conditional transition probabilities, shown
in (3.25), must be obtained. This is done in the following corollaries.
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∗
Corollary 6.1. Consider a transition matrix, P0,1
, with equal-sized partitions. Under As∗
sumptions 5, 2(i) and 6, pkl (x) is bounded sharply by




1
1
∗
(rkl (x) − Q), 0 ≤ pkl (x) ≤ min
(rkl (x) + Q), 1 .
(3.28)
max
pk (x)
pk (x)

Under Assumptions 2(ii) and 6, p∗kl (x) is bounded sharply by




1
1
∗
max
(rkl (x) − Q/K), 0 ≤ pkl (x) ≤ min
(rkl (x) + Q/K), 1 .
pk (x)
pk (x)

(3.29)

Under Assumption 2(i) or 2(ii) without Assumption 6, p∗kl (x) is bounded sharply by




rkl (x) + Q1,kl (x)
rkl (x) − Q2,kl (x)
∗
max
, 0 ≤ pkl (x) ≤ min
,1 ,
(3.30)
pk (x) + Q3,k (x)
pk (x) − Q4,k (x)
where the following constraints must hold

0 ≤ Q1,kl (x) ≤ 1 − rkl (x)
0 ≤ Q2,kl (x) ≤ rkl (x)


1
0 ≤ Q3,k (x) ≤ min 1 − pk (x),
− pk (x)
K · Pr(X = x)


1
− [1 − Pr(X = x)]
K
0 ≤ Q4,k (x) ≤ min pk (x), pk (x) −
Pr(X = x)
in addition to

Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}
under Assumption 2(i) or

Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}
under Assumption 2(ii). Proof: See Appendix G.
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∗
Corollary 6.2. Consider a transition matrix, P0,1
, with unequal-sized partitions. Under
∗
Assumption 5, 2(i) or 2(ii) and 6, pkl (x) is bounded sharply by




rkl (x) + Q1,kl
rkl (x) − Q2,kl
∗
, 0 ≤ pkl (x) ≤ min
,1
(3.31)
max
pk (x) + Q3,k
pk (x) − Q4,k

where the following constraints must hold

0 ≤ Q1,kl
0 ≤ Q2,kl
0 ≤ Q3,l
0 ≤ Q4,l

≤ 1 − rkl (x)
≤ rkl (x)
≤ 1 − pk (x)
≤ pk (x)

in addition to

Q1,kl + Q4,l ≤ Q
Q2,kl + Q3,l ≤ Q
under Assumption 2(i) or

Q1,kl + Q4,l ≤ Q/K
Q2,kl + Q3,l ≤ Q/K
under Assumption 2(ii). Under Assumption 2(i) or 2(ii) without 6, sharp bounds for p∗kl (x)
are given in (3.30), where the following constraints must hold

0≤
0≤
0≤
0≤

Q1,kl (x)
Q2,kl (x)
Q3,k (x)
Q4,k (x)

≤ 1 − rkl (x)
≤ rkl (x)
≤ 1 − pk (x)
≤ pk (x)

in addition to

Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}
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under Assumption 2(i) or

Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}
under Assumption 2(ii). Proof: See Appendix G.
∗
Corollary 6.3. Consider a 2×2 transition matrix, P0,1
, with unequal-sized partitions. Under
∗
Assumption 3, 5, pkl (x) is bounded sharply by

r11 (x)
≤
min{p1 (x) + Q, 1}


r12 (x) − Q
,0 ≤
max
p1 (x)


r21 (x) − Q
max
,0 ≤
p2 (x) − Q


r22 (x) − Q
,0 ≤
max
p2 (x)




r11 (x) + Q
≤ min
,1
p1 (x)


r12 (x) + Q
∗
p12 (x) ≤ min
,1
p1 (x) + Q
(
)
e
r21 (x) + QQ1
p∗21 (x) ≤ min
,1
e4 , 0}
max{p2 (x) − QQ


r
(x)
22
p∗22 (x) ≤ max
,1
min{p2 (x) − Q, 0}
p∗11 (x)

(3.32)
(3.33)
(3.34)
(3.35)

where the following constraints must hold

e1 , QQ
e4 ≥ 0
QQ
e1 + QQ
e4 ≤ Q
QQ

(3.36)

e1 , QQ
e4 ≥ 0
QQ
e1 + QQ
e4 ≤ Q/2
QQ

(3.37)

under Assumptions 2(i) and 6 or

under Assumptions 2(ii)
Without Assumption 6, with Assumption 3 and 5, p∗kl (x) is bounded sharply by
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r11 (x)
≤
Q
, 1}
min{p1 (x) + P r{X=x}
(
)
Q
r12 (x) − P r{X=x}
max
,0 ≤
p1 (x)
)
(
Q
r21 (x) − P r{X=x}
,0 ≤
max
Q
p2 (x) − P r{X=x}
)
(
Q
r22 (x) − P r{X=x}
,0 ≤
max
p2 (x)

(
p∗11 (x) ≤ min

r11 (x) +

Q
P r{X=x}

p1 (x)
(

p∗12 (x) ≤ min

r12 (x) +
p1 (x) +

Q
P r{X=x}
Q
P r{X=x}

)
,1

(3.38)

)
,1

(3.39)

(

)
e
r21 (x) + QQ1 (x)
p∗21 (x) ≤ min
, 1 (3.40)
e4 (x), 0}
max{p2 (x) − QQ
(
)
r
(x)
22
p∗22 (x) ≤ max
, 1 (3.41)
Q
, 0}
min{p2 (x) − P r{X=x}

under Assumptions 2(i) or

e1 (x), QQ
e4 (x) ≥ 0
QQ
e1 (x) + QQ
e4 (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}
QQ

(3.42)

under Assumptions 2(ii). Proof: See Appendix G.
Under Corollaries 6.1-6.3, estimation of the bounds for p∗kl (x) are straightforward using
the appropriate sample analogs and minimizing (maximizing) the lower (uper) bound subject
to the appropriate constraints. Upon obtaining bounds for p∗kl (x), sharp bounds for the
conditional and unconditional transition probabilities are given in (3.26) and (3.27).11
Before continuing, it is worth pointing out a special case of level set restrictions when
the conditioning variable, x, represents time. For example, one might separately bound
transition matrices from t = 0 → 1 and t = 1 → 2 and then impose the restriction that
mobility is constant across the two time periods. Here, the level set restriction is identical to
a stationarity assumption about the Markov process governing the outcome variable. This
is formalized in the following assumption and proposition.

11
Note, there is no assurance that the bounds under Assumption 5, but without Assumption 6, will be
narrower than the corresponding bounds without Assumption 5.
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Assumption 7 (Stationarity). The transition matrix is constant across two consecutive
periods. Formally,
∗
∗
Pt,t+1
= Pt+1,t+2
.
∗
Proposition 7. Let p∗kl (t, t + 1) represent the elements of Pt,t+1
. Denote the bounds for
∗
pkl (t, t + 1) under some combination of Assumptions 2-6 as

LB(t, t + 1) ≤ p∗kl (t, t + 1) ≤ U B(t, t + 1).

(3.43)

∗
Define the elements and corresponding bounds similarly for Pt+1,t+2
. Adding Assumption 7
∗
∗
implies the following sharp bounds on the elements of P ∗ = Pt,t+1
= Pt+1,t+2
:

max{LB(t, t + 1), LB(t + 1, t + 2)} ≤ p∗kl ≤ min{U B(t, t + 1), U B(t + 1, t + 2)},

(3.44)

where p∗kl refers to the elements of P ∗ . Proof: Follows directly from Proposition 6.

3.3.3.3. Monotonicity Assumptions
Monotonicity restrictions place inequality constraints on population transition probabilities across observations with different observed attributes (Manski and Pepper 2000).
Assumption 8 (Monotonicity). The conditional probability of upward mobility is weakly
increasing in a vector of attributes, u, and the conditiional probability of downward mobility
is weakly decreasing in the same vector of attributes. Formally, if u2 ≥ u1 , then

p∗kl (u1 ) ≤ p∗kl (u2 ) ∀l > k
p∗kl (u1 ) ≥ p∗kl (u2 ) ∀l < k
p∗11 (u1 ) ≥ p∗11 (u2 )
p∗KK (u1 ) ≤ p∗KK (u2 ).

For instance, if u denotes the education of an individual, one might wish to assume that the
probability of upward (downward) mobility is no lower (higher) for individuals with more
education. Note, the monotonicity assumption provides no information on the conditional
staying probabilities, p∗kk (u), for k = 2, ..., K − 1.
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This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Denote the bounds for p∗kl (u) under some combination of Assumptions 2-5
as
LB(u) ≤ p∗kl (u) ≤ U B(u).
(3.45)
Adding Assumption 8 implies the following sharp bounds on the conditional transition probabilities
p∗kl (u)

≤ inf U B(u2 ) ∀l > k

(3.46)

p∗kl (u)

≤ inf U B(u2 ) ∀l < k

(3.47)

p∗11 (u)

≤ inf U B(u2 )

(3.48)

sup LB(u1 ) ≤ p∗KK (u) ≤ inf U B(u2 )

(3.49)

sup LB(u1 ) ≤
u1 ≤u

sup LB(u1 ) ≤
u≤u1

sup LB(u1 ) ≤
u≤u1

u≤u2

u2 ≤u

u2 ≤u
u≤u2

u1 ≤u

Assuming U is discrete, sharp bounds on the unconditional transition probabilities are given
as




X
X
∗
Pr(U = u) inf U B(u1 ) .
(3.50)
Pr(U = u) sup LB(u1 ) ≤ pkl ≤
u

u

u1 ≤u

u1 ≥u

Proof: This is a simple extension of Manski and Pepper (2000, Proposition 1 and Corollary
1).

3.3.4. Summary Mobility Measures
Upon obtaining bounds on the elements of the transition matrix, bounds on various
measures derived from these elements follow automatically. The Prais (1955) measure of
mobility is based on the mean exit time from partition k, given by
1
, k = 1, ..., K.
1 − p∗kk

(3.51)

Shorrocks (1978) defines the Immobility Ratio measure as
IR =

∗
K − tr(P0,1
)
K −1

(3.52)

where tr(·) is the trace of a matrix. Finally, Bradbury (2016) defines measures of upward
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and downward mobility that account for the size of the partitions. The upward mobility
measure is given by
UM =

K
(1 − p∗11 );
K −1

(3.53)

DM =

K
(1 − p∗KK ).
K −1

(3.54)

downward mobility is given by

Mobility is decreasing in the value of the Prais measure; increasing in the remaining three
measures.
The measures in in (3.51) and (3.53)-(3.54) can be sharply bounded in a straightforward
manner using sharp bounds on the individual conditional staying probabilities since each
measure depends on only one element from the transition matrix. This is not the case for IR
under the assumption of arbitrary misclassification errors (Assumption 2(i )). Under uniform
misclassification errors (Assumption 2(ii )), however, there is no additional information one
can use to tighten bounds on IR as the measure depends on only one element from each row
and column of the transition matrix. With arbitrary errors, there is additional information
and the bounds can be tightened. Here, the bounds are given by
P
P
K − k U Bkk
K − k LBkk
+ Q ≤ IR ≤
− Q,
K −1
K −1

(3.55)

where LBkk (U Bkk ) is the lower (upper) bounds for p∗kk under some set of assumptions. The
proof is given in Appendix G.
3.3.5. Properties

3.3.5.1. Bias Correction
In most of the cases considered here, estimates of the bounds are obtained via plug-in
estimators relying on infima and suprema. Such estimators are biased in finite samples,
producing bounds that are too narrow (Kreider and Pepper 2008). To circumvent this
issue, a bootstrap bias correction is typically used in the literature on partial identification.

86

Denote the plug-in estimators of the lower and upper bounds under some set of the preceding
d and U B U
d
assumptions as LB LB
B, respectively. The bootstrap bias corrected estimates are
given by

h
i
dc = 2LB LB
d − E∗ LB LB
d
LB LB
h
i
d
d
d
U BU
B c = 2U B U
B − E∗ U B U
B ,

dc and U B U
d
where LB LB
B c denote the bootstrap bias corrected estimates and E∗ [·] denotes
the expectation operator with respect to the bootstrap distribution. See Kreider and Pepper
(2008) and the references therein. However, there is an added complication here. Because we
are estimating bounds on probabilities, the upper (lower) bound is constrained by one (zero).
It is well known that the traditional bootstrap does not work for parameters at or near the
boundary of the parameter space (Andrews 2000). Instead, we employ subsampling, using
replicate samples with N/2 observations (Andrews and Guggenberger 2009; Martínez-Muñoz
and Suáreza 2010).12
3.3.5.2. Inference
A substantial body of literature exists on inference in partial identification models.
Horowitz and Manski (2000) use nonparametric analysis to provide bounds for data with
missing covariates and outcomes. They develop confidence intervals (CIs) that cover the
entire identification region using the bootstrap. Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007) extended Horowitz and Manski (2000) to models where the criterion function is minimized on
a identified set. Imbens and Manski (2004) propose CIs that asymptotically cover the “true”
value of the parameter with a fixed probability rather than cover the entire region with such
12

We employ sub-sampling (without replacement) rather than an m-bootstrap (with replacement), where
m < N , as sub-sampling is valid under weaker assumptions (Horowitz 2001). Noneless, our Stata code
allows for both options. Moreover, we set m = N/2 as it is unlikely that an optimal, data-driven choice of
m is available (or computationally feasible in the present context). Politis et al. (1999, p. 61) state that
“subsampling has some asymptotic validity across a broad range of choices for the subsample size” as long as
m/N → 0 and m → ∞ as N → ∞. Martínez-Muñoz and Suáreza (2010, p. 143) note that setting m = N/2
is “typical.”
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a probability.
In this paper, inference is handled via subsampling and the Imbens-Manski (2004) correction to obtain 90% confidence intervals (CIs). As with the bias correction, we set the size
of the replicate samples to N/2. Some comments on this choice is necessary as there has
been much recent work on inference in partially identified models; Canay and Shaikh (2016)
provide an excellent review. For instance, the random set theory, (conditional) moment
inequality and intersection bounds are widely used to provide estimations and inference for
partial identification models.
Moment Inequality Method works for models characterized by moment inequalities and
equalities. Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007) conduct the finite-sample inference by
obtaining asymptotic estimates of quantiles of the critical value using either a generic subsampling method or the asymptotic approximation to the distribution for it in the moment
condition problems. Andrews and Shi (2013) use instrument functions to transfer conditional
moment inequalities to unconditional moment inequalities. They use "Plug-in Asymptotic" (PA) critical values to construct confidence sets, they also show the confidence sets
constructed by subsampling, but the former one is preferred. To apply the (conditional)
moment inequality method, the economic model is required to be characterized by moment
function. In our paper, the parameter of interest Pr∗kl is determined by a given value of Q
and the properties of probability, rather than a population criterion function. Therefore, it
is more tractable to directly use subsampling bootstrap.
The random set variable approach is used for estimation and inference for partial identified population which has a compact and convex identification region that is equal to a
transformation of the Aumann expectation. Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) estimate set
valued random variables (SVRVs) instead of having parameters of interest as real numbers
or real vectors in point estimation. The inferential approach is based on the Hausdorff Distance between the population identification region and the estimator. The critical value is
obtained either by subsampling bootstrap or a simulation method. In the random set theory,
the key point is to have set valued random variable (SVRV), so that the parameter of interest
is interval- or set-identified. However, in our paper, the sum of measurement errors (Q) is
pre-determined and each conditional probability in the transition matrix is thus not mapped
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to a random set because the bounds depend on the value of Q.
Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2013) develop a partial identification method for intersection bounds estimation and inference. Intersection bounds are bounds defined by either the
infimum or supremum of a parametric or non-parametric function. They develop theory for
large sample inference based on the strong approximation of a sequence of series or kernelbased empirical processes by a sequence of penulimate Gaussian processes. The parameter
of interest in the intersection bounds method is characterized by lower bound and an upper
bound functions conditional on a vector of observed variables. The subsampling method is
still preferred in our paper because the lower and upper bounds can be directly obtained
under each assumption or restriction, it is not necessary to apply intersection bounds.
3.4. U.S. Mobility

3.4.1. Data
To assess U.S. intragenerational mobility, we use panel data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP). Collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, SIPP is a rotating,
nationally representative longitudinal survey of households. Begun in 1984, SIPP collects
detailed income data as well as data on a host of other economic and demographic attributes.
Households in the SIPP are surveyed over a multi-year period ranging from two and a half
years to four years. Then, a new sample of households are drawn. The sample sizes range
from approximately 14,000 to 52,000 households. Here, we use the 2004 and 2008 panels to
examine mobility leading up to the Great Recession and during the early recovery period. For
the 2004 panel, the initial period is November 2003 and the terminal period is October 2007.
For the 2008 panel, the initial period is June 2008 and the terminal period is September
2012. Thus, we investigate household-level income dynamics over two separate four-year
windows. We also assess mobility pooling the two panels.
For the analysis, the outcome variable is derived from total monthly household income
(variable THTOTINC). This includes income from all household members and sources: labor market earnings, pensions, social security income, interest dividends, and other income
sources. When analyzing the 2 × 2 poverty matrix, we determine poverty status for each
89

household in each period by comparing income with the SIPP-reported poverty threshold
for the household (variable RHPOV). When analyzing general mobility, we estimate 3 × 3
matrices based on terciles of the income distribution in each period. However, to adjust
for household composition, we construct three different measures of so-called equivalized
household income.13 Adjusting income for household size when drawing welfare or policy
conclusions is known to be crucial (e.g., Chiappori 2016). In our baseline analysis, we use
OECD equivalized household income (OECD 1982).14 As alternatives, we also construct OECD-modified equivalized household income (Haagenars et al. 1994) and per capita
household income.15 Specifically, the OECD (OECD-modified) equivalence scale assigns a
value of one to the first household member, 0.7 (0.5) to each additional adult, and of 0.5
(0.3) to each child. In contrast, the per capita measure assigns a value of one to all household
members. In the interest of brevity, results based on these alternative equivalence scales are
relegated to the appendix.
When assessing the two panels separately and imposing level set restrictions, we use
age of the household head in the initial period. Specifically, we group households into tenyear age bins (25-34, ..., 55-65) and impose the restriction that mobility is constant across
adjacent bins. For example, we tighten the bounds on mobility for households where the
head is, say, 30-34 by assuming that mobility is constant across households where the head
is 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39. When pooling the two panels and imposing level set restrictions,
we combine the age of household head restriction used in the case of separate panels with
a stationarity assumption that mobility is constant across the two panels. For example, we
tighten the bounds on mobility for households where the head is, say, 30-34 in the initial
period of the 2004 panel by assuming that mobility is constant across households where the
head is 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39 in the 2004 and 2008 panels.
13

There is no need to adjust income for household size when estimating the poverty transition matrix since
the poverty threshold already accounts for differences in household composition.
14

OECD equivalized household income for an individual household is defined as Y /N , where Y is total
household income, N = 1 + 0.7(A − 1) + 0.5C, and A (C) is the total number of adults (children) in the
household.
15

OECD-modified equivalized household income for an individual household is defined as Y /N , where Y
is total household income, N = 1 + 0.5(A − 1) + 0.3C, and A (C) is the total number of adults (children) in
the household.
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When imposing the monotonicity restrictions, we use the education of the household head
in the initial period. Here, households are grouped into three bins (high school graduate and
below, some college but less than a four-year degree, and at least a four-year college degree).
In constructing our estimation sample, we use only the initial and terminal wave for
each panel. The sample, by necessity, must be balanced. Households with any invalid or
missing information on the relevant variables are excluded. Finally, we restrict the sample to
households where the head is between 25 and 65 years old in the initial period. The sample
size for the 2004 panel is 7,834 and for the 2008 panel is 16,006.16 Summary statistics are
presented in Table 1.
3.4.2. Results

3.4.2.1. Poverty Transition Matrix
Results for the 2 × 2 poverty transition matrix are presented in Tables 2-4.17 Overall,
the observed poverty rate declined from 11.8% to 10.7% in the first panel (November 2003
to October 2007) and held constant at 12.6% in the second panel (June 2008 to September
2012); see Table 1. Turning to mobility, under the baseline assumption of Rank-Preserving
Measurement Error (Table 2, Panel I) the probability of a household remaining in poverty
across the initial and terminal periods in the first (second) SIPP panel is 0.448 (0.462), while
the probability of remaining out of poverty is 0.939 (0.923).18 Thus, observed transitions
out of (into) poverty are higher in the first (second) SIPP panel (transition out of poverty:
0.552 versus 0.538; transitions into poverty: 0.061 versus 0.077). This is not surprising since
16
The 2004 panel contains 10,503 households observed in the initial and terminal periods. Two observations
are dropped due to negative household income. The remainder are dropped because the household head is
outside the 25-65 year old age range. The 2008 panel panel contains 21,616 households observed in the
initial and terminal periods. 88 observations are dropped due to negative or missing household income. The
remainder are dropped because the household head is outside the 25-65 year old age range.
17

In all cases, we use 25 replicate samples for the subsampling bias correction and 100 replicate samples to
construct 90% Imbens-Manski (2004) confidence intervals via subsampling using m = N/2 without replacement. For brevity, we do not report bounds based on all possible combinations of restrictions. Unreported
results are available upon request.
18

Throughout the analysis, poverty status is measured only at the initial and terminal period. Thus, for
example, “remaining in poverty” does not mean a household is necessarily continuously in poverty over the
four-year period. For expositional purposes, however, we describe the results in terms of remaining in or out
of poverty.
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the second SIPP panel spans the end of the Great Recession and the early part of the recovery.

Misclassification Assumptions
Panels II and III in Table 2 allow for misclassification, but impose arbitrary (Assumption
2(i )) and uniform (Assumption 2(ii )) errors, respectively. The assumed maximum misclassification rate is 10% (Q = 0.10). The rationale for this choice is discussed in Supplemental
Appendix G; we also explore sensitivity to this choice below. In Panel II the bounds are
nearly uninformative on the mobility of households in poverty in the initial period in both
SIPP panels. Thus, a relatively small amount of arbitrary misclassification results, in the
absence of other information, in an inability to say anything about the four-year mobility
rates of households initially in poverty. For households initially above the poverty line, the
probability of remaining out of poverty four years later is at least 0.825 (0.808) in the first
(second) SIPP panel.19 Moreover, in the second SIPP panel, we are able to rule out the
possibility (at the 90% confidence level) that no households move into poverty over the four
years spanned by the second SIPP panel.
In Panel III the bounds are more informative. Thus, the assumption of uniform errors
has some identifying power. Under this assumption, the probability of escaping poverty is
at least 0.130 (0.142) in the first (second) SIPP panel. The probability of remaining out of
poverty is at least 0.882 (0.865) in the first (second) SIPP panel.
Panels IV and V in Table 2 add the assumption that misclassification is only in the
upward direction (Assumption 3). This assumption has no identifying power on the transition probabilities for households above the poverty line in the initial period. However, it
is useful in tightening the bounds on the transition probabilities for households in poverty
in the initial period. With arbitrary and uni-directional misclassification (Assumptions 2(i )
and 3), bounds on the probability of remaining in poverty four years later are [0.243, 1.000]
in the first SIPP panel and [0.258, 1.000] in the second SIPP panel. Under uniform and
uni-directional misclassification (Assumptions 2(ii ) and 3), bounds on the probability of remaining in poverty four years later are further tightened to [0.315, 0.870] in the first SIPP
19

Throughout the discussion of the results, we focus on the point estimates for simplicity. The confidence
intervals are generally not much wider than the point estimates of the bounds.
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panel and [0.331, 0.858] in the second SIPP panel. While the assumptions of uniformity and
uni-directional misclassification certainly tighten the bounds, the width of the bounds under
the assumption of 10% misclassification makes it clear than even relatively small amounts
of misclassification adds considerable uncertainty to estimates of income mobility.

Level Set Restrictions
Table 3 allows for misclassification, but imposes different combinations of Assumptions
2–7.20 For the separate SIPP panels, level set restrictions are based on the age of the
household head in the initial period. For the pooled panels, level set restrictions based on
the age of the household head are imposed within each panel and stationarity (Assumption
7) is imposed across the panels. In Panel I, the level set restrictions are not combined
with shape restrictions (Assumption 4). In Panel II, Assumption 4 is added to the level set
restrictions. Assumption 4 corresponds to the restriction that households are more likely
to maintain the same poverty status over the four-year period than change status. With
each panel, we present results based on different types of misclassification errors based on
Assumptions 2-3.
Several findings stand out. First, under arbitrary and independent misclassification errors
(Assumptions 2(i ) and 6), Panels IA and IIA reveal that the level set and shape restrictions
have little identifying power. There is some tightening of the lower bounds relative to Panel
II in Table 2, but it is modest. Second, under uniform and independent misclassification
errors (Assumptions 2(ii ) and 6), Panels IB and IIB reveal that the level set and shape
restrictions have substantial identifying power. For example, bounds on the probability of
remaining in poverty over the four-year period in the first SIPP panel under uniform errors
alone are [0.026, 0.870] (Table 2, Panel III), under level set restrictions with independent errors are [0.100, 0.810] (Table 3, Panel IB), and under level set and shape restrictions
with independent errors is [0.183, 0.810] (Table 3, Panel IIB). In addition, if we utilize the
pooled panels and impose the stationarity assumption, the bounds are further tightened to
[0.198, 0.823] (Table 3, Panel IIB). Under these assumptions, which seem plausible, at least 1
in 5 impoverished households in the initial period remain in poverty four years later. Third,
20

For brevity, not all combinations are presented. Full results are available upon request.
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adding the assumption of uni-directional misclassification errors has considerable identifying
power on the transition probabilities for households below the poverty line in the initial period. Now the bounds on the probability of remaining in poverty over the four-year period
in the first SIPP Panel are [0.315, 0.870], implying that at least 3 in 10 impoverished households in the initial period remain in poverty four years later. Finally, adding the stationarity
assumption modestly tightens the bounds further; bounds on the probability of remaining
in poverty over the four-year period under uniform, independent, and uni-directional errors
are [0.326, 0.862] (Table 3, Panels IC and IIC).

Monotonicity Restriction
Table 4 is similar to Table 3, but adds Assumption 8.21 The monotonicity restriction
requires upward mobility to be weakly increasing in the household head’s education level in
the initial period. In general, the monotonicity assumption has little identifying power in
this application as the bounds are only modestly tightened, if at all. For instance, assuming
uniform, independent, and uni-directional misclassification and imposing shape, level set,
and stationarity restrictions, adding the monotonicity restriction fails to tighten the bounds
on the probability of remaining in poverty across the initial and terminal periods (see Panel
IIC in Table 3 and 4).
3.4.2.2. Tercile Transition Matrix
Results for the 3 × 3 tercile transition matrix based on OECD equivalized household
income are presented in Tables 5-7. These tables are analogous to Tables 2-4 except we no
longer consider the assumption of uni-directional misclassification since now any upward misclassification must induce downward misclassification as well. Results based on alternative
equivalence scales are reported in the appendix, Tables G.1-G.8.
Under the baseline assumption of Rank-Preserving Measurement Error (Table 5, Panel
I) the conditional staying probabilities in the first (second) SIPP panel are 0.683, 0.533,
and 0.692 (0.685, 0.538, and 0.685) for terciles 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Thus, the observed
four-year conditional staying probabilities do not vary much across the two panels. Further21

For brevity, not all combinations are presented. Full results are available upon request.
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more, we find that the probability of observing larger movements in the income distribution
are less likely than smaller movements. For example, pooling the two panels together, the
probability of moving from the first to second tercile is 0.245 and the first to third tercile is
0.071. Similarly, the probability of moving from the third to second tercile is 0.217 and the
third to first tercile is 0.095.

Misclassification Assumptions
Panels II and III in Table 5 allow for misclassification, but impose Assumption 2(i ) and
2(ii ), respectively. The assumed maximum misclassification rate is at most 20% (Q = 0.20).
The rationale for this choice is discussed in Supplemental Appendix G; we also explore
sensitivity to this choice below. Under arbitrary misclassification (Assumption 2(i )), the
width of the bounds is one (= 2KQ) unless the bounds hit one of the boundaries. Under
uniform misclassification (Assumption 2(ii )), the width is 0.4 (= 2Q) unless the bounds hit
one of the boundaries. Thus, the bounds are guaranteed to be at least somewhat informative
in both cases, but the assumption of uniform misclassification has significant identifying
power. This assumption is reasonable if misclassification is equally likely in the upward and
downward direction. With mean-reverting measurement error in income, this is plausible.
Focusing on the pooled results, as these differ very little from the individual panel results, we find that the bounds on the conditional staying probabilities are [0.385, 0.985],
[0.238, 0.838], and [0.388, 0.988] across terciles 1, 2, and 3 under arbitrary misclassification.
The bounds tighten to [0.585, 0.785], [0.438, 0.638], and [0.588, 0.788] under uniform misclassification. Bounds on the off-diagonal elements, while generally lower as one moves further
from the diagonal, cannot rule out the possibility that large movements in the income distribution are more likely than smaller movements (conditional on changing terciles).

Level Set Restrictions
Table 6 allows for misclassification, but imposes different combinations of Assumptions
2–7.22 Because of the similarity of the results across the two SIPP panels in Table 5, we
focus on the results for the pooled sample where the stationarity restriction (Assumption 7)
22

For brevity, not all combinations are presented. Full results are available upon request.
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is imposed. In Panel I, the level set restrictions are not combined with shape restrictions
(Assumption 4). In Panel II, shape restrictions are imposed on top of the level set restrictions.
This assumption corresponds to the restriction that households are more likely to make
smaller movements in the income distribution than larger movements.
Several findings stand out. First, under arbitrary and independent misclassification errors
(Assumptions 2(i ) and 6), Panels IA and IIA reveal that the level set restrictions have some
identifying power. The shape restrictions do not add new information. As stated previously,
the bounds under arbitrary errors in Table 5 have a width of 0.6 unless the boundary comes
into play. After imposing the level set restrictions, the width of the bounds on the conditional staying probabilities falls to around 0.5. Thus, while still wide, there is some information
in the level set restrictions. Second, under uniform and independent misclassification errors
(Assumptions 2(ii ) and 6), Panels IB and IIB reveal that the level set restrictions continue
to have some identifying power. The shape restrictions continue to add no new information.
The bounds under uniform errors in Table 5 have a width of 0.2 unless the boundary comes
into play. After imposing the level set restrictions, the width of the bounds on the conditional staying probabilities falls to around 0.12. For example, bounds on the probability
of remaining in the bottom tercile over the four-year period in the pooled sample under
uniform errors alone are [0.585, 0.785] (Table 5, Panel III), but under level set restrictions
with independent errors are [0.623, 0.732] (Table 6, Panel IB). Finally, under uniform and
independent errors with the level set restrictions (including the stationarity assumption),
the bounds on the probabilities of extreme income mobility – both upward and downward
– exclude zero. However, under arbitrary and independent errors, the bounds include zero.
Thus, we can rule out the possibility that there is no movement from the first to third or
third to first tercile over the two four-year periods (at the 90% confidence level) only under
the assumption of uniform and independent errors.

Monotonicity Restriction
Table 7 adds the monotonicity assumption. Two findings emerge. First, the monotonicity
assumption has only modest identifying power under arbitrary, independent errors (Panels
IA and IIA). For instance, the bounds on the probability of remaining in the bottom tercile
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across the initial and terminal periods in the pooled sample tighten from [0.449, 0.907] to
[0.449, 0.888] (Panel IA in Table 6 and 7). Second, the monotonicity assumption has more
identifying power, in relative terms, under uniform, independent errors (Panels IB and IIB).
Here, the bounds on the probability of remaining in the bottom tercile across the initial and
terminal periods in the pooled sample tighten from [0.623, 0.732] to [0.623, 0.706] (Panel IB
in Table 6 and 7). The bounds on the probability of remaining in the top tercile across the
initial and terminal periods in the pooled sample tighten from [0.635, 0.764] to [0.635, 0.719]
(Panel IB in Table 6 and 7). In both cases, the bounds are fairly tight around the observed
conditional staying probabilities of 0.685 and 0.688, respectively (Table 5, Panel I).

Summary Mobility Measures
Bounds on the summary mobility measures are reported in Table 8.23 Generally speaking,
three conclusions can be drawn by this exercise. First, relative to the baseline assumption
of Rank-Preserving Measurement Error, one can assess the dramatic increase in uncertainty once misclassification rates of up to 10% are allowed. For example, the 90% confidence
interval for Shorrocks (1978) Immobility Ratio measure based on the first SIPP panel is
[0.529, 0.563] under rank-preserving measurement error. Under the assumption of arbitrary
errors (with Q = 0.10), the confidence interval is [0.084, 1.009]. Second, our strictest set of
assumptions – uniform, independent errors under level set, shape, and monotonicity restrictions – can tighten these bounds. Under these assumptions, the 90% confidence interval for
Shorrocks (1978) Immobility Ratio measure based on the first SIPP panel is [0.435, 0.659].
Finally, the bounds differ very little across the two SIPP panels. Thus, allowing for misclassification, there is no evidence that mobility changed across the two panels.
3.4.2.3. Sensitivity to Q
To explore the sensitivity of the bounds to the choice of Q, we re-estimate the bounds
varying Q from 0 to 0.20 (0.40) in the case of poverty (tercile) transition matrices. For the
sake of computational time, we focus on the point estimates of the bounds, not the confidence
23

For brevity, Table 8 displays only the 90% confidence intervals and not the point estimates of the bounds.
In addition, only the results for the individual panels are provided. All results are available upon request.
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intervals. Select results are presented in Figures G.1-G.5 in Supplemental Appendix G.
3.5. Conclusion
That self-reported income contains complex, nonclassical measurement error is a wellestablished fact. That administrative data on income is imperfect is also relatively uncontroversial. As such, addressing measurement error in the study of income mobility should
no longer be optional. To that end, several recent attempts to address measurement error
have been put forth. Here, we offer a new and complementary approach based on the partial
identification of transition matrices.
Among others, our approach has the advantage of transparency, as the assumptions used
to tighten the bounds are easily understood and may be imposed in any combination depending on the particular context and the beliefs of the researcher. Moreover, our approach
only requires data at two points in time. Finally, our approach extends easily to applications
other than income. The primary drawback to our approach is the lack of point identification.
Consequently, our approach should be viewed as a complement to existing approaches that
produce point estimates under more stringent (or, at least, alternative) identifying assumptions. Using data from the SIPP, we show that relatively small amounts of measurement
error leads to bounds that can be quite wide in the absence of other information or restrictions. However, the restrictions we consider contain significant identifying power. We are
hopeful that future work will consider additional restrictions that may be used to further
tighten the bounds on transition probabilities.
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APPENDIX A
ROBUSTNESS CHECK ON DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS OF CHILDBEARING AGE
WOMEN

Figure A.1. Synthetic Control Analysis Result for Women Aged 20-45

Figure A.2. Synthetic Control Analysis Result for Women Aged 25-35
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Figure A.3. Synthetic Control Analysis Result for Women Aged 25-40

Figure A.4. Synthetic Control Analysis Result for Women Aged 25-50
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APPENDIX B
FULL SET OF CONTROL VARIABLES

Treated Synthetic
number of children younger than 5

Treated Synthetic
female lfpr(1991)

0.704

0.733

1 child

0.745

0.745

female lfpr(1992)

0.718

0.749

2 children

0.192

0.191

female lfpr(1993)

0.644

0.717

3 children

0.058

0.058

female lfpr(1994)

0.701

0.712

more than 4

0.005

0.007

female lfpr(1995)

0.717

0.736

female lfpr(1996)

0.725

0.738

male lfpr(1980-1984)

0.953

0.943

female lfpr(1997)

0.759

0.749

male lfpr(1985-1989)

0.927

0.936

female lfpr 45-65 years old(1985-1989) 0.569

0.512

male lfpr(1990-1994)

0.918

0.916

female lfpr 45-65 years old(1990-1994) 0.536

0.546

male lfpr(1995-1997)

0.908

0.908

female lfpr 45-65 years old(1995-1997) 0.602

0.610

male lfpr 45-65 years old(80-84) 0.772

0.769

above poverty line

0.160

0.159

male lfpr 45-65 years old(85-89) 0.753

0.736

food stamp

0.099

0.108

male lfpr 45-65 years old(90-90) 0.793

0.740

free lunch

0.139

0.124

male lfpr 45-65 years old(95-97) 0.800

0.748

age<4

0.075

0.078

GDP

age4-18

0.214

0.212

white

0.853

0.823

age18-45

0.585

0.606

black

0.073

0.146

age>45

0.126

0.105

other race

0.073

0.032
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Treated Synthetic
average male education (1980-1991)

Treated Synthetic
famsize1

0.133

0.158

less than high school

0.141

0.169

famsize-1 member

0.133

0.158

high school

0.344

0.356

famsize-2 members

0.167

0.179

college unfinished

0.228

0.211

famsize-3 members

0.217

0.219

college and above

0.254

0.232

famsize-4 members

0.293

0.254

famsize-5 members

0.134

0.1205

average male education (1992-1997)
less than high school

0.115

0.155

famsize-6 members

0.039

0.0438

high school

0.378

0.367

famsize-7 members

0.017

0.027

some college

0.210

0.201

married

0.733

0.678

2 years in college

0.055

0.063

separated, divorced, widowed 0.185

0.189

3 years in college

0.176

0.154

never married

0.082

0.134

college degree

0.066

0.061

not in good health

0.322

0.322

good health condition

0.368

0.356

average female education (1980-1991)
less than high school

0.147

0.161

very good health condition

0.215

0.232

high school

0.416

0.423

excellent health condition

0.095

0.092

college unfinished

0.218

0.208

male personal income

college and above

0.181

0.178

male working hours

average female education (1992-1997)

17922.22 18958.45
40

40.04

age(1980-1984)

34.14

33.79

less than high school

0.109

0.144

age(1990-1994)

34.81

34.82

high school

0.392

0.362

age(1995-1997)

35.25

35.07

some college

0.223

0.223

female lfpr(1980)

0.633

0.646

2 years in college

0.075

0.075

female lfpr(1981)

0.654

0.652

3 years in college

0.151

0.150

female lfpr(1982)

0.653

0.688

college degree

0.050

0.047

female lfpr(1981)

0.654

0.652

family total income

32673.94 33921.59 female lfpr(1982)

0.653

0.688

number of children

female lfpr(1983)

0.736

0.705

no children

0.309

0.357

female lfpr(1984)

0.719

0.718

1 child

0.211

0.214

female lfpr(1985)

0.723

0.723

2 children

0.211

0.214

female lfpr(1986)

0.721

0.711

3 children

0.300

0.260

female lfpr(1987)

0.764

0.732

4 children

0.130

0.115

female lfpr(1988)

0.737

0.726

5 children

0.036

0.038

female lfpr(1989)

0.756

0.737

more than 6

0.013

0.017

female lfpr(1990)

0.759

Sources: IPUMS-CPS.
Notes: lfpr stands for labor force participation rates.
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Table B.1. Full Set of Explanatory Variables and Measure of Closeness

APPENDIX C
FERTILITY RATE OF WOMEN AGED 25-45

Figure C.1. Pre-k Enrollment Rate in Oklahoma

Figure C.2. Synthetic Control Analysis on Oklahoma Pre-k Enrollment Rate
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Figure C.3. Fertility Rate of Oklahoma Women Aged 25-45

Figure C.4. Synthetic Control Analysis on Fertility Rate of Women Aged 25-45
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APPENDIX D
EFFECTS OF OKLAHOMA UNIVERSAL PRE-K ON OTHER SAMPLES

Figure D.1. Synthetic Control Analysis on Full-time Labor Force Participation Rate of
Mothers with Children Younger than 5 Years Old

Figure D.2. Synthetic Control Analysis on Employment Rate of Mothers with Children
Younger than 5 Years Old
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Figure D.3. Synthetic Control Analysis on Employment Rate of Mothers with 4-year-olds
Only

Figure D.4. Synthetic Control Analysis on Full-time Labor Force Participation Rate (Georgia)

Figure D.5. Synthetic Control Analysis on Employment Rate (Georgia)
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APPENDIX E
SUBSAMPLE RESULTS OF THE EFFECT OF OKLAHOMA UNIVERSAL PRE-K

Figure E.1. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate (Below Poverty
Line)

Figure E.2. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours (Below Poverty Line)
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Figure E.3. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate (Above Poverty
Line)

Figure E.4. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours (Above Poverty Line)

Figure E.5. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate (Married)
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Figure E.6. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours (Married)

Figure E.7. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate (Unmarried)

Figure E.8. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours (Unmarried)
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Figure E.9. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate (Differential
Education Level—Lower than Highschool, High School, College and Above College by Order)

Figure E.10. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours (Differential Education
Level—Lower than Highschool, High School, College and Above College by Order)
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Figure E.11. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate (Fewer than 2
Children)

Figure E.12. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours (Fewer than 2 Children)

Figure E.13. Synthetic Control Analysis on Labor Force Participation Rate (More than 2
Children)
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Figure E.14. Synthetic Control Analysis on Weekly Working Hours (More than 2 Children)

Figure E.15. Synthetic control analysis on women (25-45) with less than high school education level

Figure E.16. Synthetic control analysis on women (25-45) with high school education level
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Figure E.17. Synthetic control analysis on women (25-45) with college and above education
level

Figure E.18. Synthetic control analysis on women (25-45) with family income above poverty
line

Figure E.19. Synthetic control analysis on women (25-45) with family income below poverty
line
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Figure E.20. Synthetic control analysis on married mothers

Figure E.21. Synthetic control analysis on unmarried mothers
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APPENDIX F
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 3
Literature Review
We identify three general approaches to handling measurement error in the study of mobility in the existing literature: (i) ignore it, (ii) ad hoc data approaches, and (iii) structural
approaches. The first, and most common, approach is to note the problem and then ignore
it. Pavlopoulos et al. (2012, p. 750) state that “despite the enormous bias that measurement
error can cause in the estimation of wage dynamics, most relevant studies ignore this phenomenon.” Lee et al. (2017, p. 37) write that “most studies of income and poverty dynamics
have ignored potential measurement error biases in the transition matrices, although the
presence of measurement error in both income and expenditure survey data has been widely
acknowledged.”
The second strategy we refer to as ad hoc data approaches. Trimming is one example and
refers to the practice of deleting a fraction (say, 1%) of the poorest and richest observations
in the sample. Jäntti and Jenkins (2015, p. 862) note that trimming has been “applied in
virtually every study cited.” The motivation for trimming is the removal of outliers that may
represent measurement error (e.g., Maasoumi and Trede 2001). The drawbacks to trimming
include the fact that outliers may arise for reasons other than measurement error and that
it does not address measurement error outside the tails of the distribution.
A second example of an ad hoc approach is to average income data over several years.
Thus, when computing mobility between two points in time, income in the initial (terminal)
period is taken as, say, the three-year average around the true initial (terminal) period.
Such a strategy was popularized in Solon (1992); see Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011)
and Bradbury (2016) for more recent examples. The motivation for averaging income over
several periods is to smooth away measurement error. However, there are several drawbacks
to this procedure. First, averaging smooths away all time-varying idiosyncratic sources
of income variation, regardless of whether the variation arises from measurement error or
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legitimate shocks to income. Second, averaging will not remove measurement error that is
persistent over time. Finally, averaging requires data from more than two time periods, a
requirement that may be prohibitive.
A third example of an ad hoc approach is the pseudo-panel estimator in Antman and
McKenzie (2007), although the approach can also be applied with genuine panel data. Here,
rather than averaging income over several periods for each observation, income is averaged
over individuals assigned to the same cohort within each time period. Measures of mobility are then computed using panel data at the cohort level. As in the preceding case, the
motivation for averaging income within cohorts and time periods is to smooth away measurement error. Again, though, there are several drawbacks. First, averaging smooths away all
time-varying idiosyncratic sources of income variation. Second, cohorts must remain stable
over time, which is not assured when using pseudo-panel data, and cohorts must be large.
Finally, the definition of cohorts is arbitrary and shrinks the effective sample size.
The final general strategy used in the extant literature we refer to as structural approaches. Approaches falling under this category represent the forefront of the literature and can be
sub-divided into two groups. The first group seeks to estimate a scalar measure of mobility:
either the correlation coefficient between (true) log incomes in the initial and terminal periods, denoted by ρ, or the elasticity of (true) terminal period income with respect to (true)
initial period income, denoted by β in the following linear regression model
∗
∗
ln(y1i
) = α + β ln(y0i
) + εi ,

(F.1)

∗
∗
where y0i
(y1i
) is income in the true initial (terminal) period for observation i. Glewwe

(2012) notes that if we define βR as the coefficient in the reverse regression, given by
∗
∗
) = αR + βR ln(y1i
) + ηi ,
ln(y0i

(F.2)

then
q
plim

b · ββ
b = ρ,
ββ
R
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(F.3)

b and β β
b denote the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the corresponding
where β β
R
population parameters.
b and β β
bR
With measurement error, the researcher observes y0i and y1i . As such, β β
are inconsistent and the square root of their product provides a consistent estimate of the
correlation between the logs of observed income, not true income. The solution proffered in
the literature is to recover consistent estimates of β, βR , and ρ via instrumental variables
(IV). There are two drawbacks to this approach. First, obtaining credible instruments is
extremely difficult (if not impossible). Antman and McKenzie (2007) and Glewwe (2012)
offer detailed examinations of this issue. Second, the scalar nature of ρ and β precludes
examination of mobility at different parts of the distribution.
The second group of structural approaches are discussed in the main text.
Misclassification Probabilities
∗
as
We can write the elements of P0,1

p∗kl =

Pr(y0∗ ∈ k, y1∗ ∈ l)
Pr(y0∗ ∈ k)
(k0 −k,l0 −l)

P

Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l) +

k0 ,l0 =1,2,...,K
(k0 −k,l0 −l)6=(0,0)

=
k0 ,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
k0 6=k

rkl +

k0 ,l0 =1,2,...,K
(k0 −k,l0 −l)6=(0,0)

=
pk +

P
k0 ,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
k0 6=k

θ(k,lel)

(k0 −k,l0 −l)

P

θ(k,l)

(k0 −k,l0 −le
l)

θ(k,lel)

ke
k,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
ke
k6=k

ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
(ke
k,le
l)6=(k,l)

P

−

ke
k,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
ke
k6=k

θ(kek,lel)

(k−ke
k,l0 −le
l)

P

−

P

−

(k−ke
k,l−le
l)

P

−

ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
(ke
k,le
l)6=(k,l)

(k0 −k,l0 −le
l)

P

Pr(y0 ∈ k) +

θ(k,l)

θ(kek,lel)

(k−ke
k,l−le
l)

θ(kek,lel)

(k−ke
k,l0 −le
l)

θ(kek,lel)




= K Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l) +



X
k0 ,l0 =1,2,...,K
(k0 −k,l0 −l)6=(0,0)
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(k0 −k,l0 −l)
θ(k,l)

−

X
ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
(ke
k,le
l)6=(k,l)



(k−ke
k,l−le
l) 
θ(kek,lel)
,


where the final line holds only in the case of equal-sized partitions. The transition probabilities are not identified from the data alone. The data identify Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l) and
Pr(y0 ∈ k), but not the misclassification parameters, θ. In principal, one can compute sharp
bounds by searching across the unknown misclassification parameters. There are K 2 (K 2 −1)
∗
misclassification parameters in P0,1
. However, the following constraints must hold.
(k−ke
k,l−le
l)

P

(i) 0 ≤

θ(kek,lel)

≤ Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l) ≡ rkl ,

k, l = 1, ..., K

ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
(ke
k,le
l)6=(k,l)
(k−ke
k,l0 −le
l)

P

(ii) 0 ≤

ke
k,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
ke
k6=k

θ(kek,lel)

(k−ke
k,l0 −le
l)

P

(iii) 0 ≤

k0 ,ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
le
l6=l

θ(kek,lel)

≤ Pr(y0 ∈ k) ≡ pk ,

k = 1, ..., K

≤ Pr(y0 ∈ l) ≡ pl ,

l = 1, ..., K

The K 2 inequality constraints in (i) must hold since the fraction of observations incorrectly
classified as belonging to partition (k, l) cannot exceed the fraction of observations classified
as belonging to this partition. The K inequality constraints in (ii) and (iii) must hold since
the fraction of observations incorrectly classified as belonging to partition k in period 0 or
partition l in period 1 cannot exceed the fraction of observations classified as belonging to
these partitions.
In addition, the following constraints must hold in the case of equal-sized partitions:
(iv.a)

(k0 −k,l0 −le
l)

P
k0 ,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
k0 6=k

(v.a)

θ(k,lel)

k0 ,ke
k,l0 =1,2,...,K
l0 6=l
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ke
k,l0 ,le
l=1,2,...,K
ke
k6=k

(k0 −ke
k,l0 −l)

P

θ(kek,l)

P
k0 ,l0 =1,2,...,K
(k0 −k,l0 −l)6=(0,0)

(k−ke
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P

−

θ(kek,lel)

(k0 −ke
k,l−le
l)

P

−

k0 ,ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
le
l6=l
(k0 −k,l0 −l)

θ(k,l)

−

= 0,

θ(kek,lel)

P
ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
(ke
k,le
l)6=(k,l)

= 0,

(k−ke
k,l−le
l)

θ(kek,lel)

k = 1, ..., K

l = 1, ..., K

≤

1
K

− rkl ,

k, l = 1, ..., K

The constraints in (iv.a) and (v.a) follow from the fact that Pr(y0 ∈ k) = Pr(y1 ∈ l) = 1/K.
∗
The constraints in (vi.a) follow from the fact that rkl
≡ Pr(y0∗ ∈ k, y1∗ ∈ l) ∈ [0, 1/K].

If the partitions are of unequal size, then the following constraints must hold:
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P
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(k0 −ke
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θ(kek,l)

P
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(k0 −k,l0 −l)6=(0,0)
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P

−

ke
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l=1,2,...,K
ke
k6=k

−

(k−ke
k,l0 −le
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θ(kek,lel)

(k0 −ke
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l)

P
k0 ,ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
le
l6=l

−

P
ke
k,le
l=1,2,...,K
(ke
k,le
l)6=(k,l)

≤ 1 − pk ,

θ(kek,lel)

(k−ke
k,l−le
l)

θ(kek,lel)

≤ 1 − pl ,

≤ 1 − rkl ,

k = 1, ..., K

l = 1, ..., K

k, l = 1, ..., K

The constraints in (iv.b) and (v.b) follow from the fact that p∗k ≡ Pr(y0∗ ∈ k) ∈ [0, 1]
and p∗l ≡ Pr(y1∗ ∈ l) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, the constraints in (vi.b) follow from the fact that
∗
≡ Pr(y0∗ ∈ k, y1∗ ∈ l) ∈ [0, 1].
rkl
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Proofs for Propositions
Proof for Proposition 1
Assumption 1 implies Q1,kl = Q2,kl = Q3,k = Q4,k = 0, ∀k, l. Therefore,
Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l) + Q1,kl − Q2,kl
Pr(y0 ∈ k) + Q3,k − Q4,k
Pr(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l)
=
Pr(y0 ∈ k)


I(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l)
=E
I(y0 ∈ k)

p∗kl =

= KE[I(y0 ∈ k, y1 ∈ l)]
where the last line holds in the case of equal-sized partitions. The sample analog s of p∗kl ,
denoted by pˆkl , is thus given by
P

I(y0i ∈ k, y1i ∈ l)
P
i I(y0i ∈ k)
P
I(y0i ∈ k, y1i ∈ l)
= i
N/K
KX
=
I(y0i ∈ k, y1i ∈ l)
N i

pˆkl =

i

where the last two line holds in the case of equal-sized partitions.

Proof for Proposition 3
Let it be known that Q ≤ 1, then
p∗kl = [0, 1] ∩ [

rkl − Q2,kl rkl + Q1,kl
,
]
pk + Q3,k pk − Q4,k

The component before intersection follows the definition of probability, such that p∗kl ∈ [0, 1].
The lower bound of in the second component in the right hand side is obtained by setting
Q1,kl = Q4,k = 0, and the upper bound is obtained by setting Q2,kl = Q3,k = 0.
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The bound can be written as
max{

rkl + Q1,kl
rkl − Q2,kl
, 0} ≤ p∗kl ≤ min{
, 1}
pk + Q3,k
pk − Q4,k

When the lower bounds are obtained, Q1,kl = Q4,k = 0. This implies
0 ≤ rkl − Q2,kl ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ pk + Q3,k ≤ 1
Equivalently,
0 ≤ Q2,kl ≤ rkl , and 0 ≤ Q3,k ≤ 1 − pk
When the upper bounds are obtained, Q2,kl = Q3,k = 0. This implies
0 ≤ rkl + Q1,kl ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ pk − Q4,k ≤ 1
Equivalently,
0 ≤ Q1,kl ≤ 1 − rkl , and 0 ≤ Q3,k ≤ pk
Since setting Q1,kl = Q4,k = 0 wil not increase Q2,kl and Q3,k ; and setting Q2,kl = Q3,k = 0
will not increase Q1,kl and Q4,k . Under Assumption 2(i), we have
Q1,kl + Q4,k ≤ Q
Q2,kl + Q3,k ≤ Q
Under Assumption 2(ii), we have
Q1,kl + Q4,k ≤ Q/K
Q2,kl + Q3,k ≤ Q/K
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Thus we can bound the transition probability by assigning a value to Q. It follows that if
rkl = Q2,kl the lower bound on the true transition probability is zero. And if

rkl +Q1,kl
pk −Q4,k

> 1,

the upper bound is one. The bound becomes wider if Q increases.

Proof for Proposition 4
In the 2 × 2 transition matrix case, following equation (5) we have,
p∗11 =
=
p∗12 =
=
p∗21 =
=
p∗22 =
=

r11 + Q1,11 − Q2,11
p1 + Q3,1 − Q4,1
0−1
−10
−1−1
10
01
11
r11 + (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ11
) − (θ12
+ θ21
+ θ22
)
1−1
−10
−11
−10
−1−1
10
11
10
)
p1 + (θ11 + θ11 + θ12 + θ12 ) − (θ21 + θ21 + θ22 + θ22
r12 + Q1,12 − Q2,12
p1 + Q3,1 − Q4,1
0−1
1−1
−11
−10
10
01
r12 + (θ12
+ θ12
+ θ12
) − (θ11
+ θ21
+ θ22
)
1−1
−10
−11
−10
−1−1
10
11
10
p1 + (θ11 + θ11 + θ12 + θ12 ) − (θ21 + θ21 + θ22 + θ22
)
r21 + Q1,21 − Q2,21
p2 + Q3,2 − Q4,2
−10
−11
1−1
0−1
01
10
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+ θ21
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+ θ12
+ θ22
)
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−10
−11
−1−1
1−1
10
11
10
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)
r22 + Q1,22 − Q2,22
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−10
0−1
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11
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) − (θ11
−10
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−11
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1−1
10
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p2 + (θ21 + θ22 + θ21 + θ22 ) − (θ11 + θ11 + θ12 + θ12
)

Since all the θs with negative superscripts are the probabilities of misreporting to be in a
lower partition, specifically in the 2 × 2 case, superscript -1 means in the time period, the
person reports herself to be in Partition 1 while she is truely in Parition 1, under Assumption
3, are all the θs with negative superscripts are zero. Therefore, we have
10
01
11
r22 + (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ11
)
10
11
10
p2 + (θ11 + θ11 + θ12 )
10
01
r12 + θ12
− θ11
=
10
11
10
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+ θ11
+ θ12
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01
10
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10
11
10
p2 − (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ12
)
11
10
01
r22 − (θ11 + θ12 + θ21 )
=
10
11
10
p2 − (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ12
)

p∗11 =
p∗12
p∗21
p∗22
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∗
10
01
11
10
1) For P11
, the lower bound is obtained when θ11
= θ11
= θ11
= 0 and θ12
= Q, or

equivalently, Q1,11 = 0, Q3,1 = Q. And since p∗1 ∈ [0, 1], we have 0 ≤ p1 + Q ≤ 1. Therefore,
p∗11 ≥

r11
min{p1 + Q, 1}

01
11
10
10
= Q, or equivalently,
= 0 and θ11
= θ11
= θ12
The upper bound is obtained when θ11

Q1,11 = Q, Q3,1 = 0. And since p∗11 ∈ [0, 1], we have
p∗11 ≤ min{

r11 + Q
, 1}
p1

∗
Therefore, the bound for P11
is given by

r11
r11 + Q
≤ p∗11 ≤ min{
, 1}
min{p1 + Q, 1}
p1
∗
10
10
11
01
2) For P12
, the lower bound is obtained when θ12
= θ11
= θ11
= 0 and θ11
= Q, or

equivalently, Q1,12 = Q3,1 = 0, Q2,12 = Q. And since p∗12 ∈ [0, 1], we have
p∗12 ≥ max{

r12 − Q
, 0}
p1

10
11
01
10
= Q, or equivalently,
= 0 and θ12
= θ11
= θ11
The upper bound is obtained when θ11

Q1,12 = Q3,1 = 0, Q2,12 = 0. And since p∗12 ∈ [0, 1], we have
p∗12 ≤ min{

r12 + Q
, 1}
p1 + Q

∗
Therefore, the bound for P12
is given by

max{

r12 + Q
r12 − Q
, 0} ≤ p∗12 ≤ min{
, 1}
p1
p1 + Q

∗
10
10
11
10
3) For P21
, the lower bound is obtained when θ21
= θ12
= θ11
= 0 and θ11
= Q, or
∗
equivalently, Q1,21 = Q4,2 = Q, Q2,21 = 0. And since r21
, p∗2 ∈ [0, 1], we have

p∗21 ≥ max{

r21 − Q
, 0}
p2 − Q
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10
01
10
11
The upper bound is obtained when θ11
= 0, θ21
= Q1 and θ12
= θ11
= Q4 , or equivalently,

Q1,21 = Q1 , Q4,2 = Q4 and Q2,21 = 0. And since p∗2 ∈ [0, 1], we have 0 ≤ p2 − Q ≤ 1.
Therefore,
p∗21 ≤ min{

r21 + Q1
, 1}
max{p2 − Q4 , 0}

where
Q1 , Q4 ≥ 0
Q1 + Q4 ≤ Q
∗
is given by
Therefore, the bound for P12

max{

r21 − Q
r21 + Q1
, 0} ≤ p∗21 ≤ min{
, 1}
p2 − Q
max{p2 − Q4 , 0}

In addition to
Q1 , Q4 ≥ 0
Q1 + Q4 ≤ Q
∗
10
10
11
01
4) For P22
, the lower bound is obtained when θ12
= θ11
= θ11
= 0 and θ21
= Q, or

equivalently, Q4,2 = 0, Q2,22 = Q. And since p∗22 ∈ [0, 1], we have
p∗22 ≥ max{

r22 − Q
, 0}
p2

11
10
01
10
The upper bound is obtained when θ11
= θ12
= θ21
= 0 and θ11
= Q, or equivalently,

Q4,2 = Q, Q2,22 = 0. And since p∗2 ∈ [0, 1], we have 0 ≤ p2 − Q ≤ 1. Therefore,
p∗22 ≤ min{

r22
, 1}
max{p2 − Q, 0}
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∗
Therefore, the bound for P12
is given by

max{

r22
r22 − Q
, 0} ≤ p∗22 ≤ min{
, 1}
p2
max{p2 − Q, 0}

Altogether, we have
r11
≤ p∗11
min{p1 + Q, 1}
r12 − Q
, 0} ≤ p∗12
max{
p1
r21 − Q
max{
, 0} ≤ p∗21
p2 − Q
r22 − Q
, 0} ≤ p∗22
max{
p2

r11 + Q
, 1}
p1
r12 + Q
≤ min{
, 1}
p1 + Q
r21 + Q1
≤ min{
, 1}
max{p2 − Q4 , 0}
r22
≤ min{
, 1}
max{p2 − Q, 0}
≤ min{

In addition to
Q1 , Q4 ≥ 0
Q1 + Q4 ≤ Q
Proof for Proposition 5
To make the notations simple, denote the bounds on p∗kl under some combination of Assumption 2-3 as
LBkl ≤ p∗kl ≤ U Bkl

(F.4)

1) First, if k=l then |k − l|= 0, since p∗kl is weakly decreasing in |k − l|, p∗kl is maximized at
k=l. Formally,
0

p∗kl ≥ LBkl0 ∀l = 1, ..., K ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≥
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sup LBkl0

l0 =1,...,K

and
0

p∗kl ≥ LBk0 l ∀k = 1, ..., K, ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≥

sup
k0 =1,...,K

LBk0 l

We also know the condition (C.1), therefore we obtain equation (21)

max


sup LBkl0 ,

l0 =1,...,K

sup
k0 =1,...,K

LBk0 l

≤ p∗kl ≤ U Bkl if k = l

0

0

0

2) Second, if k < l, Suppose i) there exists an l ≥ l, so that k < l ≤ l , then |k − l|≤ |k − l |,
since p∗kl is weakly decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≥ LBkl0 ∀l ≥ l ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≥ sup LBkl0
l0 ≥l

0

0

0

Suppose ii) there exists an l ≤ l, so that k ≤ l ≤ l, then |k − l |≤ |k − l|, since p∗kl is weakly
decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≤ U Bkl0 ∀k ≤ l ≤ l ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≤ inf0 U Bkl0
k≤l ≤l

0

0

0

Suppose iii) there exists a k ≥ k, so that k ≤ k ≤ l, then |k − l|≤ |k − l|, since p∗kl is weakly
decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≤ U Bk0 l ∀k ≤ k ≤ l ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≤ inf0 U Bk0 l
k≤k ≤l

0

0

0

Suppose v) there exists a k ≤ k, so that k ≤ k < l, then |k − l|≥ |k − l|, since p∗kl is weakly
decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≥ LBk0 l ∀k ≤ k ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≥ sup LBk0 l
k0 ≤k

We also know the condition (C.1), therefore we obtain equation (22)




∗
max sup LBkl0 , sup LBk0 l ≤ pkl ≤ min inf0 U Bkl0 , inf0 U Bk0 l if k < l
l0 ≥l

k≤l ≤l

k0 ≤k
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k≤k ≤l

0

0

0

3) Third, if k > l, Suppose i) there exists a k ≥ k, so that l < k ≤ k , then |k − l|≤ |k − l |,
since p∗kl is weakly decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≥ LBk0 l ∀k ≥ k ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≥ sup LBk0 l
k0 ≥k

0

0

0

Suppose ii) there exists a k ≤ k, so that l ≤ k ≤ k, then |k − l|leq|k − l|, since p∗kl is weakly
decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≤ U Bk0 l ∀l ≤ k ≤ k ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≤ inf
U Bk 0 l
0
l≤k ≤k

0

0

0

Suppose iii) there exists an l ≥ l, so that l ≤ l ≤ k, then |k − l|≤ |k − l |, since p∗kl is weakly
decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≤ U Bkl0 ∀l ≤ l ≤ k ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≤ inf
U Bkl0
0
l≤l ≤k

0

0

0

Suppose v) there exists a l ≤ l, so that l ≤ l < k, then |k − l |≤ |k − l|, since p∗kl is weakly
decreasing in |k − l|, we have
0

p∗kl ≥ LBkl0 ∀l ≤ l ⇐⇒ p∗kl ≥ sup LBkl0
l0 ≤l

We also know the condition (C.1), therefore we obtain equation (23)




∗
U Bkl0 , inf
U Bk0 l if k > l
max sup LBkl0 , sup LBk0 l ≤ pkl ≤ min inf
0
0
l0 ≤l

l≤l ≤k

k0 ≥k

Proposition 5 is proved.
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l≤k ≤k

Proof for Corollary 6.1
From Equation (24) and Assumption 6, we have
rkl (x) + Q1,kl (x) − Q2,kl (x)
pk (x) + Q3,k (x) − Q4,k (x)
rkl (x) + Q1,kl − Q2,kl
=
pk (x) + Q3,k − Q4,k

p∗kl =

In the case of equal-sized partitions, we have p∗k = pk =

1
,
K

so that Q3,k = Q4,k . Therefore,

we have
=

rkl (x) + Q1,kl − Q2,kl
pk (x)

Under Assumption 2(i), which implies Q1,kl + Q2,kl + Q3,k + Q4,k ≤ Q, the bound is given by

max




1
1
∗
(rkl (x) − Q), 0 ≤ pkl (x) ≤ min
(rkl (x) + Q), 1 .
pk (x)
pk (x)

(F.5)

where the lower bound is obtained by setting Q1,kl = 0 and Q2,kl = Q, and the upper bound
is given by setting Q1,kl = Q and Q2,kl = 0.
NOTE: Professor, please check the lower bounds, if the nonzero item of lower
the LB is possible to be (always) positive.
Under Assumption 2(ii), which implies Q1,kl + Q2,kl + Q3,k + Q4,k ≤ Q/K, the bound is given
by

max




1
1
∗
(rkl (x) − Q/K), 0 ≤ pkl (x) ≤ min
(rkl (x) + Q/K), 1 .
pk (x)
pk (x)

(F.6)

where the lower bound is obtained by setting Q1,kl = 0 and Q2,kl = Q, and the upper bound
is given by setting Q1,kl = Q and Q2,kl = 0.
Now without Assumption 6, given Equation (24) and following the Proof for Proposition 3,
the bound of Pr∗kl (x) is given by
max{

rkl (x) − Q2,kl (x)
rkl (x) + Q1,kl (x)
, 0} ≤ p∗kl (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
pk (x) + Q3,k (x)
pk (x) − Q4,k (x)
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where the lower bounds are obtained by setting Q1,kl (x) = Q4,k (x) = 0 and the upper bounds
are obtained by setting Q2,kl (x) = Q3,k (x) = 0.
We also have,
0 ≤ rkl (x) − Q2,kl (x) ≤ 1
0 ≤ rkl (x) + Q1,kl (x) ≤ 1
0 ≤ pk (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ 1
0 ≤ pk (x) − Q4,k (x) ≤ 1
Or,
0 ≤ Q2,kl (x) ≤ rkl (x)

(F.7)

0 ≤ Q1,kl (x) ≤ 1 − rkl (x)

(F.8)

0 ≤ Q3,k (x) ≤ 1 − pk (x)

(F.9)

0 ≤ Q4,k (x) ≤ pk (x)

(F.10)

The law of total probability implies
P r(y0 ∈ k)∗ = P r(y0∗ ∈ k|X = x)P r(X = x) + P r(y0∗ ∈ k|X = x̄)P r(X = x̄)
= P r(y0∗ ∈ k|X = x)P r(X = x) + P r(y0∗ ∈ k|X = x̄)[1 − P r(X = x)]
In the case of equal-sized partitions, we know P r(y0 ∈ k)∗ =

1
,
K

therefore we have

1
= p∗k (x)P r(X = x) + p∗k (x̄)[1 − P r(X = x)]
K
1
− P r(X = x)p∗k (x)
⇐⇒ p∗k (x̄) = K
1 − P r(X = x)
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And since p∗k (x̄) ∈ [0, 1], we have
− P r(X = x)p∗k (x)
≤1
0≤
1 − P r(X = x)
− [1 − P r(X = x)]
1
≤ p∗k (x) ≤
P r(X = x)
KP r(X = x)
1
K

⇐⇒

1
K

(F.11)

Now we derive the bounds using the information above.
1) When the lower bounds are obtained, Q1,kl (x) = Q4,k (x) = 0, we have p∗k (x) = pk (x) +
Q3,k (x), or Q3,k (x) = p∗k (x) − pk (x), applying (C.6), we have
1
K

− [1 − P r(X = x)]
1
− pk (x) ≤ Q3,k (x) ≤
− pk (x)
P r(X = x)
KP r(X = x)

(F.12)

From (C.3) and (C.7), we obtain the following bound
max{

1
K



− [1 − P r(X = x)]
1
− pk (x), 0} ≤ Q3,k (x) ≤ min 1 − pk (x),
− pk (x)
P r(X = x)
KP r(X = x)
(F.13)

2) When the upper bounds are obtained, Q2,kl (x) = Q3,k (x) = 0, we have p∗k (x) = pk (x) −
Q4,k (x), or Q4,k (x) = pk (x) − p∗k (x), applying (C.6), we have
pk −

1
≤ Q4,k (x) ≤ pk (x) −
kP r(X = x)

1
K

− [1 − P r(X = x)]
P r(X = x)

(F.14)

From (C.4) and (C.9), we obtain the following bound
1
max{pk −
, 0} ≤ Q4,k (x) ≤ min{pk (x), pk (x) −
kP r(X = x)
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1
K

− [1 − P r(X = x)]
} (F.15)
P r(X = x)

Also, Assumption 2(i) implies Q1,kl + Q2,kl + Q3,k + Q4,k ≤ Q, and Assumption 2(ii) implies
Q1,kl + Q2,kl + Q3,k + Q4,k ≤ Q/K. We know that under Assumption 2(i),
Q1,kl + Q2,kl + Q3,k + Q4,k = Q1,kl (x)P r(X = x) + Q2,kl (x)P r(X = x)
+ Q3,k (x)P r(X = x) + Q4,k (x)P r(X = x)
≤Q
and under Assumption 2(ii),
Q1,kl + Q2,kl + Q3,k + Q4,k = Q1,kl (x)P r(X = x) + Q2,kl (x)P r(X = x)
+ Q3,k (x)P r(X = x) + Q4,k (x)P r(X = x)
≤ Q/K
Therefore, we have

Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}

under Assumption Assumption 2(i) or

Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}

under Assumption Assumption 2(ii).
Corollary 6.1 is proved.
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Proof for Corollary 6.2
Given Equation (24) and following the Proof for Proposition 3, with unequal-sized partitions,
the bound of Pr∗kl (x) is given by
max{

rkl (x) − Q2,kl (x)
rkl (x) + Q1,kl (x)
, 0} ≤ p∗kl (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
pk (x) + Q3,k (x)
pk (x) − Q4,k (x)

(F.16)

where the lower bounds are obtained by setting Q1,kl (x) = Q4,k (x) = 0 and the upper bounds
are obtained by setting Q2,kl (x) = Q3,k (x) = 0.
We also have,
0 ≤ rkl (x) − Q2,kl (x) ≤ 1
0 ≤ rkl (x) + Q1,kl (x) ≤ 1
0 ≤ pk (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ 1
0 ≤ pk (x) − Q4,k (x) ≤ 1
Or,
0 ≤ Q2,kl (x) ≤ rkl (x)

(F.17)

0 ≤ Q1,kl (x) ≤ 1 − rkl (x)

(F.18)

0 ≤ Q3,k (x) ≤ 1 − pk (x)

(F.19)

0 ≤ Q4,k (x) ≤ pk (x)

(F.20)

Under Assumption 6, we have
Q1,kl (x) = Q1,kl , Q2,kl (x) = Q2,kl , Q3,k (x) = Q3,k , and Q4,k (x) = Q4,k
the bound in (C.13) is then given by
max{

rkl (x) − Q2,kl
rkl (x) + Q1,kl
, 0} ≤ p∗kl (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
pk (x) + Q3,k
pk (x) − Q4,k
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(F.21)

where the lower bounds are obtained by setting Q1,kl = Q4,k = 0 and the upper bounds are
obtained by setting Q2,kl = Q3,k = 0.
Applying (C.18) to (C.14)-(C.17), we have
0 ≤ Q2,kl ≤ rkl (x)
0 ≤ Q1,kl ≤ 1 − rkl (x)
0 ≤ Q3,k ≤ 1 − pk (x)
0 ≤ Q4,k ≤ pk (x)
Following Proposition 3, we also have
Q1,kl + Q4,k ≤ Q
Q2,kl + Q3,k ≤ Q
under Assumption 2(i), and

Q1,kl + Q4,k ≤ Q/K
Q2,kl + Q3,k ≤ Q/K
under Assumption 2(i).
Under Assumption 2(i) or 2(ii) without 6, (C.13)-(C.17) hold, following Corollary 6.1, with
unequal-sized partition, we have

Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/Pr(X = x), 1}

under Assumption Assumption 2(i) or
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Q1,kl (x) + Q4,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}
Q2,kl (x) + Q3,k (x) ≤ min{Q/[K · Pr(X = x)], 1}

under Assumption Assumption 2(ii).
Corollary 6.2 is proved.

Proof for Corollary 6.3
Following the Proof of Proposition 4, Equation (24) and Assumption 3, in the 2×2 transition
matrix case, we have
10
01
11
r22 (x) + (θ11
(x) + θ11
(x) + θ11
(x))
10
11
10
p2 (x) + (θ11 (x) + θ11 (x) + θ12 (x))
10
01
r12 (x) + θ12
(x) − θ11
(x)
=
10
11
10
p1 (x) + (θ11 (x) + θ11 (x) + θ12
(x))
01
10
r21 (x) + θ21 (x) − θ11 (x)
=
10
11
10
p2 (x) − (θ11
(x) + θ11
(x) + θ12
(x))
11
10
01
r22 (x) − (θ11 (x) + θ12 (x) + θ21 (x))
=
10
11
10
p2 (x) − (θ11
(x) + θ11
(x) + θ12
(x))

p∗11 =
p∗12
p∗21
p∗22
0

0

k −k,l −l
Under Assumption 6, θk,l
(x) = θ ∀k, l, k 0 , l0 , then we have
10
01
11
r22 (x) + (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ11
)
10
11
10
p2 (x) + (θ11 + θ11 + θ12 )
10
01
r12 (x) + θ12
− θ11
=
10
11
10
p1 (x) + (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ12
)
01
10
r21 (x) + θ21 − θ11
=
10
11
10
p2 (x) − (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ12
)
11
10
01
r22 (x) − (θ11 + θ12 + θ21 )
=
10
11
10
p2 (x) − (θ11
+ θ11
+ θ12
)

p∗11 =
p∗12
p∗21
p∗22
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Following the same argument in the Proof for Proposition 4, we have
r11 (x) + Q
r11 (x)
≤ p∗11 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
min{p1 (x) + Q, 1}
p1 (x)
r12 (x) − Q
r12 (x) + Q
max{
, 0} ≤ p∗12 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
p1 (x)
p1 (x) + Q
r21 (x) + Q1
r21 (x) − Q
, 0} ≤ p∗21 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
max{
p2 (x) − Q
max{p2 (x) − Q4 , 0}
r22 (x) − Q
r22 (x)
max{
, 0} ≤ p∗22 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
p2 (x)
max{p2 (x) − Q, 0}

where the following constraints must hold
Q̃1 , Q̃4 ≥ 0
Q̃1 + Q̃4 ≤ Q
under Assumption 2(i) or
Q̃1 , Q̃4 ≥ 0
Q̃1 + Q̃4 ≤ Q/2
∗
10
Now suppose without Assumption 6, For P11
(x), the lower bound is obtained when θ11
(x) =
01
11
10
θ11
(x) = θ11
(x) = 0 and θ12
(x) = Q =

Q(x) =

Q
.
P r(X=x)

Q
,
P r{X=x}

or equivalently, Q1,11 (x) = 0, Q3,1 (x) =

And since p∗1 ∈ [0, 1], we have 0 ≤ p1 (x) + Q(x) ≤
p∗11 (x) ≥

1
.
P r{X=x}

Therefore,

r11 (x)
min{p1 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}, 1}

10
10
11
01
The upper bound is obtained when θ11
(x) = θ12
(x) = θ11
(x) = 0 and θ11
(x) = Q(x) =
Q
,
P r{X=x}

or equivalently, Q1,11 (x) = Q =

Q
,
P r{X=x}

Q3,1 (x) = 0. And since p∗11 (x) ∈ [0, 1], we

have
p∗11 (x) ≤ min{

r11 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}
, 1}
p1 (x)
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∗
Therefore, the bound for P11
(x) is given by

r11 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}
r11 (x)
≤ min{
, 1}
min{p1 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}, 1}
p1 (x)
∗
∗
∗
Similarly, for P12
(x), P21
(x) and P22
(x), we have

r12 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
r12 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}
, 0} ≤ p∗12 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
p1 (x)
p1 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}
r21 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
r21 (x) + Q1 (x)
max{
, 0} ≤ p∗21 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
p2 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
max{p2 (x) − Q4 (x), 0}
r22 (x)
r22 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
, 0} ≤ p∗22 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
max{
p2 (x)
max{p2 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}, 0}
max{

where the following constraints must hold
Q̃1 (x), Q̃4 (x) ≥ 0
Q̃1 (x) + Q̃4 (x) ≤ Q/P r{X = x}
under Assumption 2(i) or
Q̃1 (x), Q̃4 (x) ≥ 0
Q̃1 (x) + Q̃4 (x) ≤ Q/2P r{X = x}
under Assumption 2(ii).
Altogether, we have
r11 (x)
r11 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}
≤ min{
, 1}
min{p1 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}, 1}
p1 (x)
r12 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
r12 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}
max{
, 0} ≤ p∗12 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
p1 (x)
p1 (x) + Q/P r{X = x}
r21 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
r21 (x) + Q1 (x)
max{
, 0} ≤ p∗21 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
p2 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
max{p2 (x) − Q4 (x), 0}
r22 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}
r22 (x)
max{
, 0} ≤ p∗22 (x) ≤ min{
, 1}
p2 (x)
max{p2 (x) − Q/P r{X = x}, 0}
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where the following constraints must hold
Q̃1 (x), Q̃4 (x) ≥ 0
Q̃1 (x) + Q̃4 (x) ≤ max{Q/P r{X = x}, 1}
under Assumption 2(i) or
Q̃1 (x), Q̃4 (x) ≥ 0
Q̃1 (x) + Q̃4 (x) ≤ max{Q/2P r{X = x}, 1}
under Assumption 2(ii).
Corollary 6.3 is proved.
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Simulated Misclassification Rates
The total misclassification rate in income data, Q, is unknown, but figures prominently in
the width of the bounds. While one of the advantages of our approach is that the transition
probabilities may be bounded under various assumptions concerning Q, having some prior
knowledge concerning plausible values of Q is important. Here, we discuss one possible way
to obtain reasonable choices of Q.
Prior to discussing our approach, it is worth noting that some previous studies have attempted to quantify the measurement error rate in income data by matching self-reported
income to administrative data. For example, Pedace and Bates (2000) compare self-reported
earnings for over 50,000 respondents in the 1992 SIPP longitudinal file to respondents’ earnings documented in the Social Security Administration’s Summary Earnings Record (SER).
The authors find that 3.6% (6.4%) of the final sample report no (positive) earnings in the
SIPP despite having positive (no) earnings in the SER. A similar exercise in Kapteyn and
Ypma (2007) using Swedish data on older individuals finds that 18.2% (4.6%) report no (positive) earnings in the survey data despite having positive (no) earnings in the administrative
records. While interesting, such results are of limited usefulness in the current context of
estimating transition probabilities since rates of measurement error in self-reported earnings
do not directly translate into misclassification rates when examining transition matrices.
Moreover, the amount of misclassification generated by a given amount of measurement
error will depend on the dimensionality of the transition matrix.
In light of this, we employ a simulation-based approach to quantify Q when the data
is discretized into a different number of equal-sized partitions. To proceed, we utilize a
structural model for income dynamics and measurement error based on an AR(1) model as
in Lee et al. (2017). Note, while Lee et al. (2017) rely on the model to assess mobility, we
only rely on the model to suggest plausible values of the misclassification rate, Q.
The model for income dyanmics is given by

∗
ln (yit∗ ) = γ ln(yi,t−1
) + αi + εit , t = 1, ..., T
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(F.22)

∗
where yit∗ is the true income of household i at time t, yi,t−1
is the true income at time t − 1,

αi is a time invariant household-specific intercept, and εit is an idiosyncratic error term.
The initial condition is drawn from the stationary distribution of y, given by
∗
ln(yi0
)

iid
∼ N



αi
σα2
σε2
,
+
1 − γ (1 − γ)2 1 − γ 2


,

(F.23)

where σα2 and σε2 are the variances of α and ε, respectively. The fixed effect, α, is drawn
from a uniform distribution, given by
iid
αi ∼ U(αl , αu ).

(F.24)

The mean of α, α = 0.5(αl + αu ), is chosen to pin down the expected value of ln(y ∗ ) for a
given choice of γ as
∗
E[ln(y )] =

α
1−γ

assuming E[εit ] = 0. The bounds on α are given by

αl = α − κ
αu = α + κ.

implying that σα2 = κ2 /3. The idiosyncratic error, ε, is drawn from a normal distribution,
given by

iid
εit ∼ N 0, σε2 .
The variance of ε is chosen to pin down the varaince of ln(y ∗ ) for a given choice of γas given
in (F.23).
We do not observe true income, yit∗ , but rather mismeasured income, yit . Given that
there is substantial evidence that measurement error is mean-reverting and serially correlated
(Bound and Krueger 1991; Bound et al. 1994; Bollinger and Chandra 2005; Kim and Solon
2005), we express observed income as

139

ln(yit ) = ρ ln(yit∗ ) + ηit ,

(F.25)

where ρ denotes the mean reversion parameter, ρ ∈ (0, 1). The error, ηit , is assumed to be
indepedent of y ∗ and is decomposed into a time invariant and time-varying component as
follows

ηit = ei + vit ,

(F.26)

where Cov(ei , vit ) = 0 and e and v are each normally distributed.
Define the realized measurement error as

µit = ln(yit ) − ln(yit∗ )

(F.27)

= (ρ − 1) ln(yit∗ ) + ηit ,

where

∗
E[µit ] = (ρ − 1) E[ln(y )] + E[ηit ]

Var(µit ) = (ρ − 1)2 Var[ln(y ∗ )] + Var[ηit ]

The mean and variance of η are chosen to pin down the mean and the variance of µ for a
given choice of ρ. Finally, we set

E[ei ] = 0

(F.28)

∗
E[vit ] = E[µit ] − (ρ − 1) E[ln(y )]

(F.29)


σe2 = ζ Var(µit ) − (ρ − 1)2 Var[ln(y ∗ )]

(F.30)


σv2 = (1 − ζ) Var(µit ) − (ρ − 1)2 Var[ln(y ∗ )]

(F.31)
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where σe2 and σv2 are the variances of e and v, respectively.
In sum, we need to choose values for γ (auto-regressive parameter in (F.22)), ρ (meanreverting parameter in (F.25)), κ (variance of fixed effect in (F.24)), ζ (share of measurement
error variance due to time invariant component in (F.30)), and E[µit ] and Var(µit ) (mean and
variance of measurement error in (F.27)). However, instead of directly choosing values for
Var(µit ), we instead choose values for the reliability statistic (Gottschalk and Huynh 2010;
Abowd and Stinson 2013), given as
R=

Var[ln(y ∗ )]
.
Var[ln(y ∗ )] + Var(µit )

(F.32)

The remaining parameters are chosen to pin down E[ln(y ∗ )] and Var[ln(y ∗ )] (mean and
variance of true income in (F.23)).
We consider the following cases

∗
E[ln(y )] = 10

Var[ln(y ∗ )] = 2
E[µit ] = −0.15
(γ, κ) = {(0.9, 0.2), (0.8, 0.45), (0.7, 0.7), (0.6, 0.95)}
(R, ρ) = {(0.95, 0.8), (0.9, 0.7), (0.85, 0.6), (0.8, 0.55)}
ζ = {0.25, 0.50, 0.75}

Note, γ and κ are chosen together to enure that σε2 > 0 and R and ρ are chosen together to
ensure that σe2 , σv2 > 0.
The mean and the variance of ln(y ∗ ) are set at values a bit above those observed in our
self-reported income data. The mean measurement error, E[µit ] = −0.15, is from Gottschalk
and Huynh (2010) and is based on annual earnings of males in the 1996 SIPP panel matched
to tax records and assumes the tax records are correct. In contrast, Gibson and Kim (2010)
use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Validation Study (PSIDVS) based on 1981–1986
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data and find the mean measurement error to range from -0.22 to 0.22 across the different
years. However, in results not shown, Q is not particularly sensitive to this value.
For the reliability statistic, R, Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) and Abowd and Stinson
(2013) both report values around 0.7 when assuming the adminstrative data are correct.
However, when Abowd and Stinson (2013) give equal probability to the SIPP and administrative data being correct, the reliability statistic of the SIPP data rises to above 0.9. Hyslop
and Townsend (2016) perform a similar analysis using survey and administrative data from
New Zealand and report reliability statistics between 0.83 and 0.85. Thus, we consider values of R from 0.8 to 0.95. These values for R then allow us to consider values of ρ from
0.55 to 0.8. This is a reasonable range based on the literature. Specifically, Bound and and
Krueger (1991) and Bollinger (1998) examine the structure of response error when income
is the natural log of annual labor market earnings using the Social Security income data
matched to the 1977 and 1978 Current Population Survey. The authors obtain estimates of
ρ roughly equal to 0.90. However, using the PSIDVS, Gibson and Kim (2010) find much
lower values, with ρ ranging from 0.3 to 0.7. Kim and Solon (2005) discuss a number of
estimates from prior studies, citing values between roughly 0.6 and 0.8.
For the autoregressive parameter, γ, we consider a range from 0.6 to 0.9. Gustavsson
and Österholm (2014) use Swedish longitudinal data on males observed from 1968-2005 to
estimate individual-level time series models of income dynamics. The authors obtain median
values of γ ranging from 0.6 to 0.8 across samples and specifications. Finally, without an a
priori information, we consider a range of values of ζ from 0.25-0.75.
With four values of (γ, κ), four values of (R, ρ), and three values of ζ, we end up with 48
total cases. For each case, we simulate 1000 data sets with N = 10, 000 and T = 100. We
then retain periods t = 97, 100 in order compute transition matrices over four periods. The
choice of N is comparable to the data in our application. The choice of T ensures that initial
conditions play a limited role. The choice of a four-year transition matrix follows from our
application. Finally, we compute the misclassification rate in each of the 1000 data sets for
different dimensions of the transition matrix, K = 2, ..., 5. Denote this misclassification rate
as Q(K).
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Table D1 reports the mean misclassification rates. The following findings stand out.
First, for any value of the parameters, Q(K) unsurprisingly increases significantly with K.
Second, for any given combination of γ, κ, and ζ, Q(K) increases significantly as R and ρ
decrease. This is not surprising since R directly controls the salience of the measurement
error. Howvever, the misclassification rate does not increase linearly across the columns (for
a given ζ). In particular, the misclassification rate increases by roughly 50% as R falls from
0.95 to 0.9, but then only rises marginally as R falls from 0.9 to 0.85. The misclassification
rate then increases by roughly 70% as R falls from 0.85 to 0.80. Third, for any given K,
Q(K) is marginally decreasing with ζ. This holds for all values of γ and ρ. This implies that
misclassification is less likely to occur when the time invariant component of the measurement
error, η, is more salient. Finally, for any given combination of R, ρ, and ζ, Q(K) decreases as
one moves from Panel A to D. As one moves from Panel A to D, γ declines and κ increases.
As γ declines, Var[ln(y ∗ )] declines as shown in (F.23). Because we wish to hold Var[ln(y ∗ )]
constant (and equal to two), σα2 and/or σε2 must increase. The corresponding rise in κ ensures
that some of the increase is due to the fixed effect, α. The fall in the misclassification rate
across the panels of the table implies that misclassification is less likely to occur when income
shocks are less permanent.
As it relates to our application, the assumption of Q = 20% seems reasonable in the case
of tercile transition matrices. The corresponds to roughly the maximum misclassification rate
when K = 3 and the relaiability statistic is at least 0.85. In the case of poverty transition
matrices, we use Q = 10%. This corresponds to roughly the maximum misclassification rate
when K = 2 and the relaiability statistic is at least 0.85.
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